Volume 235 — Federal Reporter

<p>1. Appeal and Error @=>866(1)—Review—Questions Considered—Judgment on Demurrer.</p> <p>On writ of error from a judgment dismissing an action on demurrer to the complaint, the appellate court is not limited to a consideration of the particular ground of demurrer sustained by the trial court, but all questions raised by the demurrer are reviewable.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3467-3473; Dec. Dig. @=866(1).]</p> <p>2. Monopolies @=28—Anti-Trust Act—Action for Violation—Parties De-</p> <p>fendant—“Associations.”</p> <p>In Anti-Trust Act, July 2, 1890, c. 647, § 8, 26 Stat. 210 (Comp. St. 1913, § 8830), providing that the word “person” or “persons,” whenever used in the act, shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the territories, the laws of any state, or the laws of any foreign country, the woi'd “associations” includes unincorporated associations, such as labor organizations recognized by federal and state legislation as lawful, and such an organization may be sued by its name, under section 7, by one injured in his business or property by its action in violation of the provisions of the act.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Monopolies, Cent. Dig. § 18; Dec. Dig. @=>28.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Association.]</p> <p>3. Monopolies @=>28—Anti-Trust Act—Action for Damages—Sufficiency</p> <p>of Complaint.</p> <p>The complaint in an action brought under section 7 of the Anti-Trust Act by the receiver of certain coal companies against a labor organization and its constituent organizations to recover damages for injury to the business and property of the coal companies by reason of a conspiracy and combination of defendants in violation of the act, and acts done by them pursuant thereto, considered, and held to state a cause of action as against a general demurrer.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Monopolies, Cent. Dig. § 18; Dee. Dig. @=>28.]</p> <p>4. Monopolies @=28—Anti-Trust Act—Action for Damages—Defenses.</p> <p>That a plaintiff in such an action was not, at the time of the alleged unlawful acts of defendants, actually engaged in interstate commerce, does not deprive Mm of a right of action, where he was preparing to so engage, and was prevented by the wrongful acts of defendants.</p> <p>@=For oilier casos soe same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>LEd. Note.—For other eases, see Monopolies, Cent. Dig. § 18; Dec. Dig. <§=>28.]</p> <p>5. Monopolies <§=>28—Anti-Trust Act—Action for Damages—Defenses.</p> <p>That the alleged unlawful acts of defendants did not relate directly to interstate commerce is not a defense, where it was their purpose to restrain such commerce, and that was their necessary, although indirect, effect.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Monopolies, Cent. Dig. § 18; Dec. Dig. <§=>28J</p> <p>szoFor other cases see same topic & KEY^NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

Day, Judge. Suit in equity by the Central Trust Company of New York, trustee, against the Wheeling & Take Erie Railroad Company and others. From the decree, Horace F. Baker, receiver of the Wabash-Pittsburgh Terminal Railway Company, and E. E. Carpenter and others, cross-complainants, appeal.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee; John E. McCall, Judge.</p> <p>Actions by the Interstate Banking & Trust Company and others against J. W. Brown, trustee in bankruptcy of the Lesser-Ely Cotton Company, bankrupt, and others; J. W. Brown against Commercial Trust & Savings Bank and others; Commercial Trust & Savings Bank and others against J. W. Brown; and State Savings Bank of Memphis against J. W. Brown. From a judgment of the District Court confirming conclusions of the referee, the Interstate Banking & Trust Company and others appeal.</p> <p>For some years prior to April, 1913, a business as cotton factors had been carried on, at Memphis, by the Lesser-Ely Company, a partnership, of which Lesser was the active head. On the 25th day of April, Lesser disappeared. It was at once evident that the company was insolvent, and an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed on April 26th. This was duly followed by adjudication; and these controversies arise between adverse claimants in the administration of the bankrupt estate.</p> <p>As the business was regularly carried on, the Lesser-Ely Company received (e. g.,) a consignment of 10 bales of cotton. The consignor might be the grower or the grower’s vendee. Each bale bore a tag which, by gin marks and otherwise, identified this bale from- all others and enabled it to be traced back to the grower and the ginner. The Lesser-Ely Company paid the freight and similar expenses, perhaps made or had already made advances to the consignor on account of the selling price, and deposited the bales in a certain Memphis warehouse.- Eventually, the cotton was sold, and the selling price, less charges and expenses, commissions and advancements, remitted by the Lesser-Ely Company to the consignor. Sometimes the Lesser-Ely Company itself, by sufficient advances or by outright purchase, became the owner of cotton and thereafter sold to others. The warehouseman did not issue to the Lesser-Ely Company warehouse receipts from day to day as the cotton was received and stored, but issued such receipts from time to time as requested by the Lesser-Ely Company, each receipt covering 100 bales, or some convenient number.. These receipts did not identify the bales of cotton to which they referred, but each one was in the form shown by the specimen given in the margin.1 The Lesser-Ely Company used these receipts as collateral in borrowing money from banks and individuals in Memphis and the tributary cotton country, borrowing, usually if not always, $50 against each bale supposed to be represented by the receipt. When the bankruptcy came, it appeared that there were in the warehouse about 2,000 bales deposited by the Lesser-Ely Company, and that there were outstanding as collateral in the possession of these banks and individual lenders warehouse receipts for about 5,000 bales. This situation resulted from the fraud of Lesser, and the negligence of the warehouseman. All .parties exonerate the latter from intentional fraud, but he Issued receipts as requested by Lesser without insisting upon the deposit of additional bales or the cancellation of old receipts in equivalent amount, and he trusted Lesser not to ask for receipts which were not against cotton on hand. The bankrupts were also largely indebted to general creditors.</p> <p>Under the direction of the court, the entire 2,000 bales were sold by the bankruptcy trastee, and the sale proceeds of each bale or lot separately entered. Many intervening petitions were filed by cotton claimants, but it was determined that the cotton should be sold and all existing claims and liens transferred from the cotton to the proceeds. The cotton so sold was divisible into two classes: First,' that in which the total of the Lesser-Ely Company’s expenses, charges, and advances was less than the selling price. As to this cotton, it was evident—as between the consignor and the Lesser-Ely Company —that title had remained in the consignor, subject to the Lesser-Ely Company’s lien or interest for the amount due it. The second class included those bales which had been purchased by the Lesser-Ely Company or as to which its charges and advancements were greater than the sale price. As to these, it was evident that the Lesser-Ely Company’s resulting interest, legal or equitable, covered the entire title to and interest in the cotton.</p> <p>The intervening petitions were by consignors and by receipt holding pledgees. The consignors demanded their respective bales of cotton, subject to such charges and advances as existed. Each holder of a warehouse receipt as collateral security demanded the number of bales called for by his receipt. The bankruptcy trustee answered and claimed title superior to the consignors and the receipt holders. The receipt holders denied the right of the consignors, and the consignors denied the right of the receipt holders; and many subordinate controversies also arose as to special rights or defenses alleged by or against individual claimants. It is sufficient for present purposes to say that the referee held that the claims of the consignors were valid against both trustee and receipt holders; that as to the remainder of the property, after that identified by the consignors was withdrawn, and including the surplus value over the consignor’s interest in cotton partly paid 1'or, the receipt holders were tenants in common, among whom the fund should be distributed proportionately; and that the bankruptcy trustee took nothing. Those conclusions were confirmed by the district judge, excepting that he disallowed entirely, because usurious, the claim of the largest receipt holder. This receipt holder, the Interstate Banking & Trust Company, brings appeal No. 2717, the bankruptcy trustee brings appeal No. 2718, and other receipt holders bring appeals Nos. 2885 and 2886.</p>

