Volume 234 — New York Reports

<p>Decedent’s estate — transfer tax — postponement of valuation of decedent’s estate — valuation must be made as of time of decedent’s death but the court may in its discretion and for sufficient reasons postpone the valuation.</p> <p>1. A transfer tax is imposed upon the estate of the decedent as it exists at the hour of his death and its value is to be fixed as of that time, but the court may, in its discretion, upon sufficient facts postpone the valuation to await the happening of some event which may render the appraisal more easy and certain.</p> <p>2. By the terms of a partnership agreement between decedent and his partner the surviving partner was given three years within which to liquidate and dispose of the business and make division of the proceeds thereof; also a large part of decedent’s estate consisting of securities owned by him individually was pledged to secure loans made by others to a railroad corporation in which he was interestéd, and such loans being also secured by collateral belonging to the debtor, and not becoming due for a couple of years at the time of his death it was uncertain whether the debtor would discharge its obligations or whether the creditors would be compelled to resort to the individual securities of decedent. Under these circumstances the court may in its discretion postpone the appraisal to be made for fixing the transfer tax upon these two portions of decedent’s estate, in the case of the interest in the copartnership until the liquidation shall be completed by the surviving partner, as provided in the' copartnership agreement, and in the case of the securities pledged for the loans of the third party until the loans shall become due and it shall be ascertained whether in fact resort will be had to the individual securities of the decedent for the purpose of paying them. The valuation to, be then made must be made as of the date of decedent’s death and, therefore, the amounts realized by the partner on liquidation may require some modification to adjust them to that date.</p>

Appeal, in each of the above-entitled actions, from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department, entered January 7, 1921, reversing a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon a dismissal of the complaint by the court at a Trial Term and granting a new trial.

Appeal, by permission, from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered May 18, 1921, unanimously affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict. The court erred in refusing to charge the jury that the defendant was not liable for the negligence of the men who threw the timber, if the jury came to the conclusion that the accident was due to their negligence.

Appeal, by permission, from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial department, entered December 29, 1921, unanimously affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict. The evidence in this case wholly fails to establish a cause of action against the defendants. (Maxmilian v. Mayor, etc., of N. Y., 62 N. Y. 160; Corbett v. St. Vincent Indus. School, 177 N. Y. 16; Ackley v. Bd. of Education, 177 App.

Appeal, by permission, from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered May 9, 1922, unanimously affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict. Plaintiff’s intestate was not engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accident within the provisions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. (Pedersen v. D., L. & W. R. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146; Roush v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 243 Fed.

Property rights may be acquired as against the People of the State of New York through the filling and occupation of ungranted lands under navigable waters for a period of more than forty years. (Civ. Pr.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Richmond County Court, rendered April 24, 1922, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of murder in the first degree.</p>

Appeal, by permission, from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in. the first judicial department, entered January 3, 1922, unanimously affirming a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon a dismissal of the complaint by the court on trial at Special Term.

The action was for specific performance of an alleged written agreement to convey real property and involved the interpretation of a letter written by the defendant Guardian Holding Company, Inc., in which it was alleged the latter gave the plaintiff an “ option to purchase the premises situate at 471-3 Fifth Ave. and 4-6 East 41st Street, New York City, for a period of sixty days,” for the consideration of $1,200,000.