State v. Hyde’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 federal appellate · 126 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 135 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The defendant in this case does not contend that the court had no power to order him into custody while the trial was in progress. The contention is that, under the circumstances, the order was an abuse of discretion, and prejudicial to the interests of the defendant. “It must be conceded that, under some circumstances, it might become the duty of the court to order the defendant into actual custody. If, for instance, it should clearly appear to the court that the defendant intended immediate flight. Furthermore, if such order is made, it must be assumed, in the absence of a contrary showing, that the court acted in good faith and upon sufficient grounds. In this case, however, the court stated its reasons for the order, and we must determine whether they are sufficient to justify this very unusual proceeding. It is not uncommon to order the defendant into custody at the beginning of the trial. In some States this course is authorized by statute. The case of People v. Williams, 59 Cal. 676 , involves such a statute; also the case of State v. Baker, 146 Iowa, 612 ( 125 N. W. 659 ) ; yet in this latter case, the exercise of the power was held to be discretionary, and was justified because it appeared that the court had grounds to believe that the defendant was feigning sickness, and designed to avoid a trial altogether. In the case of Hull v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 87 Mich. 497 , cited by the State, the defendant was ordered into custody, as here, while the trial was in progress”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. People v. Merhige

2. ““The defendant now contends that there is no question of intent in the case. His counsel now concede that if the defendant gave Col. Swope a deadly dose of poison, the criminal intent may be inferred from the act. The defense denied the act. It is true that the evidence in the record raises no question of intent. It may also be conceded that if the defendant knowingly administered deadly poison, the intent may be inferred from the act, and no further proof is required. But it must be remembered that in a criminal case the defendant files no written pleading setting up his grounds of defense. His plea of not guilty puts in issue every element of the charge, including intent. It would have been consistent with his plea had the defendant claimed in his defense that there was accident or mistake, both of which are involved in intent, in the giving of the alleged poisoned capsule to Col. Swope. It is a part of the State’s case to show criminal intent, and in doing so to negative accident or mistake, by any proof competent for that purpose. The State was not required to rest upon the assumption that the proof would show that the intent accompanied the act, nor to hold back, for rebuttal, evidence showing intent. The State could not anticipate the theory of the defense. “In the case of Trogdon v. Commonwealth, 31 Grat. (Va.) 862, quoted with approval in State v. Myers, 82 Mo. 569 ( 52 Am. Rep. 389 ), in answer to the suggestion of counsel for the prisoner that the jury would infer t”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. People v. MacGregor

3. ““In a sense, the effect of the bail bond was to place the defendant in the custody of his. bondsmen, but he was in custodia legis. ‘A man’s bail are looked upon as his gaolers of his own choosing, and the person bailed is, in the eye of the law, for many purposes esteemed to be as much in the prison of the court by which he is bailed as if he were in the actual custody of the proper gaoler. ’ [2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, p. 140.] It is said in 1 Hale, 325: ‘Yet the law is all one if he be under bail, for he is in custodia still, for the bail are, in law, his keepers. ’ Wharton, in his work on Criminal Pleading and Practice, says: ‘ The principal is_ supposed to be in the bail’s constant custody, and tbe latter being tbe former’s jailor, may at any time surrender bim to the custody of tbe law.’ [Sec. 62.] . . . The power to surrender bis principal to tbe court at any time is given to tbe surety by our statutes, Section 5230, Revised Statutes 1909. Tbe recognizance is not a contract by which tbe defendant secures an unrestricted right to be at large; nor does it deprive tbe court of its inherent right to deal with tbe person of tbe prisoner.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hyde v. Nelson