232 Minn.
Volume 232 — Minnesota Reports
48 opinions
- 232 Minn. 1In Re Application for Discipline of Rerat (1950)
- 232 Minn. 68Dougherty v. Holm (1950)
- 232 Minn. 82Shaw v. Utecht (1950)
- 232 Minn. 91Norris Grain Co. v. Seafarers' International Union of North America (1950)
- 232 Minn. 116State Ex Rel. Perkins v. Utecht (1950)
- 232 Minn. 118Gustafson v. Holm (1950)
- 232 Minn. 128Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Spaeth (1950)
<bold>Taxation — franchise tax — nonliability therefor — telegraph</bold> <bold>company subject to gross earnings tax</bold>. <block_quote> A telegraph company which has paid gross earnings taxes for the calendar years 1941, 1942, and 1943 pursuant to Minn. St. 1941, § <cross_reference>295.32</cross_reference>, is not liable for franchise taxes imposed by Minn. St. 1941, § <cross_reference>290.02</cross_reference>, for said calendar years, following The Pullman Co. v. Commr. of Taxation, <cross_reference>223 Minn. 96</cross_reference>, <cross_reference>25 N.W.2d 838</cross_reference>, holding that the franchise tax imposed by Minn. St. 1941, § <cross_reference>290.02</cross_reference>, was an ad valorem property tax.</block_quote>
- 232 Minn. 134Youngdale v. Eastvold (1950)
<bold>United States — representative in congress — election —</bold> <bold>jurisdiction of congress</bold>. <block_quote> 1. Our state courts have no jurisdiction over the election of representatives to congress, but congress is its own judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members.</block_quote> <bold>Election — representative in congress — nomination —</bold> <bold>jurisdiction of state courts</bold>. <block_quote> 2. State courts have jurisdiction to the extent provided by law over the nomination of candidates for representative to congress.</block_quote> <bold>Same — filing of notice of contest — necessity therefor</bold>. <block_quote> 3. Filing of proper petition or notice as required by law is jurisdictional in election contests.</block_quote> <bold>Same — contest — jurisdiction of courts</bold>. <block_quote> 4. The authority of courts to entertain election contests is purely statutory. Absent statutory authorization, the courts are without jurisdiction to determine election contests.</block_quote> <bold>Same — notice of contest — place of filing</bold>. <block_quote> 5. Filing of petition for contest in county of contestee's residence confers no jurisdiction upon court under M.S.A. <cross_reference>208.07</cross_reference>, which requires notice of contest to be filed in county of contestant's residence.</block_quote> <bold>Same — contest — errors in counting ballots — statute</bold>. <block_quote> 6. M.S.A. <cross_reference>208.01</cross_reference> does not authorize an election contest for mere errors in counting ballots.</block_quote>
- 232 Minn. 144Wolff v. Lerum (1950)
- 232 Minn. 149Danielson v. Fitzsimmons (1950)
- 232 Minn. 152Bjerketvedt v. Jacobson (1950)
<bold>Adverse possession — establishment — burden of proof</bold>. <block_quote> 1. The burden of proving essential facts which create title by prescription rests upon him who asserts it.</block_quote> <bold>Boundary — establishment — practical location — period of</bold> <bold>acquiescence in location</bold>. <block_quote> 2. In boundary-line disputes, the practical location of the boundary lines can be established by showing that the location relied upon has been acquiesced in for a sufficient period of time under the statute of limitations to bar right of entry.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — by adverse possession</bold>. <block_quote> 3. A boundary line is established by adverse possession where the disseizors or predecessors in title, for more than 15 years prior to the commencement of the action, have been in hostile, open, actual, continuous, and exclusive possession of the premises in question.</block_quote> <bold>Appeal and error — review — findings of fact — sufficiency</bold> <bold>of evidence to support findings</bold>. <block_quote> 4. The supreme court interferes with the findings of the trial court<page_number>Page 153</page_number> only where the evidence taken as a whole furnishes no substantial support for them. There may be some evidence reasonably tending to support the findings, and yet the evidence as a whole may be manifestly and palpably contrary to the findings. <italic>Held</italic> that while the findings here could have been different there was evidence reasonably tending to support them, and, taken as a whole, the evidence was not manifestly and palpably contrary to the findings.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — admission of incompetent evidence —</bold> <bold>prejudicial effect</bold>. <block_quote> 5. Where issues of fact are tried by a court without a jury and incompetent evidence is received, but the competent evidence is sufficient to support the findings of fact and there is no reasonable ground for inferring from the character of the incompetent evidence that it was or might have been a material factor in the court's determination of the facts, the admission of such evidence is not reversible error.</block_quote>
