J-A06007-20
2020 PA Super 141
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
WALLACE CARTER
Appellee No. 154 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered December 13, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Criminal Division at No: CP-46-CR-0004959-2017
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STABILE, J.: Filed: June 16, 2020
The Commonwealth appeals from the December 13, 2018 order entered
in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County granting the motion to
suppress filed by Appellee, Wallace Carter (“Carter”). The Commonwealth
claims trial court error for granting Carter’s motion on grounds not raised in
his motion to suppress or at his suppression hearing. Finding merit in the
Commonwealth’s argument, we reverse and remand.
In conjunction with its December 13, 2018 order, the suppression court
issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Findings of Fact,
supported by citation to the suppression hearing transcript, are summarized
as follows:
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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In the early morning hours of June 12, 2016, a shooting occurred in
Norristown. Detective Charles Leeds (“Leeds”) responded to the scene
approximately ten minutes later. Leeds took on an investigative lead
regarding the shooting.
At the scene, Leeds encountered Carter, who was suffering from a
gunshot wound—an entry wound to the lower-left abdomen and an exit wound
in his back. Carter was under the influence of PCP, crack, and alcohol, and
was visibly intoxicated.
Carter was transported to Penn Presbyterian Medical Center in
Philadelphia where he underwent surgery. Leeds was in contact with hospital
personnel who kept Leeds informed of Carter’s condition and progress. During
the daytime hours of June 14, 2016, after receiving information that Carter
was conscious and alert, Leeds and Corporal Nicholas Dumas (“Dumas”)
traveled to the hospital. They spoke with hospital personnel before entering
Carter’s room in the ICU where Carter was sleeping and was hooked up to
numerous medical devices. Upon their entry to his room, Carter awoke. He
“was under the influence of some kind of pain medication” at the time.
Leeds and Dumas were wearing detective uniforms identifying them as
Norristown Police Detectives. Their badges were displayed and both had their
service weapons openly and visibly holstered on their hips.
Leeds and Dumas positioned themselves on either side of Carter’s bed.
Leeds, who deemed Carter “alert and conscious,” began to speak with Carter
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and asked if Carter knew who Leeds was. Carter responded, “Yeah, Leeds.”
Leeds then asked if Carter knew why he was in the hospital. Carter said he
was in the hospital because he had been shot.
Leeds then read Carter his Miranda1 rights. Leeds ordinarily has
interrogation subjects sign a Miranda waiver when they agree to waive their
rights but did not do so in this instance because Carter was connected to
numerous medical devices. Instead, Leeds opted to secure only Carter’s
verbal confirmation and waiver of his Miranda rights. Carter stated he
understood his Miranda rights and he was willing to speak with Leeds.
Leeds then began to question Carter and Carter answered Leeds’
questions, giving appropriate responses. The conversation was described as
cordial and calm and Carter appeared clearheaded as he gave concise
responses that made sense. During the conversation, neither Leeds nor
Dumas raised his voice, unholstered or brandished a firearm, physically
touched Carter, or made any threats or promises to Carter. At no point, did
Leeds or Dumas discuss how charges against Carter would proceed. It was
stipulated that the encounter in Carter’s hospital room was a custodial
interrogation. See Findings of Fact, 12/13/18, at ¶¶ 1-26.
The interrogation yielded a confession from Carter. In his brief, Carter
contends he was the victim of the June 12, 2016 shooting. Appellee’s Brief at
____________________________________________
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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1 (citing Notes of Testimony, Suppression Hearing, 11/29/18, at 8-10, 22).
The Commonwealth contends,
[Carter] pulled a gun on the victims, a struggle ensued, one of the
victims wrestled the gun away from [Carter] and warned him to
stay away. [Carter] then charged him and was shot. [Carter]
was charged with two counts of simple assault, possession of a
firearm with the intent to employ it criminally, recklessly
endangering another person, terroristic threats, and person not to
possess a firearm.
Commonwealth Brief at 4-5.
Carter filed a motion to suppress, styled “Motion to Suppress
Statements Made While He Was Confined to a Hospital Bed and Extracted
Absent a Knowing, Voluntary and Intelligent Waiver of his Miranda Rights.”
In his motion, he asserted his confession was obtained only “as a result of a
custodial interrogation that occurred while [] Carter was medicated, connected
to medical devices, confined to a hospital bed and questioned under
circumstances in which he could not have knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently waived his Miranda rights.” Motion to Suppress, 9/17/18, at 1.
