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← 232 Md. 397 - Craig v. Chenoweth

Craig v. Chenoweth’s Empirical Analysis

1963

Citation profile

33
cited by 33 later decisions
1
states following
May 2013
most recently cited

6 federal appellate · 2 district · 23 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 33 later decisions — most recently May 2013 · most notably Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Scarlett Harbor Associates Ltd. Partnership (1996), 114 Md. App. 357 - S.B. Thomas, Inc. v. Thompson (1997)

6 federal appellate · 2 district · 23 state decisions

90196319701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Wilhelm v. State of Maryland Traffic Safety Commission · Kujawa v. Baltimore Transit Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[t]here are, unquestionably, many occasions where the causal connection between a defendant’s negligence and a disability claimed by a plaintiff does not need to be established by expert testimony. Particularly is this true when the disability develops coincidentally with, or within a reasonable time after, the negligent act, or where the causal connection is clearly apparent from the illness itself and the circumstances surrounding it, or where the cause of the injury relates to matters of common experience, knowledge, or observation of laymen. However, where the cause of an injury claimed to have resulted from a negligent act is a complicated medical question involving fact[-]finding which properly falls within the province of medical experts ... proof of the cause must be made by such witnesses.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““The appellants’ other contention is that ‘there is uncontradicted evidence from which a conclusion of permanency may be drawn’ and that therefore it was error to instruct the jury that they could not return an award for a permanent injury of any type. Again, we are constrained to disagree. The applicable rule as to proof of permanency of injuries was recently set out in the case of Kujawa v. Baltimore Transit Co., 224 Md. 195 , 167 A. 2d 96 (1961), wherein it was stated on page 206 of 224 Md. that, ‘[cjertainly evidence tending to show only a possibility of permanency is not sufficient to take that issue to the jury.’ In the present case there was no medical testimony showing, or even tending to show, that the injuries suffered by Mrs. Craig were permanent in nature. Dr. Irey, when asked how long treatment would last, stated ‘[t]hat would be a guess * * *. It. would be hard to say,’ and that he could not put any time limit on the duration of the injuries. When the appellants called a Dr. Reynolds (a specialist to whom Mrs. Craig had been referred for treatment to her neck and shoulder), he was not asked whether the injuries were permanent, but it is significant that he did testify that he had discharged Mrs. Craig from formal treatment prior to trial because of her improvement and stated his belief that any further treatment could be administered by the appellant wife herself. Thus there was insufficient evidence to take the issue of permanency to the jury and the trial judg”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “The rule, and the many authorities cited in support of it in Wilhelm , make it clear that the causal connection, if any existed, between the appellee’s negligence and the paralysis of Mrs. Craig’s hand was not of the type which is provable without medical testimony. The paralysis did not occur coincidentally with, or within what we feel was a reasonable time, under the facts of this case, after the accident had occurred. The causal connection was not clearly apparent from the paralysis itself or the circumstances surrounding it, nor was the connection a matter within the common knowledge of laymen. That this is so is manifest from the fact that the appellants’ own medical expert was unable to say that there was any causal connection between the accident and the paralysis, thus effectually precluding any conclusion that this was a matter clearly apparent to laymen or within their common experience and knowledge. (Emphasis supplied).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.