Safer, Judge. Action by Charles E. Levy against Herman H. Hoffman. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Hoffman owned the stock control of the Demócrata Cananea-Sonora Copper Company, and desired to sell out. Levy thought that the personal relations of himself and some associates with Mr. Greene of the Greene Consolidated Company were such that he could get Greene to buy the Demócrata.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke; Henry Clay McDowell, Judge.</p> <p>On rehearing. Former opinion (230 Fed. 88, 144 C. C. A. 386), reversing judgment below, adhered to.</p>

Tuttle, Judge. Suit in admiralty for collision by the Lehigh Valley Transportation Company, owner of the steamer Bethlehem, against the steamer Australia and the barge Polynesia, the Australia Transit Company, claimant, with cross-libel, and intervening libels of the Federal Insurance Company and others. From the decree, the Australia Transit Company and the Insurance Companies appeal.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>Suit in admiralty by the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company against the steamship Satilla, the Texas City Steamship Company, claimant, with the Chiarello Bros. Company, impleaded. Decree for libelant against the Chiarello Bros. Company, and that company appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United Slates for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>Suit in admiralty by the Munson Steamship Dine against the Glasgow Navigation Company, Limited. From a decree dismissing the libel, libelant appeals.</p>

Petition by Maria Julia Wolf for a writ of mandamus directed to the District Court of the United VStales for the Northern District of California, Second Division, and William C. Van Fleet, Judge of said court.

<p>Specific Performance <®^>71—Right to Remedy—Construction of Contract.</p> <p>A contract by which defendant, an electrical engineer, was employed by complainant, a manufacturer of electrical appliances, and bound himself to assign to complainant any patentable inventions made by him during his employment, but expressly excepting any “not applicable to the line manufactured by this company,” held not to so clearly apply to a patent for a system of motor control, which included as one of its elements a mechanical structure, not within complainant’s line of manufacture, as to entitle complainant to enforce specific performance.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Specific Performance, Cent. Dig. § 204; Dec. Dig. <®=>71.]</p> <p><§=»For other oases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore; John C. Rose, Judge.</p> <p>Petition in admiralty by the Chesapeake Steamship Company of Baltimore City, as owner of the steam tug Southern and scow No. 8, for limitation of liability. From a decree holding petitioner not liable for collision, Max A. Cohen, Joseph P. Harris, and the State of Maryland, to the use of Frances Cohen, widow of Phineas Cohen, damage claimants, appeal.</p>

Suit in admiralty by Sidoro Vaccarino against the steamship Themistocles; Nicholas D. Goulandris, claimant. Decree for libelant, and claimant appeals. Affirmed. This cause comes here on appeal from a decree of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York, awarding the libelant the sum of $4,800 damages, together with costs.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Oklahoma; John H. Cotteral, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by Frank Kell against R. A. Moody. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

, Judge. Libels by William Eedwitch, by Peter Johnson, by Edward Pressy, by Enoch Spratley, and by R. D. Smith, administrator of William Byrd, deceased, against the steamship Anglo-P'atagonian; Stanley Eord, master and claimant. These causes were consolidated and heard together. Decree for libelants, and claimant appeals.

