Skinner v. Uphoff’s Empirical Analysis
2002
Citation profile
3 district ·
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (§ 20409 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994) · 28 U.S.C. § 1331 · 28 U.S.C. § 1391 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · Celotex Corporation v. Catrett H · Farmer v. Brennan · Hudson v. Palmer · Lewis Director Arizona Department of Corrections v. Casey
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the federal right,- and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The Court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Defendants argue that [they] have instituted new policies and that Plaintiff cannot show a likelihood of a continuing violation, which is necessary for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiff counters that often after an action is brought for declaratory or injunctive relief, the defendants will claim repentance and show evidence of reform in order to avoid a judgment against them. In fact this happens so often that an entire body of law has been developed to address the problem. According to the Supreme Court, “voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case, i.e., does not make the case moot.” United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 , 73 S.Ct. 894 , 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953). The Tenth Circuit, in the same vein, has stated that “[t]he court must exercise supervisory power over the matter until it can say with assurance that the unconstitutional practices have been discontinued and that there is no reasonable expectation that unconstitutional practices will recur.” Battle v. Anderson, 708 F.2d 1523, 1538 (10th Cir.1983). The burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that “there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated,” and “[t]he burden is a heavy one.” W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 633 , 73 S.Ct. 894 , 97 L.Ed. 1303 (internal quotations marks omitted). Defendants in this case clearly have not met this heavy burden.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“To be held liable under § 1983, a supervisor “must have participated or acquiesced in the constitutional deprivations of which complaint is made.” Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1528 (10th Cir.1988) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). An “affirmative link” must exist “between the [constitutional] deprivation and either the supervisor’s personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise.” Id. at 1527 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This link is satisfied if “a supervisor has established or utilized an unconstitutional policy or custom.” Id. at 1528 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.