¶1dissenting.
¶2I do not agree that due process is satisfied by a charge to the jury that unless the defendant satisfactorily explains his recent possession of stolen goods the jury may presume he is guilty of the theft. The possession is but a circumstance. "If it is recent, it is, when unexplained, a very strong circumstance tending to show the guilt of the possessor . . .” Gravitt v. State, 114 Ga. 841, 842 (40 SE 1003). But it still is just circumstantial evidence and by itself does not necessarily prove the defendant is guilty.
¶3There was no charge on circumstantial evidence in this case. The jury was told only that the presumption of guilt could be rebutted by proof satisfactory to the jury presented by the defendant. I believe the result of all this was to place the burden of proving he was not guilty on the defendant so that if he offered no explanation of his recent possession, or one the jury thought unsatisfactory for any reason, the jury was duty bound to find him guilty.
¶4This charge goes too far in my judgment and either compromised the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, which the Constitution places on the state, or it left the jury , with confusion as to the essential burden in the case. In either event, the error is of constitutional magnitude and, under the Georgia Habeas Corpus Statute, requires a new trial free of this due process difficulty. There is a meaningful difference between a permissible inference and a presumption of guilt which I believe we cannot overlook. I would apply this due process standard to cases involving both the principal theft and those dealing with receiving stolen goods knowing them to have been stolen. See Gaskin v. State, 119 Ga. App. 593 (168 SE2d 183) and its *253progeny, and particularly the specially concurring opinion of Judge Pannell, beginning at p. 595 of Gaskin.