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234 F.2d 692

Docket No. 13146.

Bantel v. Brownell

District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals

Argued May 14, 1956.

Decided June 7, 1956.

District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1956-06-07

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently November 1973

1 federal appellate · 1 district ·

3 counsel of record

Relies on Hawley v. Brownell

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1956-06-07

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¶1Mr. George Eric Rosden, Washington, D. C., for appellants.

¶2Mr. Irwin A. Seibel, Attorney, Dept, of Justice, with whom Mr. George B. Searls, Attorney, Dept, of Justice, was on the brief, for appellees.

¶3Messrs. Leo A. Rover, U. S. Atty., at the time record was filed, Oliver Gasch, U. S. Atty., and Lewis Carroll, Asst. U. S. Atty., also entered appearances for appellees.

¶4Before EDGERTON, Chief Judge, and PRETTYMAN and WASHINGTON, Circuit Judges.

¶5WASHINGTON, Circuit Judge.

¶6This is a suit arising under the Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, § 1 et seq. (1952). The complaint seeks return of vested property under Section 9(a) of that Act, or in the alternative a mandatory injunction and *693declaratory judgment.1 The District Court dismissed the complaint, and this appeal followed.

¶7 Plaintiffs-appellants are and always have been citizens and residents of Germany, and hence as former enemies are prima facie barred from relief under Section 9(a) by the express language of that section. They argue, however, that General License No. 94, as amended on March 4, 1947 (12 Fed.Reg. 1457), made them “licensees” and removed them from the “enemy” category under Section 9 (a). This, they say, had the double effect of preventing the Attorney General from thereafter vesting their property, and of permitting them to sue under Section 9(a). We cannot agree. General License No. 94, as amended, certainly does not so provide in terms, and nothing in its background or necessary effect indicates that it should be given the construction appellants urge.2

¶8The relief sought as an alternative to Section 9(a) relief cannot be granted: that section “provides the only judicial remedy for reclaiming vested property .” Hawley v. Brownell, 1954, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 104, 215 F.2d 36. The judgment of the District Court, dismissing the complaint, must therefore be

¶9Affirmed.

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