Taylor v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Under the law applicable in this case, the defendant, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, may earn time off the period of incarceration imposed through the award of good conduct time. Prison authorities may award good conduct time ■ to a prisoner who exhibits good behavior, diligence in carrying out prison work assignments, and attempts at rehabilitation. If a prisoner engages in misconduct, prison authorities may also take away all or part of any good conduct time earned by the prisoner. It is also possible that the length of time for which the defendant will be imprisoned might be reduced by the award of parole. Under the law applicable in this case, if the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, she will not become eligible for parole until the actual time served plus any good conduct time earned equals one-fourth of the sentence imposed or 15 years, whichever is less. Eligibility for parole does not guarantee that parole will be granted. It cannot accurately be predicted how the parole law and good conduct time might be applied to this defendant if she is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, because the application of these laws will depend on decisions made by prison and parole authorities. You may consider the existence of the parole law and good conduct time. However, you are not to consider the extent to which good conduct time may be awarded to or forfeited by this particular defendant. You are not to consider the manner in which the parole law may be a”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Breanna Spencer v. State

2. “In Hawkins v. State, [ 135 S.W.3d 72, 84 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) ] we explained that “[i]t was not improper for the prosecutor to accurately restate the law given in the jury charge.” [footnote omitted] In the case before us, the prosecutor did not convey any information beyond what was properly contained in the charge when he explained how the parole eligibility rules set out in the charge worked with forty, sixty and seventy-five year sentences. The explanation simply ensured that the jury understood the language set out in the instructions. Nor do we ascribe any significance to the prosecutor’s passing use of the words “defendant” and “he” in the course of giving his explanation. The statutory instruction itself uses the words “defendant” and “he” when describing the rules of parole eligibility. Nothing in this case indicates that the prosecutor’s explanations went beyond an attempt to clarify the meaning of the jury instructions.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Waters v. State

3. “State: What’s the appropriate sentence for him? What’s the appropriate sentence when under the applicable law in this case if the Defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment he will not become eligible for parole until the actual time served plus any good conduct time— Defense: Your Honor— State: —equals one-fourth of the sentence— The Court: One moment, Mr. Driver. Defense: We’re going to object that that’s an improper argument on considering parole law. The Court: The objection is overruled. State: You can read it for yourself. When the actual time served plus any good conduct time equals one-fourth of the sentence imposed.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ballard v. State