- 232 Minn. 160Hagsten v. Simberg (1950)
- 232 Minn. 168Goette v. Howe (1950)
- 232 Minn. 175State v. Labo's Direct Service (1950)
- 232 Minn. 183Graf v. Root (1950)
- 232 Minn. 187Henry Simons Lumber Co. v. Simons (1950)
- 232 Minn. 196State v. Masteller (1950)
- 232 Minn. 202State v. Brandvold (1950)
- 232 Minn. 203LaBere v. Palmer (1950)
- 232 Minn. 207In Re Dissolution of E. C. Warner Co. (1950)
- 232 Minn. 217Locals 1140 & 1145, United Electrical, Radio & MacHine Workers of America v. United Electrical, Radio & MacHine Workers of America (1950)
- 232 Minn. 234Hasse v. Hasse (1950)
- 232 Minn. 238Schrader v. Kriesel (1950)
- 232 Minn. 250Sisco v. Paulson (1950)
- 232 Minn. 255Lind v. Nebel (1950)
- 232 Minn. 259Lamb v. South Unit Jehovah's Witnesses (1950)
- 232 Minn. 266State v. End (1950)
- 232 Minn. 275Steller v. Thomas (1950)
- 232 Minn. 292Kowalke v. Lutheran Welfare Society (1950)
- 232 Minn. 292In Re Guardianship of Kowalke (1950)
- 232 Minn. 312Dahlin v. Kron (1950)
- 232 Minn. 323Thon v. Erickson (1950)
- 232 Minn. 327In Re Discipline of King (1950)
- 232 Minn. 329In re To Enlarge, County Ditch No. 27 (1951)
- 232 Minn. 336Meagher v. Hirt (1951)
- 232 Minn. 342State Ex Rel. Huntley School District No. 4 JT. v. Schweickhard (1951)
- 232 Minn. 347Loining v. Kilgore (1951)
- 232 Minn. 350Senske v. Fairmont & Waseca Canning Co. (1951)
<bold>Workmen's compensation — special compensation fund — control</bold> <bold>ever disbursements — function of state treasurer</bold>. <block_quote> 1. The state treasurer as custodian is possessed of no discretionary power, by way of stipulation or otherwise, over the disbursement of total disability benefits from the special compensation fund, but is vested only with the ministerial duty to disburse its proceeds <italic>as directed by the</italic> <italic>industrial commission</italic>.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — nature of claim for total disability benefits</bold>. <block_quote> 2. An employe's claim for total disability benefits from the special fund is not in the nature of a claim against the state which may be compromised and settled by the attorney general.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — control over disbursements</bold>. <block_quote> 3. Control over the allowance of disability benefits from such publicly administered special fund is wholly vested in the industrial commission, and no other official or department, in behalf of the state or in behalf of anyone else, has such ownership in, or supervision over, the fund as to empower them to compromise disability benefits or to make recommendations which are a material factor in the exercise of the industrial commission's direction.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — commutation to lump sum of periodic benefit</bold> <bold>payments</bold>. <block_quote> 4. Assuming that the liability of the special fund for total disability benefits has been established, compensation benefits periodically payable from such fund may, in a proper case, be commuted to one or more lump-sum payments.</block_quote> <bold>Same — authorization for settlement of disability benefits by</bold> <bold>stipulation</bold>. <block_quote> 5. The only authorization for a settlement of disability benefits by stipulation of the parties is found in M.S.A. 176.69.</block_quote><page_number>Page 351</page_number> <bold>Same — stipulation for settlement of disability compensation</bold> <bold>— approval of industrial commission</bold>. <block_quote> 6. A written and signed stipulation of the parties for the settlement of disability compensation, if it does not purport to establish such finality of settlement as to preclude a reopening of any award thereon under § <cross_reference>176.60</cross_reference>, and if it is made subject to the approval of the industrial commission and in conformity with the compensation act, <italic>except as to amount</italic>, and further if it is fair and reasonable, may be approved by the industrial commission and given validity by the making of an award thereon.</block_quote> <bold>Same — award pursuant to approved settlement — right to</bold> <bold>further benefits from special compensation fund</bold>. <block_quote> 7. If an award is once made on a properly approved settlement, such an award may be considered as establishing that the employe's right to compensation for which the employer alone is responsible has been exhausted, and to provide, therefore, the necessary prerequisite to a consideration of whether the employe is entitled to receive further benefits from the special fund by reason of a combined disability which is both permanent and total.