¶1dissenting.
¶2I have joined the dissent in this case written by Justice Undercofler because I think it is correct and because I believe the judgment of this court should be *259controlled by the authorities cited in that dissent.
¶3However, because of the far reaching implications of the majority decision, I feel compelled to state several additional reasons why I consider the majority opinion to be erroneous.
¶4The fatal flaw which I see in the reasoning of the majority is the implicit assumption it makes that the legislature has changed the wise and historic public policy of this state in its official attitude toward marriage by the mere addition of another ground for divorce. As long as the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, our state has always indicated it had an interest in preserving the marriages of its citizens. Since at least 1867, this court has consistently said that a trial judge has a serious duty to see that a party seeking a divorce is entitled to it under the law and the evidence before a divorce is granted. See Creamer v. Creamer, 36 Ga. 618.
¶5The statute there involved requires the judge, in an undefended case, to see that the grounds are legal and sustained by proof or to appoint the solicitor general (now district attorney) or some other attorney to discharge that duty of the judge. This same statute remains on the books today as Code Ann. § 30-129. Yet, a majority of this court has effectively said by its decision that the state no longer has any interest in the marriages of its citizens. A married person can now get a divorce after 30 days by a judgment on the pleadings without ever coming to court to face the judge and persuade him by sworn testimony that a divorce ought to be granted. I personally view this as grievous error because I believe it will encourage more divorces by impetuous couples who have a spat, file for a divorce and then let false pride carry them through to a quick final divorce simply because their lawyers have filed the papers in court.
¶6In addition, I view the majority decision as directly violative of the provisions of Code Ann. § 30-113 which states that the "allegations of the pleadings shall be established by evidence.” Where did the legislature say it intended to change these statutes and the public policy of this state so that the state no longer has any interest in the marriage? I cannot find it, nor does the majority reveal it. All the new statute (Ga. L. 1973, p. 557) says is *260that a divorce is now authorized upon the additional ground that the marriage is irretrievably broken. This ground, like the pre-existing grounds, must still be proven and a divorce case brought on this ground is subject to the same procedural rules applicable to divorce cases brought on other grounds. Why? — Because the legislature did not change the existing divorce statutes and the mere addition of the new ground did not repeal them.
¶7One inescapable irony of the majority decision is that proof the marriage is irretrievably broken actually requires the trial judge to be satisfied that there is no reasonable hope or expectation of a reconciliation between the parties. See Harwell v. Harwell, 233 Ga. 89. I believe many trial judges consistently make this inquiry in divorce cases brought on other grounds although it is not a part of the required proof in those cases. Some marriages can be saved by this simple inquiry of the applicant for divorce who, upon being confronted with the thought of a possible reconciliation, on reflection will ask for a postponement and then not return to pursue a final decree. For the first time in Georgia, the trial judge is charged with inquiring into the reasonable possibility of reconciliation between the parties when a divorce is sought on the ground the marriage is irretrievably broken. The irony is that, by the majority decision of this court today, the trial judge will not have to see or hear in court the parties involved in the divorce.
¶8Thus I believe divorce cases will become more routine and impersonal and will soon be handled as default cases despite the provisions of Code Ann. § 30-113. Those people who might try to reconcile their differences and attempt to save their marriages if a superior court judge suggested such a possibility to them in open court will not do it now because the judge will not see them. The lawyers will simply file the papers in court and the marriage will proceed to final severance in an automatic fashion.
¶9I cannot believe the legislature intended such fundamental changes in the policy of our state toward marriages, and, therefore, feel I must dissent to the majority decision which sweeps aside the important *261public interest in marriage and divorce which has always been embodied in our law.