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← 233 U.S. 250 - El Paso Brick Co. v. McKnight

El Paso Brick Co. v. McKnight’s Empirical Analysis

233 U.S. 250 · 1914

Citation profile

51
cited by 51 later decisions
6
cited 6 times by the Supreme Court
2
states following
March 1997
most recently cited

12 federal appellate · 11 district · 8 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 51 later decisions (6 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 1997 · most notably Union Oil Co of California v. Smith (1919), Butte & Superior Copper Co. v. Clark-Montana Realty Co. (1919)

12 federal appellate · 11 district · 8 state decisions

160191419201930194019501960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Cornelius v. Kessel · Hammer v. Garfield Mining & Milling Co. · Oregon Ry Nav Co v. Oregonian Ry Co · Parsons v. Venzke

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 51 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““1. Locators of mining claims have the exclusive right of possession of all the surface included within the exterior limits of their claims so long as they make the improvements or do the annual assessment work required by the Revised Statutes, § 2324, U.S.Comp. Stat.1901, p. 1426 [ 30 U.S.C.A. § 28 ], The law, however, provides (Rev.Stat. §§ 2325, 2333, U.S.Comp.Stat.1901, pp. 1429, 1433 [ 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 29 , 37]) a means by which the locator can pay the purchase price fixed by statute and convert the defeasible possessory title into a fee simple. * * * “2. In the present case the Brick ■Company’s application for a patent was filed, each of the several forms of notice required by statute was given, no adverse claim was filed, the purchase price was paid to the government, and .a final receipt was issued by the local land office. The entry by the local land officer issuing the final receipt was in the nature of a judgment in rem (Wight v. Dubois, [C.C.] 21 F. 693 ), and determined that the Brick Company’s original locations were valid, and that everything necessary to keep them in force, including the annual assessment work, had been done. It also ■adjudicated that no adverse claim existed and that the Brick Company was •entitled to a patent. “From that date, and until the entry was lawfully canceled, the Brick Company was in possession under an equitable title, and to be treated as ‘though the patent had been delivered to’ it. Dahl v. Raunheim, 132 U.S. [260] 262, 10 S.Ct. 7”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “The government does not deal at arm's length with the settler or locator and whenever it appears that there has been a compliance with the substantial requirements of the law, irregularities are waived or permission is given, even on appeal, to cure them by supplemental proofs. United States v. Marshall Silver Mining Co., 129 U.S. [579], 587, 9 S.Ct. 343, 32 L.Ed. [734], 737.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.