</block_quote> <bold>Same — lump-sum settlement — welfare of employe</bold>. <block_quote> 8. In adjudging whether a lump-sum settlement is fair and reasonable, the commission must keep in mind the welfare of the employe; and, although he is not entitled to any undue advantage, a settlement which is improvident for him is not fair and reasonable.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — same</bold>. <block_quote> 9. Commutation, or payment in a lump sum, although authorized by statute, is a departure from the normal mode of periodic payment of disability benefits as contemplated by the compensation act, and should be allowed only with a cautious regard for the welfare of the employe and the protection of the public.</block_quote> <bold>Same — compensation settlements in general</bold>. <block_quote> 10. Compensation settlements, as authorized and limited by § 176.69, are compatible with the public welfare and in the interest of all parties concerned, inclusive of that of the disabled employe, and should be favored and not viewed with a jaundiced eye, in that they avoid the delays of litigation and expedite the granting of relief.</block_quote><page_number>Page 352</page_number> <bold>Same — injury aggravating prior arthritic condition —</bold> <bold>evidence — speculative medical opinions</bold>. <block_quote> 11. Medical opinions which do nothing more than speculate on the possibility that an injury may have aggravated a prior arthritic condition provide no basis for a finding that such aggravation resulted.</block_quote> <bold>Same — condition not constituting preexisting disability —</bold> <bold>arteriosclerosis existing independently of accidental injury</bold>. <block_quote> 12. Degenerative diseases such as arteriosclerosis <italic>which progress normally and exist independently of an</italic> <italic>accidental injury</italic> do not constitute a preexisting disability within the meaning of the compensation act.</block_quote> <bold>Same — lump-sum settlement — use of proceeds</bold>. <block_quote> 13. If the proceeds of a lump-sum settlement are to be depleted materially by devoting the same to the payment of debts, such settlement is improvident and is neither fair nor reasonable within the meaning of the act; furthermore, such lump-sum settlement becomes then by indirection a device for circumventing the express provisions of § <cross_reference>176.23</cross_reference>, which state that claims for compensation owned by an injured employe shall not be assignable and shall be exempt from seizure or sale for the payment of any debt or liability except as the compensation act may otherwise provide.</block_quote>
- 232 Minn. 365Borstad v. Ulstad (1951)
- 232 Minn. 373Gilbertson v. Gross (1951)
- 232 Minn. 377State v. Northwestern Vocational Institute, Inc. (1951)
<bold>Taxation — exemptions — private educational institutions</bold>. <block_quote> 1. Constitutional tax exemption for private educational institutions created by Minn. Const. art. <cross_reference>9</cross_reference>, § <cross_reference>1</cross_reference>, was intended to foster the public benefits accruing from the maintenance of private educational institutions which supply some substantial part of the educational training intended to be provided by various publicly supported schools, academies, colleges, and seminaries of learning, thereby lessening the tax burden imposed as the result of our public educational system.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — same</bold>. <block_quote> 2. A private educational institution does not automatically fall within this constitutional exemption merely by designating itself a <italic>vocational institute, a</italic> <italic>college</italic>, a <italic>seminary of learning</italic>, or other like term. To justify a finding that it is exempt, the evidence must establish that it offers courses which may be readily assimilated into those of a publicly supported elementary school, high school, college, seminary of learning, or university.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — same</bold>. <block_quote> 3. Where evidence established that private educational institution did not provide courses similar to or capable of being assimilated by those provided in our public educational system, but, on the contrary, offered only elementary training in radio and electric repair and maintenance service, <italic>held</italic> that trial court properly denied such institution tax exemption as a seminary of learning.</block_quote> <bold>No conflict with decisions of foreign jurisdictions</bold>. <block_quote> 4. Determination of issue presented here is not in conflict with decisions of many foreign jurisdictions.</block_quote>
- 232 Minn. 383Roske v. Ilykanyics (1951)
- 232 Minn. 394Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co. (1951)
- 232 Minn. 403Hanson v. Homeland Insurance Co. of America (1951)
- 232 Minn. 408Muirhead v. Johnson (1951)
- 232 Minn. 416Krusemark v. Krusemark (1951)
- 232 Minn. 422Todeva v. Oliver Iron Mining Co. (1951)
- 232 Minn. 435Gibson v. Nelson (1950)