<p>1. Indians <&->1o(1)—Lands—Restrictions on Alienation.</p> <p>The original Creek treaty of March 1, 1801 (31 Stat. 863, c. 670, § 4), provided that allotted lands selected for a minor should not be sold during his minority. The Supplemental Agreement of June 30, 1902 (32 Sta.t. 503, c. 1323, § 16), which became effective August 8, 1902, provided that allotted lands should not be incumbered or alienated before the expiration of live years, except with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. Act May 27, 190S, c. 199, § 1, 35 Stat. 312, provided as follows: “From and after sixty days from the dato of this act * * * all allotted lands of enrolled full bloods, and enrolled mixed bloods of three-quarters or more Indian blood, including minors of such degrees of blood, shall not be subject to alienation, * * * or any other incumbrance prior to April 26, 1931, * * * nothing herein shall be construed to impose restrictions removed from land by or under any law prior to the passage of this act.” Held, that the allotment of a three-quarter blood Creek Indian, who was a minor when the last-named act became effective, was subject to the restrictions therein prescribed after she attained her majority, although such minors who reached their majority before July 27, 1908, were freed from restrictions.</p> <p>^rs>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Indians, Cent. Dig. § 37; Dec. Dig. <@=>15 (1).]</p> <p>2. Statutes <@=>228—Construction—Exceptions from General Words.</p> <p>All that is not clearly embraced in an exception from the general words of a statute remains within the scope of the principal provision.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 310; Dee. Dig. <@=>228.]</p> <p><S=s>Por other cases see same topic & ICBY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Southern Division of the Western District of Washington; Edward E. Cushman, Judge. Suit in admiralty for collision by the Strathalbyn Steamship Company, Limited, as owner of the steamship Strathalbyn and bailee of a cargo of lumber, against the steamship Virginian, the American-Hawaiian Steamship Company, claimant, with cross-libel. From a decree dividing damages, both parties appeal.

Boyd, Judge. Bill in equity by the United States against J. B. Minor, administrator of C. O. Ward, deceased, and others. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainant appeals.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Oklahoma; Ralph E. Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by H. G. Cheney, C. C. Harmon, A. F. Vandersall, John Jelinek, and E. K. Cheney against David Etchen and W. C. Drumm. Decree for complainants, and defendants appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York.</p> <p>Suit in admiralty for collision by Clarence E. Bleakley, owner of the barge U. H. No. 66, against the steam tug William E. Cleary, the Cornell Steamboat Company, claimant, and the steam tug Transfer No. 10, the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, claimant, impleaded. Decree for libelant against the Cleary, and her claimant appeals.</p> <p>This is an appeal from a decree in admiralty of the District Court entered on August 2, 1915, after a hearing upon a libel in rem. The occasion of the suit was injuries to the barge U. H. No. 66, loaded with a cargo of stone and injured by contact with a railroad float in tow of Transfer No. 10 at 9 p. m. on January 30, 1914. The owner of the barge U. H. No. 66 filed a libel in rem against the steam tug William E. Cleary, which had her in tow at the time of the collision. The Cleary’s owners appeared and answered, denying fault, and petitioned in the Transfer No. 10, whose floats came in contact with the U. H. No. 66. The New York, New Haven & Hartford Railway Company claimed the Transfer No. 10, and answered the petition of the Cleary’s owners, and also answered the libel. The decree dismissed the petition against the Transfer No. 10, with costs, and awarded damages against the William E. Cleary for $1,436.40, with costs and interest.</p> <p>The facts are as follows: The U. H. No. 66 on the 30th day of January, 1914, was taken in tow by the tug Terry, belonging to the Cornell Steamship Company, at the foot of Eifty-Eifth street in the North River, bound for the south side of Pier 42 in the East River, where her cargo was to be discharged. She was taken into a general tow at about 4:30 p. m. that day; the weather being clear, the wind light, and the tide flood. The Cleary was a helper tug' engaged with the tow in picking out separate barges and taking them to their destination. After the tow had rounded the Battery and had gone up the East River to about Corlear’s Hook, the Terry rounded to, facing the flood tide and Jetting her tow tail off up the river, opposite Cherry street. She waited in this position some time until the Cleary, which had been towing two other barges to Wallabout Bay, came back and took upon her starboard hand the barge ü. H. No. 66. This was well above Corlear street. The Cleary proceeded along the port side of the tow, keeping inshore so as to get the effect of an eddy which makes at that point upon the flood tide close in towards Corlear’s Hook Park. Pier 42 is just south of the Jackson Square pier, and in order to reach it the Cleary had to starboard her wheel somewhat so as to clear the end of the pier. In doing so she exposed the starboard bow of the barge a.t a substantial angle to the full force of the flood tide, which is close to the pier ends at that point. This caused the barge to swing off so much to port that the Cleary had to drop back and to try a second time to clear the pier ends by keeping further off, so that she would have to starboard only a little and not expose the bow at so great an angle to the tide. She had worked down until she was just about off the end of the Jackson Street pier and in a position almost to clear it.</p> <p>Meanwhile, the Transfer No. 10, with a car float on either hand, was coming down the river and had starboarded around Corlear’s Hook under the tail of the Terry’s tow, which had remained in place. She passed the tow on her starboard hand and eventually came in sight of the Cleary in a position which seemed to the Transfer’s captain to be hanging to the end of the Jackson Square pier. Shortly thereafter, the Transfer blew two blasts, and her captain says that she got the same in answer. The captain of the Cleary says that, at once upon hearing the blasts of the Transfer, he looked about and was afraid, if he ported, he would expose his stern to the Transfer, which was coming down too close for safety. Therefore he backed and blew an alarm, and he continued backing until the time of the accident. The Transfer for a time continued her course, but, seeing the lights on the Cleary change, and eventually getting her red light half a minute or less before the accident she starboarded and backed. Through the backing of the Cleary, probably coupled with the strength of the tide, the barge was swung strongly to port nearly across stream, and her port bow struck the starboard car float a little forward of amidships, causing the damage in Question.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Colorado; Jacob Trieber, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by the United States against the Exploration Company, Limited, and Philip L. Foster. Decree for'the United States and defendants appeal.</p>

