J-A13040-20
2020 PA Super 193
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
EDWARD C. MEEHAN JR., :
:
Appellant : No. 685 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 17, 2019
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): MC-51-MD-0000011-2019
BEFORE: BENDER P.J.E., LAZARUS, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*
OPINION BY STRASSBURGER, J.: Filed: August 13, 2020
Edward C. Meehan Jr., Esquire, (Appellant) appeals from the January
17, 2019 judgment of sentence imposed following his convictions for
contempt. We vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and reverse his
convictions.
The background underlying this matter can be summarized as follows.
On January 10, 2019, the Honorable Jacquelyn M. Frazier-Lyde, a judge on
the Philadelphia Municipal Court, held a preliminary hearing of a criminal
case wherein Appellant represented one co-defendant, and Melissa
Singleton, Esquire, represented the other co-defendant. Appellant moved to
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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dismiss the charges against his client, but the court denied the motion to
dismiss and held the case for court.
Although it does not appear in the notes of testimony, Appellant
seemingly interrupted the trial court when it was advising Appellant’s client
of his upcoming court date because the trial court admonished Appellant,
stating, “I am still talking, counsel. I am still talking.” N.T., 1/10/2019, at
21. The trial court continued advising Appellant’s client, when Appellant
interjected, “I am just laughing, judge.” Id. The trial court excused
Appellant from the courtroom and said, “[Y]ou can laugh on out of here, with
all due respect.”
Id. The trial court opinion indicates Appellant “continued
[making] distracting remarks, laughing and expressing disagreement with
the trial court ruling[]” as he exited the courtroom in the midst of Attorney
Singleton’s bail motion on behalf of co-defendant. Trial Court Opinion,
7/30/2019, at 3. However, any such remarks were not transcribed by the
court reporter. The notes of testimony indicate that Attorney Singleton’s bail
motion on behalf of co-defendant was addressed, and the court took a brief
recess. N.T., 1/10/2019, at 21.
During this recess, the trial court requested Appellant return to its
courtroom. When Appellant returned, the trial court asked, “What did you
say?,” apparently in reference to something it heard Appellant say when he
was exiting the courtroom after he was initially excused. Id. Rather than
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respond to the question, Appellant argued the merits of his client’s case.
The following verbal exchange ensued:
THE COURT: Your client – wait a minute. Hold it.
[APPELLANT]: If you didn’t want to get into it, you shouldn’t
have asked the question.
THE COURT: What you shouldn’t have said is I need to know the
law, read up on the law.
[APPELLANT]: You do.
THE COURT: Well, I do know the law and you owe me an
apology or I will grant you a contempt hearing.
[APPELLANT]: You can hold me in contempt, if you want.
Id. at 22. The trial court twice more presented the ultimatum - apologize or
be subjected to a contempt hearing - to Appellant. Both times, Appellant
responded, “You made a bad decision.” Id. at 23-24. Following the court’s
fourth recitation of the ultimatum, Appellant responded, “I will apologize for
you making a bad decision on the law.” Id. at 24. The trial court then
stated that it was going to hold a contempt hearing for Appellant, scheduled
the hearing, and indicated the reason being that it must “maintain the
integrity of the court at all times.” Id. at 27. In reply to the trial court’s
reasoning, Appellant stated, “It’s an uphill battle,” to which the trial court
responded, “No it’s not. It’s really not an uphill battle to be courteous,
cordial, and competent. Not for me it’s not.” Id.
On January 17, 2019, a contempt hearing was held, at which Appellant
appeared pro se. Immediately, Appellant apologized for his actions at the
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January 10, 2019 preliminary hearing. The trial court accepted Appellant’s
apology and read the charges – one count each of contempt under
subsections (1), (2), and (3) of 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132. The trial court then
provided a lengthy description of its judicial duties, and concluded by asking
Appellant “how do you plead?” N.T., 1/17/2019, at 7. Appellant initially
expressed confusion, stating, “I’m sorry?” before answering, “I’m going to
plead guilty, Judge.” Id. The trial court clarified, “You plead guilty?” to
which Appellant replied, “[Y]eah, my behavior was abominable.” Id.
Although Appellant purportedly pled guilty, the trial court nevertheless
recited at length its factual findings in support of contempt, reading the
January 10, 2019 record, and at times, supplementing it with its own
perception of the events that occurred. The trial court then sentenced
Appellant to five days of incarceration for each charge to run concurrently,
and a $100.00 fine for each charge, for a total of $300.00.
On January 25, 2019, Appellant timely filed pro se a post-sentence
motion for reconsideration of sentence. After retaining counsel, on February
5, 2019, Appellant filed both an amended motion for reconsideration of
sentence, in which he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
his convictions and the discretionary aspects of sentencing, and a motion to
vacate the contempt finding pending the resolution of the motion for
reconsideration. The trial court denied Appellant’s motions on February 12,
2019.
