Bell v. Tilton’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 21 district · 54 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 82 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ ‘Where the controlling facts are based upon written or documentary evidence by way of pleadings, admissions, depositions and stipulations, the trial court has no peculiar opportunity to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. In such situation, ... on appellate review [we have] as good an opportunity to examine and consider the evidence as did the court below, and to determine de novo what the facts establish.’ [Citation omitted.]” Bell v. Tilton, 234 Kan. 461, 468 , 674 P.2d 468 (1983).”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ortiz v. Biscanin · 14 Kan. App. 2d 289 - Pioneer Operations Co. v. Brandeberry

2. ““Where a trial court has made findings of fact and conclusions of law, the function of an appellate court is to determine whether the findings are supported by substantial competent evidence and whether the findings are sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusions of law. In re Estate of Phillips, 4 Kan. App. 2d 256, 261 , 604 P.2d 747 , rev. denied 227 Kan. 927 (1980); and City of Council Grove v. Ossmann, 219 Kan. 120 , 546 P.2d 1399 (1976). It is not the function of an appellate court to weigh conflicting evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, English Village Properties, Inc. v. Boettcher & Lieurance Constr. Co., 7 Kan. App. 2d 307 , Syl. ¶ 2, 640 P.2d 1282 , rev. denied 231 Kan. 799 (1982), or redetermine questions of fact. Where a trial judge, sitting as a trier of facts, makes a specific finding of fact on apparently conflicting or actually conflicting evidence, an appellate court is concerned only with evidence that supports the trial court’s findings and not with evidence that might have supported contrary findings. Steele v. Harrison, 220 Kan. 422 , Syl. ¶ 1, 552 P.2d 957 (1976); Arnette v. Arnette, 162 Kan. 677, 681 , 178 P.2d 1019 (1947); and In re Estate of Phillips, 4 Kan. App. 2d at 261-62. In other words, an appellate court searches the record for the purpose of determining whether there is any substantial competent evidence to support the findings and verdict. If so, the appellate court will not weigh the evidence. Findings of fact determined o”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 11 Kan. App. 2d 254 - Potucek v. Potucek · Medling v. Wecoe Credit Union

3. ““The mere fact an insurance company retains an attorney to represent an insured against a lawsuit does not mean the attorney is also the insurance company’s attorney capable of binding the insurance company. In Hensley v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, 451 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1970), plaintiff contended because a company lawyer had participated in the insured’s defense at the initial trial the insurance company had waived its right to disclaim liability under the policy. In rejecting this contention, the Kentucky Court of Appeals (then Kentucky’s highest court), observed: “ ‘The plaintiff cites a number of authorities which consider the question of waiver and estoppel asserted by the insured against his insurance company. That problem is not involved here. “ ‘The insured had no claim and has made no claim against the company. He was timely notified of the probable lack of coverage and the company reserved all of its rights to disclaim liability for any judgment against him. We know of no theory on which the plaintiff could have acquired any rights against the company. Surely an insurance company lawyer can appear in the courtroom defending an accident claim against an insured without committing the company to pay the judgment. The representation of the insured by the company lawyer in the present case may have given die plaintiff cause for hope that diere was insurance coverage. Such hope does not create a cause of action. “ ‘There was no waiver or estoppel.’ 451 S.W.2d at”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 27 Kan. App. 2d 276 - Fletcher v. Anderson