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← 233 CONN 174 - State v. Wassil

State v. Wassil’s Empirical Analysis

1995

Citation profile

34
cited by 34 later decisions
3
states following
April 2017
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 32 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 34 later decisions — most recently April 2017 · most notably United States v. Savage (2008), State v. McMahon (2001)

2 federal appellate · 32 state decisions

160199520002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 21 U.S.C. § 802 (§ 102 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 841 (§ 401 of the Controlled Substances Act)

Relies on Santoni v. United States · National Labor Relations Board v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n · Conway v. Statesman Mortgage Co. · School Board of Nassau County, Florida, Et Al. v. Arline · Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““The concept of proximate cause incorporates the notion that an accused may be charged with a criminal offense even though his acts were not the immediate cause of death. An act or omission to act is the proximate cause of death when it substantially and materially contributes, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient, intervening cause, to the resulting death____ It is unnecessary for ‘proximate cause’ purposes that the particular kind of harm that results from the defendant’s act be intended by him. In many situations giving rise to criminal liability, the harm that results is unintended, yet is directly or indirectly caused by an act of the defendant. In such cases, where the death or injury caused by the defendant’s conduct is a foreseeable and natural result of that conduct, the law considers the chain of legal causation unbroken and holds the defendant criminally responsible.” State v. Spates, [ 176 Conn. 227 , 405 A.2d 656, 660 (1978)]. The defendant’s conduct need not be the predominating cause or the substantial factor in bringing about the victim’s injuries, so long as his conduct was “a cause that necessarily set in operation the factors that accomplish the injury.” State v. Leroy, [ 232 Conn. 1 , 653 A.2d 161, 166 (1995)].”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “To prove causation, the state is required to demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of the victim's death — i.e., that the defendant's conduct contributed substantially and materially, in a direct manner, to the victim's injuries and that the defendant's conduct was not superseded by an efficient intervening cause that produced the injuries.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “'sale' is any form of delivery!,] which includes barter, exchange or gift, or offer therefor .../' see Conn. Gen.Stat. § 21a-240(50), and that”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.