Suit in admiralty for collision by Michael Blasius and Nicholas Blasius, owners of the steamer Seneca, against the steam tug Daniel Willard; the Pennsylvania Coal Company, claimant. From a decree holding both vessels in fault, libelants appeal.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Iowa; John C. Pollock, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by the G. W. Parsons Company against the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company of Baltimore, Md. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Suits in admiralty for collision by John H. Flannery, owner of the barge Economy, against the steam tug Pocahontds, the Cornell Steamboat Company, claimant, with the steamship Maia impleaded, Otto Schacht, claimant, and by Otto Schacht against the tug Pocahontas.

Suit in admiralty by the Brooklyn Ash Removal Company against the scow Nellie T.; Ellen T. Connell, claimant. From a decree dismissing the libel on exceptions, libelant appeals.

Trip-pet, Judge. Suit in admiralty for collision by M. Costa and others, owners of the gasoline boat E’Etruria, against the gasoline boat; Noe G.; Onerato Chappi, claimant. Decree dividing damages, and claimant appeals.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri; David P. Dyer, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by the Economy Fuse & Manufacturing Company against the Killark Electric Manufacturing Company. From an interlocutory order, complainant appeals.</p>

Suit in equity by the Page Machine Company against Dow, Jones & Co. Decree for complainant (230 Fed. 164), and defendant appeals. This is an appeal from a decree of the District Court, entered on December 21, 1915, awarding an injunction for the infringement of letters patent 780,664, issued to John M, Joy on January 24,..1905.

<p>1. Patents <§=>168(2)—Construction—Limitations Imposed by Patent Office.</p> <p>A limitation imposed by the Patent Office to distinguish from prior references, and accepted by the applicant, cannot be disregarded, although it may have been unnecessary.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 244; Dec. Dig. <§=>.168(2).]</p> <p>2. Patents <§=>328—Infringement—Gas Sad Iron.</p> <p>The Spahr and Stichler patent No. 948,773, for a gas sad iron, construed in view of the limitations imposed by the Patent Office, held not infringed.</p> <p>3. Patents <§=>150—Disclaimer—Construction and Operation.</p> <p>The differentiation introduced into the claims of a patent by a disclaimer must have previously appeared somewhere, either in the drawings or specification; otherwise, the disclaimer becomes no more than a making over of the whole patent, and the matter discarded must appear with sufficient clearness to advise the art and to show that it was comprehended by the patentee.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 224; Dee. Dig. <§=>150.]</p> <p>4. Patents <§=>28—Designs—Invention.</p> <p>The test of invention is the same for designs as for mechanical patents, and to show invention the design must have been something beyond the ability of the ordinary routine designer.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 33; Dec. Dig. <§=>28.]</p> <p>5. Patents <§=>328—Invention—Design for Sad Iron.</p> <p>The Spahr and Stichler design patent, No. 42,443, for a design for a sad iron, held void for lack of invention.</p> <p><©ss>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Patents <3r=>328—Infringement—Heating System for Automobiles.</p> <p>The Williams patent, No. 878,399, for a heating and ventilating system for automobiles, as the claims were amended to meet the requirements of the Patent Office is for an indirect or circulatory system having as one of the elements of the combination a register which may be opened and closed by the occupants of the car, and is not infringed by a system which heats by direct radiation and has no register.</p> <p>2. Words and Phrases—“Direct and Indirect Heating Systems”—'“Radiating and Circulatory Heating Systems.”</p> <p>All heating apparatus is of one or the other of two types, direct or indirect. In the direct, the heating body or box is in the room to be heated and the radiation is direct; in the indirect, the heating box is outside the room to be heated, and it heats a body of air in passing over it, which body of air is then conducted to the room to be heated, thus indirectly accomplishing the result. The two systems are also distinguished as “radiating” and “circulatory.”</p> <p>(go^For other casos seo same topic & KEY-NUMBEK in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

‘ Suit in equity by the Van Kannel Revolving Door Company against Nathan Straus, Jesse I. Straus, Percy S. Straus, and Plerbert M. Straus, trading as R. H. Macy & Co. Decree for complainant, and defendants appeal. This is an appeal from an interlocutory decree of the District Court entered October 28, 3915, finding claims 2 and 8 of United States patent No. 656,062 valid and infringed and awarding an injunction against the defendant for infringing the same.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>Bill by the American Graphophone Company against the American Parlograph Corporation. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainant appeals.</p> <p>On appeal from a decree of the District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissing the bill which was based on five letters patent for Graphophone-reproducers and Sound-reproducers.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the United Shoe Machinery Company against the Farmington Shoe Manufacturing Company and the Champion Shoe Machinery Company. On final hearing. Decree for complainant.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by Edwin Thaeher against the Inhabitants of the Town of Falmouth. On final hearing. Decree for defendant.</p>

