State v. Prioleau’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

320 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 320 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a person is not justified in using deadly physical force upon another person if he knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety (1) by retreating, except that the actor shall not be required to retreat if he is in his dwelling, as defined in section 53a-100, or place of work and was not the initial aggressor, or if he is a peace officer or a private person assisting such peace officer at his direction, and acting pursuant to section 53a-22, or (2) by surrendering possession of property to a person asserting a claim of right thereto, or (3) by complying with a demand that he abstain from performing an act which he is not obliged to perform. “(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a person is not justified in using physical force when (1) with intent to cause physical injury or death to another person, he provokes the use of physical force by such other person, or (2) he is the initial aggressor, except that his use of physical force upon another person under such circumstances is justifiable if he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such other person his intent to do so, but such other person notwithstanding continues or threatens the use of physical force, or (3) the physical force involved was the product of a combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Scarpiello · 49 Conn. App. 420 - State v. Rigual

2. “If an improper jury instruction is of constitutional magnitude, the burden is on the state to prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.... [A]n instructional constitutional error is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that the jury was misled.... In performing harmless error analysis, we keep in mind that [i]n determining whether it was indeed reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the trial court's instructions, the charge to the jury is not to be critically dissected for the purpose of discovering possible inaccuracies of statement, but it is to be considered rather as to its probable effect upon the jury in guiding [it] to a correct verdict in the case.... The charge is to be read as a whole and individual instructions are not to be judged in artificial isolation from the overall charge.... In other words, we must consider whether the instructions [in totality] are sufficiently correct in law, adapted to the issues and ample for the guidance of the jury.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 187 Conn. App. 661 - State v. Berrios

3. “Evidence is irrelevant or too remote if there is such a want of open and visible connection between the evidentiary and principal facts that all things considered, the former is not worthy or safe to be admitted in proof of the latter. . . . Evidence is not rendered inadmissible because it is not conclusive. All that is required is that the evidence tend to support a relevant fact even to a slight degree, so long as it is not prejudicial or merely cumulative. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 3706 - Bouchard v. Bouchard, No. Fa 91-0502794 S (Mar. 16, 2001)