¶1dissenting.
¶2While I have concurred in the judgment of reversal and in the general language of the per curiam opinion I respectfully dissent from Division 7 of the opinion. Section 6 (b) of the Campaign Financing Disclosure Act states: "Where a candidate or campaign committee has accepted contributions or made expenditures prior to the effective date of this Act, the reports required by this *498section shall include such information as the records of the candidate or his committee show, and such information as is otherwise known to the candidate or members of his committee, regarding such prior contributions and expenditures.” (Emphasis supplied.) While we are here concerned only with constitutionality of the Act and not the wisdom thereof, this provision in my opinion is not only unwise but is patently unconstitutional. In my opinion this provision of the Act violates Art. I, Sec. Ill, Par. II of the Georgia Constitution in that it operates retrospectively. The appellants in their brief state: "A careful reading of that section in conjunction with the entire Act clearly reveals that the Act operates only prospectively and does not fall prey to the constitutional proscription of ex post facto and retroactive legislation.” I do not so interpret the Act as it clearly imposes a duty upon a candidate to reveal records of contributions made prior to the effective date of the Act and in fact all contributions made within a twelve-month period prior to the first reporting date on June 29, 1974. The imposition of such an obligation is unconstitutional. I respectfully dissent from the holding to the contrary. However, the deletion of this particular provision of the Act does not destroy the general scheme of the Act.