<p>1. Patents <®=c>283(1)—Agreements—Estoppel.</p> <p>Wliere defendant, having been threatened with an infringement suit, agreed to destroy all machinery used .in the construction of those portions of the tool which were claimed to be an infringement, to deliver up all tools on hand, to respect the validity of the patent, and to thereafter avoid all infringements, such agreement as between the parties established the validity of the patent and the prior infringement, but does not prevent defendant from showing that tools subsequently constructed, differing from the original ones, did not infringe the patent, and for that purpose defendant may show the prior art as limiting the scope of complainant’s patent.</p> <p>@==>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. §§ 448-450, 452; Dec. Dig. <8=283(1).]</p> <p>2. Patents <@=272, 311—Infringement Suits—Prior Art.</p> <p>In an infringement suit, proof of the state of the prior art to aid in the construction of the patent is admissible in equity cases without any averment in the answer touching the subject, and in actions at law without the giving of tho notice required when evidence is offered to invalidate a patent.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. §§ 417, 541, 542; Dec. Dig. <@=272, 311.]</p> <p>S. BvinENOE <@=5(1)—Judicial Notice—Matters of Common Knowledge.</p> <p>The court is bound to take judicial notice of matters of common knowledge.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 4; Dec. Dig. <S=5(1); Patents, Cent. Dig. § 543.]</p> <p>4. Patents <8=168(2)—Claims—Surrender.</p> <p>Where a patentee did not appeal from the decision of tho examiner rejecting his claims, but filed new and more restricted claims, he is, regardless of the propriety of the examiner’s decision, presumed to have dedicated to the public all claims withdrawn.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 244; Dec. Dig. <@=168(2).]</p> <p>5. Patents <@=328—Construction—Infringement.</p> <p>Patent No. 737,179, for an improvement in screw-drivers, held, in view of the proceedings in the Patent Oiiice and the prior state of the art, to be limited to the conoidal shape of the bolster and lower part of the handle, and, as limited, not to be infringed.</p> <p>6. Patents <2=316—Infringement Suits—Relief—Unfair Competition.</p> <p>In a suit for infringement of a patent, no relief for unfair competition, in that defendant dressed its goods so as to palm them off on the public as those of complainant, can be granted.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 562; Dec. Dig. <@=316'.]</p> <p><@=For other eases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER, in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

In Equity. Suit by Nelson J. Quinn against J. H. Faw, Incorporated. On final hearing. Decree for defendant. This is the usual suit in equity to enjoin infringement of the first four claims of a patent to H. A. Myers, No. 1,099,715. The invention relates to directing rays of light, projected forward by a reflector, particularly in connection with motor vehicles; the purpose being to increase the intensity and decrease any objectionable light dispersion.

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Eovell-McConnell Manufacturing Company against the General Automobile Supply Company. On final hearing. Decree for defendant.</p>

<p>Patents <3=no328—Validity and Infringement—Device for Watering CnicKS.</p> <p>The Day patent, No. 727,597, for an automatic watering device for chicks, held not anticipated, valid, and infringed.</p> <p><S=oFor other caaes see same topic & KEY-NUMBEB in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Patents <@=>328—Infringement—Pulp Digester.</p> <p>The Russell reissue patent, No. 11,282 (original No. 445,235), for a pulp digester, held infringed.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the bankruptcy of Mary It. MeAusland. On petitions to review referee’s disposition of fund realized from sale of real estate. Decree ordered in conformity with opinion.

<p>1. Bankruptcy <©=292—Suit by Trustee—Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Under Bankruptcy Act July 1, 1898, c. 541,. § 70e, 30 Stat. 565 (Comp. St. 1913, § 9654), and section 23b, as amended by Act June 25, 1910, c. 412, § 7, 36 Stat. 840 (Comp. St. 1913, § 9607), a District Court has jurisdiction of a suit by a trustee to recover property fraudulently transferred by the bankrupt without the consent of the defendant. Such a suit is also cognizable in equity.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 410, 413, 415, 416; Dec. Dig. @=>292.]</p> <p>2. Fraudulent Conveyances <©=>155, 269(1)—Elements of Fraud—Intent.</p> <p>To justify the setting aside of a deed for fraud, there must have been fraud on the part of the grantor, participated or acquiesced, in by the grantee, which must be not only proved, but particularly alleged.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. §§ 493, 789-794; Dec. Dig. <@=>155, 269(1).]</p> <p><§ss>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>8. Equity <§=>288—Pleading—Amendment to Meet Evidence.</p> <p>Where evidence has been fully taken without objection on an issue not made by the pleadings, complainant may be permitted to amend his bill to meet the evidence and present such issue.</p> <p>[Ed. .Note.—For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. § 547; Dec. Dig. <§=>288.]</p> <p>4. Bankruptcy <§=»284—Fraudulent Conveyance—Suit to Recover Property.</p> <p>It is to be assumed, in, the absence of proof to the contrary, that a trustee in bankruptcy has been injured by a conveyance made by the bankrupt in fraud of hi's creditors, and it is unnecessary for the trustee to obtain judgment as a condition to maintaining a suit for recovery of the property.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Dec. Dig. <§=>284.]</p> <p>5. Fraudulent Conveyances <§=>299(1)—Suit to Set Aside—Evidence of Fraud.</p> <p>In a suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance, where the fraud must necessarily be shown largely or entirely by circumstantial evidence, such evidence must be considered in its entirety, without giving undue importance to isolated facts.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. § 876; Dec. Dig. <§=>2'99(1).]</p> <p>6. Fraudulent Conveyances <§=>299(13)—Recovery oe Property by Trustee —Evidence.</p> <p>Evidence considered, and helé sufficient to establish that a conveyance of property by a bankrupt and his mother was without consideration, and made solely for the fraudulent purpose of covering and protecting the property from present and future creditors, to which purpose the grantee was a party, and that the property was recoverable by the bankrupt’s trust ee as a part of his estate.</p> <p>[Fd. Note.—For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. § 800; Dec. Dig. <§=>299(13).]</p> <p>7. Fraudulent Conveyances <§=>69(1)—Grounds oe Invalidity—Intent to Defraud Subsequent Creditors.</p> <p>A voluntary conveyance is fraudulent and voidable as to subsequent creditors, where it appears that the grantor intended to withdraw the property from the reach of such creditors.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Gent. Dig. §§ 178-180; Dec. Dig. <§=>69(1).]</p> <p>8. Wills <§=>634(14)—Vested Remainders.</p> <p>Under a will giving to the two sons of testator a life interest in real estate, with remainder to his grandchildren, “not only those now bom, but who shall be hereafter bom,” to be equally divided among the grandchildren living at the death of the survivor of the two sons, bankrupt, who was a grandchild living at the time of the death of the testator, took a vested interest, which passed to his trustee in bankruptcy.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—Eor other cases, see Wills,. Cent. Dig. § 1502; Dec. Dig. <§=>634(14).]</p> <p><@saFor other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by J. W. Jackson and others against E. S. Cravens, Supervising Inspector of Naval Stores, or purporting to be Supervising Inspector, and others. On. application for preliminary injunction.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by Darwin S. Wolcott against the National Electric Signaling Company, in which R. A. Eessenden, intervened. On motion by Fessenden to strike out interrogatories filed by Wolcott.</p>