He claimed he was Mirandized moments after waking from sleep; he was
medicated; and his body “was physically entwined with multiple medical
devices,” which prevented him from signing any written statement that might
confirm he was able to understand the “alleged ‘Miranda warnings.’” Id. at
2, ¶¶ 9-13. He asserted that his “‘physical and psychological state’ while
medicated and confined to a hospital bed during treatment for gunshot
wounds necessarily suggests that he could not have knowingly, voluntarily
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and intelligently waived his rights.” Id. at 2, ¶ 14 (citing Commonwealth v.
D’Amato, 526 A.2d 300, 304-05 (Pa. 1987)). “Likewise, the ‘condition of,’ []
Carter’s ‘detention,’ surrounded by two police officers while physically confined
to bed by medical devices, suggests that he could not have knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently waived his rights.” Id. at 3, ¶ 15 (citing
D’Amato).
The suppression court conducted a hearing on November 29, 2018,
during which Carter argued, consistent with his motion, that the conditions
under which his confession was given were such that “a person could not
voluntarily, knowingly, intelligently surrender the rights that Miranda is
designed to protect, when they say, yes, I’ll agree to give a statement.” Notes
of Testimony, Suppression Hearing, 11/29/18, at 4.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the matter under
advisement. On December 13, 2018, the court issued the order granting
Carter’s motion. The court concluded that the encounter was a custodial
interrogation requiring Miranda warnings and a valid waiver, and that Carter
did not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily waive his Miranda rights.
Conclusions of Law, 12/13/18, at 10, ¶¶ 1-2.
The Commonwealth filed this timely appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 311(d),
which permits an appeal from the grant of a suppression order upon
certification in the notice of appeal that the order “will terminate or
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substantially handicap the prosecution.” The Commonwealth presents one
issue for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred by suppressing evidence based on a
suppression theory [Carter] failed to raise in his pretrial motion or
at the suppression hearing, and then compounded the error by
denying the Commonwealth the opportunity to present evidence
to address the waived constitutional claim raised sua sponte by
the trial court?
Commonwealth Brief at 3.
In Commonwealth v. Korn, 139 A.3d 249 (Pa. Super. 2016), this Court
explained:
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the
suppression court’s granting of a suppression motion is well
settled.
When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order,
we follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider
only the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together
with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the
context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The
suppression court’s findings of fact bind an appellate court
if the record supports those findings. The suppression
court’s conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an
appellate court, whose duty is to determine if the
suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.
Commonwealth v. Miller, 56 A.3d 1276, 1278–1279 (Pa. Super.
2012) (citations omitted). “Our standard of review is restricted to
establishing whether the record supports the suppression court’s
factual findings; however, we maintain de novo review over the
suppression court’s legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v.
Brown, 606 Pa. 198,
996 A.2d 473, 476 (2010) (citation
omitted).
Id. at 252-53.
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Prior to setting forth its Conclusions of Law, the court noted the
Commonwealth’s burden to “establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the defendant was aware of the reason for the interrogation.” Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 12/13/18, at 6 (quoting Commonwealth v.
(Marcel) Johnson, 160 A.3d 127, 138 (Pa. 2017). The court noted that the
“ultimate test of voluntariness is whether the confession is the product of an
essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.”
Id. at 5 (quoting
Commonwealth v. (Christopher) Johnson,
107 A.3d 52, 93 (Pa. 2014)
(additional citations omitted)). The court discussed the need for a suspect’s
awareness of “the transaction giving rise to the investigation,”
id. (citing
Commonwealth v. Dixon,
379 A.2d 553, 556 (Pa. 1977)), and that the
interrogation be conducted under circumstances reflecting that “there is no
circumstance lending ambiguity to the direction and purpose of the
questioning.”
Id. at 6 (quoting Johnson,
160 A.3d at 138, in turn quoting
Dixon,
379 A.2d at 556).
In (Marcel) Johnson, our Supreme Court explained:
A waiver of Miranda rights is valid where the suspect is aware of
the general nature of the transaction giving rise to the
investigation. Commonwealth v. Dixon, 475 Pa. 17,
379 A.2d
553, 556 (Pa. 1977). “[O]nly when such knowledge is possessed
by a suspect . . . can [he] be said to understand the consequences
of yielding the right to counsel.” Id. This is because “[i]t is a far
different thing to forgo a lawyer where a traffic offense is involved
than to waive counsel where first degree murder is at stake.”
Commonwealth v. Collins, 436 Pa. 114,
259 A.2d 160, 163 (Pa.
1969). When a defendant challenges the validity of his
Miranda waiver on this basis, the Commonwealth must
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant
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was aware of the reason for the interrogation. Dixon, 379 A.2d
at 556.
