¶1Opinion delivered November 12, 1962.
¶2Supplemental Opinion on Rehearing.
¶3In her petition for rehearing, appellee points out that this court overlooked the fact that Louis Campbell of Fort Smith is a trustee of the United Furniture Workers’ Insurance Fund, and, since service was had upon Campbell, the Fund was properly served under the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 66-2905, 1961 Supp. Exhibit 1, which appears in the transcript, reflects that one “Louie Campbell” is a trustee of the fund, and apparently, from appellee’s petition, Louis and Louie is one and the same.
¶4Appellee’s petition is without merit for three reasons. In the first place, appellee did not argue in her original brief that service was obtained upon a trustee of the insurance fund, though appellants devoted considerable space in their brief to the argument that service on the fund was not obtained. Appellee’s sole argument, relating to service, was to the effect that this action was brought as a class action. The heading of appellee’s Point II in the original brief reads,
“The appropriate procedure for bringing an action against an unincorporated association is by a class or representative action and the trial court correctly overruled appellants ’ motion to quash service of summons.”
¶5In her discussion under this point, appellee stated,
“This Court has held many times that the appropriate manner for obtaining service upon an unincorporated association in this state is by a class or representative action. Indeed, this is the only manner in which service can be had.”
¶6In other words, appellee never made the contention, now advanced, in her original brief. We have said on numerous occasions that we do not consider matters, in civil actions, which are not argued in the brief, and any point not argued is deemed waived. Connell v. Robinson, 217 Ark. 1, 228 S. W. 2d 475, Johnson v. Gammill, 231 Ark. 1, 328 S. W. 2d 127.
¶7In the next place, as admitted in appellee’s petition for rehearing, Exhibit 1, along with another exhibit which appellee contends to be pertinent, were not abstracted by either appellant or appellee in the original briefs. Appellee called attention to the fact that appellants had not properly abstracted these exhibits, but made no effort to supply the deficiency herself. In appellants’ reply brief, Exhibit 1 was partially abstracted, but the portion showing Louie Campbell to be a trustee of United Furniture Workers’ Insurance Fund, was omitted. Rule 9, Sub-section (e) of the procedural rules of this court provides,
“If the appellee considers the appellant’s abstract to be defective he may, at his option, submit with his brief a supplemental abstract. When the case is considered on its merits the court may impose or withhold costs to compensate either party for the other party’s noncompliance with this rule. ’ ’
¶8In Anderson v. Stallings, 234 Ark. 680, 354 S. W. 2d 21, we said,
“We have repeatedly pointed out that it is not practical for the seven members of this Court to examine the one record filed here, and that under Rule 9 the burden is on the appellant to furnish such an abstract as will give the various members of the Court an understanding of all questions presented. Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Co. v. Watt, et ux, 229 Ark. 622, 317 S. W. 2d 285. Porter v. Time Stores, Inc., 227 Ark. 286, 298 S. W. 2d 51: … We have often said that we will not explore the record; * # #
¶9Further, Rule 20, Sub-section (h), which relates to “Petitions for Rehearing,” provides,
“In no case will such petition be granted when based on any fact thought to have been overlooked by the Court, unless reference has been clearly made to same in the abstract of record prescribed by Rules 9 and 11.”
¶10Finally, even though the matter had been argued in appellee’s original brief, and the exhibits properly abstracted, it would still appear that the petition is without merit, for the reason that the provisions of Sub-section (c) of Sub-section (2), § 66-2905, have not been complied with.
¶11The petition for rehearing is denied.