In Equity. Suit by George H. Allen against Walker & Gibson. On final hearing. Decree for complainant. Suit in equity to restrain alleged infringement of complainant’s registered trade-mark “Cedarine” by the use by defendant of the name “O-Cedar” and for an accounting. The goods dealt in and sold by each party, and to which such names respectively are applied, are similar in character; both being a furniture polish.

<p>Petition of George S. Avery and Lila Avery for a writ of habeas corpus for the discharge from the National Guard of North Carolina of Richard Sandiord Avery, a minor.</p>

• In Equity. Suit by Elias C. Benedict against the City of New York. Decree for defendant. This is a suit in equity to enforce an: express trust under the following circumstances: By chapter 326 of the Laws of New York of 1874 provision was made for the improvement of certain streets and avenues in a part of Long Island City in the state of New York.

<p>In Admiralty. Suit by William D. Dittmar, owner of the scow John J., against the Frederick Starr Contracting Company and the Elliot C. Bi-own Company. Decree for Jibelant for one-half damages.</p>

In Admiralty. Suit by H. Dexter Malone and others against the gasoline schooner Gyda. In the matter of the claim of Frank R. Neal, intervener, to a maritime lien. Claim disallowed.

<p>At Law. Action by Keeler Bros., a corporation, against the Yellowstone Valley National Bank, a corporation. On motion by defendant to open its default.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the bankruptcy of John Applegate. Ex parte application by the J. M. Minugh Company to vacate the discharge of the bankrupt and for permission to file specifications. This is an application to vacate the discharge of the bankrupt and to be allowed to file specifications, under the following circumstances: The involuntary petition was filed against the bankrupt on the 6th day of October, 1915.

Suit by Nathaniel L. Carpenter against Joseph T. Beal and another. From the decree, which granted only part of the relief sought, both defendants and plaintiff appeal.

Reed, Judge. In the matter of the B. F. Richardson Company, bankrupt; Herman Ternes, trustee. From an order denying its petition for reclamation of property, and also petition to revise such order, the Smith Wallace Shoe Company appeals.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern Division of the Southern District of Illinois.</p> <p>In the matter of Walker Starter Company, bankrupt. Petition of the E. R. Essley Machinery Company to recover possession of certain personal property. From a decree of the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, Northern Division for the trustee, petitioner appeals.</p>

Suit in admiralty by the Clinton Point Stone Company, owner of scow No. 37, against the steam tug Milton, the Red Star Towing & Transportation Company, claimant, and the New York Trap Rock Company, impleaded. Decree dismissing the libel, and libelant appeals. On appeal by the Clinton Point Stone Company, owner of the scow No. 37, from a decree which dismissed the libel against the steam tug Milton with costs.

Suit in equity by the Porter Safety Seal Company against E. J. Brooks & Co. for infringement of letters patent No. 719,865, for a seal, granted to Thomas I. Porter February 3, 1903. Decree for defendant, and complainant appeals. The following is the opinion of Mayer, District Judge, in the court below : The patent relates to seals for mail bags and for money bags.

Suit in equity by the De I,aski & Thropp Circular Woven Tire Company and the John E. Thropp’s Sons Company against the United States Tire Company. Decree for defendant, and complainants appeal. The decree of the District Court dismissed the bill on claims 1 and 2 of patent No. 822,561, to Peter D. Thropp for an “apparatus for manufacturing wheel tires.”

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Oriental Tissue Company against Eouis De Jonge & Co. On final hearing. Decree for defendant.</p>

