Kerby v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

15 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““. . . [I]n the case at hand Kerby’s actual subjective intent was of controlling importance. Guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime, for Kerby would have committed no offense if he believed his statements to be true. In such circumstances proof of other similar conduct, not too remote in time, is admissible to aid the jury in determining the intent of the accused. ‘So, when it is material to show that a given act was done with a fraudulent intention, as, for example, in a prosecution for obtaining goods by false pretenses, other disconnected false pretenses in which the presence of fraud is recognized may be proved solely to show the intent. To illustrate: Where the accused had used a fraudulent abstract of title to induce one to sell him goods in exchange for real estate, it may be shown that the accused had on the same day employed the same means to induce another person to sell him goods.’ Underhill, Criminal Evidence, (5th Ed.), § 208. We applied the principle in Myers v. Martin, 168 Ark. 1028 , 272 S. W. 856 , which although a civil case, is basically similar to the present case. There in a purchaser’s action to recover damages sustained in the purchase of certain bank stock as a result of the seller’s fraudulent representations it was held that the plaintiff could introduce proof to show that the defendant had made like misrepresentations in selling shares of the same stock to others. ‘It tended to show a motive and a general scheme to induce people to in”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Tolbert v. State

2. ““The appellant’s second contention is that the court erred in permitting the prosecution to prove Kerby’s misrepresentations about matters relating solely to the future, such as the statement that the stock would increase in value within a year. It is conceded that the record contains sufficient evidence of misstatements of existing facts to support a conviction, but the appellant insists that the references to future events should have been excluded altogether. This contention is not sound. It is true that misrepresentations relating solely to the future do not constitute an offense. Conner v. State, 137 Ark. 123 , 206 S. W. 747 . It does not follow, however, that such proof must be excluded from the jury’s consideration if it is otherwise relevant. Here the testimony was relevant, as it assisted the jury in understanding all the circumstances surrounding the sale of the stock. As we said in Baker v. State, 4 Ark. 56 : ‘All the authorities concur, that the intention and design of the party are best explained by a complete view of every part of his conduct at the time, and not merely from the proof of a single and isolated act or declaration.’ In its charge to the jury the court adequately protected Kerby’s rights by an instruction which explained that the false representations ‘must be representations of the existence of some fact or facts.’ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Davis v. State