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This timely-filed appeal followed.1 On appeal, Appellant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions under all three
subsections of 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132 and claims the trial court imposed an
illegal sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 10-11. The Commonwealth agrees with
and advocates in behalf of Appellant.
Initially, we must ascertain the nature of the contempt proceeding to
determine whether Appellant may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain his convictions. Ordinarily, when entering a guilty plea in a
criminal proceeding, a defendant “waives the right to challenge on [direct]
appeal all non-jurisdictional defects except the legality of the sentence and
the validity of the plea.” Commonwealth v. Luketic, 162 A.3d 1149, 1159
(Pa. Super. 2017).
Instantly, “[s]ummary proceedings for contempt of court are those in
which the adjudication omits the usual steps of ‘the issuance of process,
service of complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening
to arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with
a conventional court trial.’” Commonwealth v. Moody, 125 A.3d 1, 8 (Pa.
2015), citing Commonwealth v. Stevenson,
393 A.2d 386, 392 (Pa. 1978)
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1 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with the mandates of Pa.R.A.P.
1925.
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(citations omitted). Furthermore, traditional procedural safeguards2 that
ensure the validity of a guilty plea in a formal proceeding did not occur,
confirming our conclusion that this indeed was a summary hearing.
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2 Our Supreme Court has outlined the procedure for guilty pleas as
follows.
In order to satisfy the constitutional requirement that a valid
guilty plea must stand as an “intelligent admission of guilt,” the
law of this Commonwealth has long required that before a judge
may properly accept a plea of guilty, a colloquy with the
defendant must demonstrate that there is a factual basis for the
plea and that the defendant understands the nature and
elements of the offense charged.
Commonwealth v. Hines, 437 A.2d 1180, 1182 (Pa. 1982). Accordingly,
prior to entry of a guilty plea in a formal proceeding, the trial court should
conduct a guilty plea colloquy, asking the following questions at a minimum:
(1) Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges to
which he or she is pleading guilty?
(2) Is there a factual basis for the plea?
(3) Does the defendant understand that he or she has the right
to trial by jury?
(4) Does the defendant understand that he or she is presumed
innocent until found guilty?
(5) Is the defendant aware of the permissible range of sentences
and/or fines for the offenses charged?
(6) Is the defendant aware that the judge is not bound by the
terms of any plea agreement tendered unless the judge accepts
such agreement?
Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, Comment.
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Therefore, Appellant’s purported guilty plea is more aptly characterized as
an acceptance of responsibility and apology to the trial court. Accordingly, it
did not result in waiver of non-jurisdictional defects, and we can examine his
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim.
“A trial court’s finding of contempt will not be disturbed absent an
abuse of discretion.” Moody, 125 A.3d at 12, citing Commonwealth v.
Baker,
766 A.2d 328, 331 (2001). Contempt of court may be classified as
civil or criminal, and “[c]riminal contempts are further subdivided into direct
and indirect contempts.” Commonwealth v. Moody,
46 A.3d 765, 772
(Pa. Super. 2012). Contempt is classified as direct criminal contempt where
the “dominant purpose is to punish the contemnor for disobedience” of a
court’s order and where that disobedience occurs “in the presence of the
court, or so near thereto [as] to interfere with its immediate business.”
Id.
at 771-72. Direct criminal contempt is codified in 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132, which
provides contempt power to the trial court and authorizes the court to
penalize:
(1) The official misconduct of the officers of such courts
respectively.
(2) Disobedience or neglect by officers, parties, jurors, or
witnesses of or to the lawful process of the court.
(3) The misbehavior of any person in the presence of the
court, thereby obstructing the administration of justice.
42 Pa.C.S. § 4132.
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Preliminarily, the trial court opinion asserts Appellant made
“distracting remarks, laugh[ed] and express[ed] disagreement with the trial
court ruling.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/2019, at 3. Although some of these
remarks were not transcribed in the January 10, 2019 hearing transcript, the
trial court indicated in its opinion that it directly heard the remarks and
observed the behavior. Appellant does not contest having made the
remarks and engaging in the behavior.
Appellant was convicted pursuant to each subsection of 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 4132. With respect to subsection (1), which refers to officers of the court,
Appellant could not be held in contempt under this subsection because “the
great weight of authority, both state and federal, supports the construction
... that attorneys do not fall within the purview of subsection (1) [of 42
Pa.C.S. § 4132].” Matter of Campolongo, 435 A.2d 581, 583 n.7 (Pa.
1981); see also Moffatt by Moffatt v. Buano,
569 A.2d 968, 970 (Pa.
Super. 1990) (holding appellant attorney held in contempt for offensive
remarks was not an “officer” of the court for the purposes of subsection (1)).
Accordingly, we vacate Appellant’s conviction under subsection (1).
Next, we review Appellant’s conviction under subsection (2).
Subsection (2) specifically provides that it can be invoked to hold officers,
parties, jurors, and witnesses in contempt; yet attorneys are not mentioned.
