State v. White’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 43 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 49 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ ‘The language of the statute is explicit. It provides for the commencement of the 180-day period when defendant has “caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court,” the written notice and request for final disposition of the pending indictment. The Legislature clearly intended that the documents be delivered to the prosecutor and the appropriate court before the 180-day period starts to run. The period does not start to run upon mere execution and delivery of the notice and request to the warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of defendant. In our view it would be contrary to the public interest to start the running of the 180-day period prior to actual receipt of the notice and request by the prosecutor and the court. If we were to interpret the statute as defendant requests, an indictment would be subject to dismissal each time delivery of the documents to the prosecutor and court is delayed, regardless of cause. We cannot conceive our Legislature as intending such a result by enacting the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. As a matter of fact, had the Legislature intended the 180-day period to begin from the time a defendant delivers the notice and request to the warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody over him, it could have so signified by appropriate language.’ ” 234 Kan. at 344 -4S.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Sweat v. Darr · In Re Habeas Corpus Application of Sweat

2. ““(a) In response to a request made under article III . . . the appropriate authority in a sending state [California] shall offer to deliver temporary custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state where such indictment, information or complaint is pending against such person [Kansas] in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the request for final disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary custody shall accompany the written notice provided for in article III of this agreement. . . . “(c) If the appropriate [Kansas] authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in article III . . . the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice . . . .””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Sweat v. Darr

3. ““In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by this chapter, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday or a legal holiday. . . . When an act is to be performed within any prescribed time under any law of this state, or any rule or regulation lawfully promulgated thereunder, and the method for computing such time is not otherwise specifically provided, the method prescribed herein shall apply.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 29 Kan. App. 2d 166 - State v. Powers