<p>1. Patents <§=292—Suits for Infringement—Interrogatories.</p> <p>In a suit for infringement of patents for an article made by a chemical process, and the process of making the same, interrogatories by complainant should not be in the language of the claims, which use terms the meaning of which may.be open to dispute; but defendant may be required to produce a true sample of its manufacture, and to state in accurate detail the process employed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 446; Dee. Dig. <®=292.]</p> <p>2. Patents <§=292.—Suits for Infringement—Interrogatories.</p> <p>In such a suit, an interrogatory requiring defendant to state whether it made, used, or sold an article like that “illustrated” by one attached to the interrogatory is objectionable, as indefinite.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 446; Dec. Dig. <§=292.]</p> <p>3. Patents <§=292—Suits for Infringement—Interrogatories.</p> <p>In infringement suits, interrogatories by complainant should not ordinarily be in the language of the claims of the patent, which may call for their construction by defendant, nor should a defendant be required to state the names of experts or others from whom the information for his answers is obtained.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 446; Dec. Dig. <@=292.]</p> <p>4. Pleading <@=323(1)—Suits for Infringement of Patent—Bill of Particulars—Exchange of Dates.</p> <p>In an infringement suit, where anticipation is pleaded, complainant is entitled on demand to a bill of particulars stating the prior patents or publications, 'or prior use, proof of which will be offered and relied upon by defendant; but complainant must at the time of demanding such bill of particulars serve on defendant a statement of the approximate date of invention as claimed by him.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. § 976; Dec. Dig. <§=323(1).]</p> <p><§=For oilier cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by Rudolph G. Wirtalla and the Steel Heddle Manufacturing Company against Isaac A. Hall, individually and doing business as I. A. Hall & Co. On final hearing. Decree for defendant.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Oswin W. Shelly, bankrupt. On review of decision of referee.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the bankruptcy of Rosenthal Bros. The United States of America claimed priority for balance due upon duties imposed on goods imported by the bankrupts. On petition to review the order of the referee, holding the United States entitled to priority. This is a petition to review the order of a referee in bankruptcy holding the United States entitled under section 64a of the Bankruptcy Act to a priority in the payment of a claim.

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Elon E. Forbes, alleged bankrupt. On motion to amend petition.</p>

In Equity. Suits by the Nevada-Califomia Power Company, a corporation, against Joseph Hamilton, as Treasurer and ex officio Tax Receiver of the County of Esmeralda, and others, and against Nathaniel K. Eranklin, in his capacity as Treasurer and ex officio Tax Receiver of the County of Nye, and others.

<p>In Bankruptcy. Petition for involuntary bankruptcy by Roszell Bros, and others against the Continental Coal Corporation, to which trustee in voluntary bankruptcy of the defendant in the District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee and a committee of creditors filed answers. On exception to referee’s finding as to principal place of business of defendant, and motion to stay proceedings.</p>

<p>1. Habeas Corpus @=>94—Scope of Inquiry—Arrest under City Ordinance.</p> <p>In habeas corpus to determine jurisdiction of state courts, as opposed to military courts, to try offenses by members of the military, the fact that an arrest is under a city ordinance is immaterial, if the ordinance is valid.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other eases, see Habeas Corpus, Cent. Dig. §§ 82, 92; Dec. Dig. @=>94.]</p> <p>2. Habeas Corpus @=>45(2)—When Writ mat Issue.</p> <p>The power to issue writ of habeas corpus under Rev. St. § 753 (Comp. St. 1913, § 1281), is to be sparingly exercised, especially when directed toward release of members of the military accused of offenses against the peace of the state; the jurisdiction of the civil courts of the state over such offenses in time of peace being admitted.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Habeas Corpus, Cent. Dig. §§ 38-45; Dee. Dig. @=>45(2).]</p> <p>3. Constitutional Law @=>68(1)—Evidence @=>48—Judicial Notice—State of War—Political Questions.</p> <p>The existence of a condition of war must be determined by the political department of the government, and the courts will take judicial notice of such determination and are bound thereby.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 125; Dec. Dig. @=>68(1); Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 70; Dec. Dig. @=>48.]</p> <p>4. Habeas Corpus @=>45(4)—Scope of Inquirt—Jurisdiction of Federal Courts. ;</p> <p>Under the Habeas Corpus Act (Comp. St. 1913, §§ 1279-1293), a federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of detention of a prisoner held by a state on a criminal charge, if the petitioner alleges that the alleged offense was committed in the performance of his duty as a soldier of the United States, and the court may determine summarily whether such allegation is true, and, if true, may discharge the prisoner on the ground that the state court is without jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Habeas Corpus, Cent. Dig. §§ 38-45; Dec. Dig. @=>45(4); Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 804, 805.]</p> <p>5. Armt and Navt @=>3—State and Federal Courts—Jurisdiction—Offenses bt the Military.</p> <p>If military authorities have the right to try members of the military for violations of state law or municipal ordinances, it is by virtue of a federal law, and if there is such a law it is paramount; nor does it deprive citizens of any rights under state law. ,</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Army and Navy, Cent. Dig. § 6; Dec. Dig. <^=3.]</p> <p>6. Army and Navt @=>3—State an)> Federal Courts—Jurisdiction—Offenses bt the Military.</p> <p>Although military authorities may have priority to try alleged offenses against state law or municipal ordinances, it does not necessarily follow that the victims of such offenses may not by proceedings in the state courts secitre redress.</p> <p><@E5>Fór other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Army and Navy, Gent. Dig. § 6; Dec. Dig. <S^>3.]</p> <p>7. Aejiy and Navy —State and Fedeeal Couets—Jurisdiction—Offenses by the Military.</p> <p>It' a member of the military is charged with disorderly conduct in violation of a municipal ordinance, a paramount remedy is provided for by punishment by the military authorities.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Army and Navy, Gent. Dig. § 6; Dec. Dig. <§£s>3.]</p> <p>8. Army and Navy <S»3—State and Federal Ooukts—Jurisdiction—Offenses by the Military.</p> <p>Where, during mobilization of state militia, at tbe time of the Mexican trouble, a company of soldiers marching to a meeting for the purpose of encouraging enlistments pushed its way through the crowd there gathered, but it is not shown that it was done violently, or that the prosecuting witness was even touched, or that there was malice, wantonness, or criminal intent, the military authorities, and not the state courts, have authority to try members of the company for such alleged breaches of the peace.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Army and Navy, Gent. Dig. § 6; Dec. Dig. <®^>3.]</p>

