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232 N.C. 575

61 S.E.2d 612

State v. Best

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Decided November 1, 1950

Supreme Court of North Carolina · decided 1950-11-01

Relies on State v. . Holbrook · State v. . Bell · State v. . Smith

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1950-11-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 18 later decisions — most recently March 1998

18 state decisions

6019501960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Stacy, C. J.

¶1 The question for decision is whether the State’s evidence survives the demurrer and suffices to carry the case to the jury on any or all of the counts in the bill of indictment. The trial court answered! in the affirmative in respect of all three counts, and we approve.

¶2*577 The defendant was present, aiding and abetting the witness Godfrey at the time he entered the house and brought out the stolen chattels. This, inculpates him as a principal in the crime then being committed. S. v. Johnson, 226 N.C. 671, 40 S.E. 2d 113; S. v. Bell, 205 N.C. 225, 171 S.E. 50; S. v. Whitehurst and Manning, 202 N.C. 631, 163 S.E. 683; S. v. Jarrell, 141 N.C. 722, 53 S.E. 127.

¶3 The fact that there was no burglarious breaking and entering at the time can avail the defendant naught. S. v. Munford, 227 N.C. 132, 41 S.E. 2d 201. Indeed, the prior breaking and entering by Godfrey, when alone or when the defendant was not with him, has no bearing on the case. G.S. 14-54.

¶4 S. v. Mumford, supra, speaks directly to the point: “Under the statute it is unlawful to break into a dwelling with intent to commit a felony therein. It is likewise unlawful to enter, with like intent, without'a breaking. Hence, evidence of a breaking, when available, is always relevant, but absence of such evidence does not constitute a fatal defect of proof.”

¶5 Then, too, the defendant’s possession of the fruits of the crime recently after its commission justified the inference of guilt on his trial for larceny. S. v. Holbrook, 223 N.C. 622, 27 S.E. 2d 725.

¶6 Moreover, there is ample evidence to support the third count in the bill of receiving stolen goods knowing them to have been stolen. G.S. 14-71; S. v. Oxendine, 223 N.C. 659, 27 S.E. 2d 814. This would sustain the judgment and repel the motion for nonsuit, even if the first two counts were eliminated. S. v. Smith, 226 N.C. 738, 40 S.E. 2d 363; S. v. Graham, 224 N.C. 347, 30 S.E. 2d 151; S. v. Toole, 106 N.C. 736, 11 S.E. 168.

¶7 No sufficient reason has been shown to justify an interference with the results of the trial. Hence, the verdict and judgment will be upheld.

¶8 No error.

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