Pennsylvania’s Statutory Construction Act informs our analysis, establishing
that statutes that relate to the same persons or things must be construed
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together as one statute. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932. “[S]tatutory interpretative
principles [] require that where the meaning of a word or phrase is clear
when used in one section of a statute, it will be construed to have the same
meaning in another section of the same statute.” Bayview Loan
Servicing, LLC v. Lindsay, 185 A.3d 307, 313 (Pa. 2018) (citations
omitted). Our case law that firmly establishes lawyers are not officers under
42 Pa.C.S. § 4132(1), coupled with our rule of statutory construction that
requires us to construe identical clear words the same throughout the
statute, compel our conclusion that a lawyer cannot be held in contempt
under subsection (2).3 Accordingly, we vacate Appellant’s conviction under
subsection (2).
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3 We recognize that lawyers have been held in contempt under subsection
(2); however, in those cases, the issue of whether a lawyer is an officer was
not raised.
This Court has held that Subsection 4132(2) relates to
disobedience or neglect by attorneys to the “lawful process of
the court.” This Court has found a counsel’s failure to appear for
a scheduled court appearance, a counsel’s failure to
communicate with the opposing party regarding transcripts, a
counsel’s failure to file timely points for charge, and a counsel’s
failure to file an accounting to fall within the purview of
Subsection 4132(2). See Commonwealth v. Kolansky, 800
A.2d 937 (Pa. Super. 2002); Commonwealth v. Pruitt,
764
A.2d 569 (Pa. Super. 2008); Estate of Baehr,
596 A.2d 803
(Pa. Super. 1991); Weingrad v. Lippy, 445 A.2d 1306 (Pa.
Super. 1982).
In re C.W., 960 A.2d 458, 467 n.9 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation format
altered).
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We now address Appellant’s conviction under subsection (3) of the
contempt statute. To sustain a conviction of contempt under subsection (3),
the following elements must be established beyond a reasonable doubt: 1)
misconduct; 2) in the presence of the court; 3) committed with the intent to
obstruct the proceedings; 4) that obstructs the administration of justice.
Moody, 125 A.3d at 5 n.4.
The evidence supports a finding that Appellant engaged in misconduct
by making distracting remarks, laughing, and snidely expressing
disagreement with the trial court’s ruling by stating that the trial court needs
to know and read up on the law.
Regarding the second element, there is no dispute that the above-
described conduct was made in the presence of the trial court.
Regarding the intent to obstruct judicial proceedings, we have
observed that “[t]here is wrongful intent if the contemnor knows or should
be aware that his conduct is wrongful.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 753
A.2d 856, 862 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citations omitted). This Court has
emphasized the role that an individual’s courtroom experience bears on his
intent to obstruct judicial proceedings, noting that the requisite intent can be
shown where the individual “should have been aware of the effect that his
comment would have on the courtroom proceedings.”
Id. By his own
admission, Appellant has appeared before the court on many occasions.
Based on Appellant’s previous courtroom experience, he knew or should
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have known that interrupting the court while it was advising his client and
during Attorney Singleton’s bail motion on behalf of co-defendant, in itself, is
wrongful. Appellant’s behavior in light of his presumed knowledge of the
proper conduct in a judicial setting evidences a clear intent to interrupt the
court’s proceedings.
“To obstruct justice, conduct must significantly disrupt judicial
proceedings ... [C]ontempt requires actual, imminent prejudice to a fair
proceeding or prejudice to the preservation of the court’s orderly procedure
and authority.” Williams, 753 A.2d at 863. “Mere affront to the trial judge
is not enough. Remarks that are injudicious, or even disrespectful, will not,
without more, justify a summary conviction for contempt of court.” Matter
of Campolongo,
435 A.2d at 584. Indeed, the court proceeded with
advising Appellant’s client and beginning co-defendant’s bail hearing despite
Appellant’s laughter and snide comments without significant interruption,
and as evidenced by the lack of a break in proceedings in the notes of
testimony. The record shows that the exchange between Appellant and the
trial court was of a momentary nature and that the progress of the
administration of justice was not impeded thereby. Accordingly, we vacate
Appellant’s conviction under subsection (3).
Finally, Appellant challenges the legality of his flat sentence of five
days of incarceration. Given that we have reversed his convictions, this
issue is moot.
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Based on the foregoing, we vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence,
and reverse his convictions.4
Judgment of sentence vacated. Convictions reversed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/13/20
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4 Despite reversing his convictions, we note Appellant effectively insinuated
that the trial court lacked competence when he suggested the trial court
must know and read up on the law. Appellant’s conduct evidenced a clear
lack of respect for the trial court, warranting our firm disapproval despite our
conclusion that his conduct does not amount to contempt. A lawyer may
disagree with the outcome of a case, but that does not give him license to
insult the trial court’s intelligence. Appellant’s insinuation as to whether the
trial court judge understood the law was manifestly improper and ill-advised.
We are in complete agreement with the trial judge’s comment that it is not
an uphill battle to be courteous, cordial and competent.
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