Johnson,
160 A.3d at 138 (emphasis added).
Here, as reflected in his suppression motion and by the testimony at the
hearing, Carter did not challenge the validity of his waiver based on a
misunderstanding of “the general nature of the transaction giving rise to the
investigation.” Id. Nevertheless, the suppression court ignored the basis for
the motion—that Carter’s physical and psychological state was such that he
could not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights—
and instead sua sponte determined that “under the circumstances, a ‘palpable
ambiguity’ existed as to the reason for the interrogation; was [Carter] being
questioned as a suspect or a victim[?]” Suppression Court Rule 1925(a)
Opinion, 3/4/19, at 6 (citing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
12/13/18, at 5-10). According to the suppression court, the Commonwealth
“was required to prove on a preponderance of the evidence that [Carter] knew
of the occasion of the interrogation.”
Id. The court concluded that “[d]ue to
the particular circumstances of [Carter’s] hospitalization and the ‘palpable
ambiguity’ concerning the detectives’ presence in his hospital room (Were the
police questioning [Carter] as a victim or a suspect?) this court found that the
[Commonwealth] failed to meet its burden of proof.”
Id. at 6-7 (citing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 12/13/18, at 5-10).
The Commonwealth counters that Carter did not suggest, either in his
motion or at the suppression hearing, that he was unaware of the reason the
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detectives were in his hospital room. The motion and the testimony presented
at the hearing related strictly to Carter’s medical condition and his ability to
waive make a knowing, intelligent, or voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights
under those circumstances.
Our reading of the motion and the hearing transcript supports the
Commonwealth’s contention. Carter’s suppression motion was clearly based
on his medical circumstances as preventing him from properly waiving his
Miranda rights. To suggest, as the suppression court does, that he was
unaware why the officers were questioning him is wholly unsupported by the
record. Moreover, it does not make sense. If the officers were there to speak
with him as a victim, there would have been no reason to Mirandize him.
The suppression court extensively cites to, and relies upon,
Dixon. However, Dixon is readily distinguishable. In that case, a woman
who had been convicted of malicious mischief was informed she would be
arrested if she did not make restitution. She failed to make restitution and
was arrested. She was read her Miranda rights and was asked if she knew
the reason for her arrest. She said she did. However, she mistakenly believed
she was being arrested and questioned in relation to her failure to make
restitution. The officers did not ask about the failure to make restitution.
Instead, they questioned her about the death of her infant son. She
immediately broke down and confessed to the murder. Our Supreme Court
held that confession was not the result of a knowing and intelligent waiver of
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her constitutional rights. Therefore, the confession should have been
suppressed. The Court reversed her judgment of sentence for second-degree
murder and ordered a new trial.
In contrast, Carter did not advance any argument in his motion or at
the suppression hearing that he believed he was waiving his Miranda rights
in conjunction with being the victim of a shooting. In fact, in his introductory
remarks to the suppression court, Carter’s counsel stated:
I submit, Your Honor, you should shift the burden to the
Commonwealth to present evidence that Mr. Carter’s statement
could not have been made in a knowing, voluntary and intelligent
manner, specifically because it’s agreed upon by the parties and
within all the police reports and obtained in discovery that Mr.
Carter’s alleged confession occurred after a Miranda warning, yes,
but a Miranda warning that was given two days after he had been
shot with both entry and exit wounds and during the course of his
treatment in the hospital, while he’s sitting in a hospital bed
intubated and drugged.
The defense’s argument, Your Honor, is that in those conditions,
a person could not voluntarily, knowingly, intelligently surrender
the rights that Miranda is designed to protect, when they say, yes,
I'll agree to give a statement.
Notes of Testimony, Suppression Hearing, 11/29/18, at 3-4.
Carter did not call any witnesses at the suppression hearing. The only
witness was Detective Leeds. No testimony was elicited from Detective Leeds
even remotely suggesting that Carter did not understand the “direction and
purpose of the questioning of the hearing.” See (Marcel) Johnson, 160 A.3d
at 138.
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While we take no issue with the suppression court’s Findings of Fact and
recognize we are, therefore, bound by them, we conclude that the suppression
court did not properly apply the law to the facts as established at the
suppression hearing. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 581(D)
requires that a motion to suppress “state specifically and with particularity the
evidence sought to be suppressed, the grounds for suppression, and the
facts and events in support thereof.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(D) (emphasis added).
Here, the suppression court erred by suppressing evidence on grounds not
asserted in Carter’s motion. Commonwealth v. Banks, 165 A.3d 976, 980-
81 (Pa. Super. 2017). Therefore, we reverse the suppression court’s order
granting Carter’s motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings. In
light of our disposition, there is no need to reconvene the hearing for additional
evidence.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/16/2020
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