<p>1. Internal Revenue <§=»9—Excise Tax on Corporations—“Insurance Company”—“Doing Business.”</p> <p>An association organized under the laws of a state for the purpose of collecting assessments from its members and disbursing the same in the payment of benefits on the death or injury of members and the expenses of the association, any surplus at the end of a year being paid into a reserve fund to be used in payment of losses in any succeeding year which may exceed the assessments for that year, is an “insurance company,” and in exercising the functions for which it was organized is “doing business,” within the meaning of those terms as used in Corporation Tax Act Aug. 5, 1909, c. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112 (Comp. St. 1913, § 6300), which provides that “every corporation * * * and every insurance company * * * organized under the laws of * * * any state * * * shall be subject to pay annually a special excise tax with respect to the carrying on or doing business by such corporation * * * or insurance company equivalent to one per centum upon the entire net income over and above five thousand dollars,” etc.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Internal Revenue, Cent. Dig.i §§ 13-28; Dec. Dig. ®=>9.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Insurance Company; Doing Business.]</p> <p>2. Internal Revenue <@=>9—Excise Tax on Corporations—Exemptions— “Fraternal Beneficiary Societies.”</p> <p>Tbe exemption from tax contained in tbe proviso of said section: “That nothing in this section contained shall apply to * * * fraternal beneficiary societies, orders or associations operating under tbe lodge system,” does not apply to such a mutual protective association organized under Gen. Code Ohio, § 9427, “fraternal benefit societies,” as distinguished from mutual protective associations, being expressly provided for in section 9462 et seq. of said Code, and defined as limited to societies having a lodge system.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Internal Revenue, Cent. Dig. §§ 13-28; Dec. Dig. <S==>9.]</p> <p>3. Internal Revenue <S=>9—Excise Tax on Corporations—Exemptions.</p> <p>The absence of profit in the operation of such an association is not tbe criterion as to whether it is witbin tbe exemption as a fraternal beneficiary society, but tbe want of a fraternal side and object wbicb it is in some measure organized to promote.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Internal Revenue, Cent. Dig. §§ 13-28; Dec. Dig. <S=s9.]</p> <p>®=»For other oases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>In Equity.' Suit by the Lead City Miners’ Union against Charles H. Moyer, the Western Federation of Miners, the Butte Miners’ Union, and others. Decree for defendants.</p>

<p>Francis Schlatter, A. Schrader, and Gus Algard were indicted for violating the postal laws. On demurrer to the indictment by A. Schrader.</p> <p>Defendant Schrader demurs both generally and specially, to the indictment herein. He is charged, along with the two other* individuals above named, with the crime of conspiracy, to violate section 215 of the federal Tenal Code, and it is alleged at some considerable length, owing to the nature of the conspiracy, that, lie and his coconspirators, together with others not known to the grand jury, combined, conspired, and confederated together to defraud numerous persons, many of them unknown to the grand jury, and being such persons as could be induced to believe the false and fraudulent misrepresentations of defendants, and to cause them to yield up to the said defendants their money and property in virtue and because of the fraudulent representations to be made by the defendants.</p> <p>Briefly, the scheme devised and contrived by the defendants, as alleged in the indictment, was that they would induce any and all persons whom they could induce to communicate with them to believe that they could and would cure almost all manner of known diseases by and through the medium of divine power. Specifically, for instance, it was alleged that the defendants conspired to represent to credulous ones, with whom they could get into communication, that they could and would bless a handkerchief, and that, if a person afflicted would apply such handkerchief to the afflicted portion of such person’s body, he or she would thereby become cured. This, of course, was to be for a quid pro quo; not necessarily certain or definite in amount, but such a sum as the one socking a cure felt justified in contributing.</p> <p>Tile indictment specifically alleges that the defendants could not cure any kind or sort of disease by divine power, and that they knew they could not effect such cures In such wise, and that they knew that persons affected with disease could not be cured by the placing of a blessed or other handkerchief upon their afflicted parts. It is also alleged that the defendants represented that they had cured many people of various kinds of disease, whereas in truth and in fact that they had not cured any person of any disease. It is further alleged that the defendants well knew that the scheme which they had contrived, and which they were executing, as alleged in the indictment, was intended by them to be used for the sole purpose of obtaining money and property from the persons intended to be defrauded, by means of the false and fraudulent representations set out in the indictment so that the defendants could convert such money and property, so obtained, to their own use and benefit, and without returning anything of value to the persons so intended to be defrauded.</p> <p>Apt allegations are made with reference to the intention to use the mails of the United States in furtherance of the scheme to defraud, and of the actual use of such mails, and of the commission of overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, and necessary to bring it within the inhibitory provisions of the Penal Code of the United States.</p>

<p>Banketjutcy <§=>317—Pbovable! Claims—Priority.</p> <p>Costs made on a writ of attachment against a bankrupt prior to the bankruptcy proceedings are provable, and entitled to preference, although the writ was- not entered, but was released after such proceedings, where such costs would have been provable and privileged under the state insolvency law.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 493-495; Dec. Dig. <§=>317.]</p> <p><©ES>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Admiralty <S=H3—Jurisdiction—Maritime Contract.</p> <p>A court of admiralty has jurisdiction of a suit for breach of a contract by which the libelant was employed for a year as master of a vessel, notwithstanding the fact that he was also required to assist at a fish-packing plant on shore when possible “without interfering with his duties as such master.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Admiralty, Cent. Dig. §§ 104-1.76; Dec. Dig. ®=>13.]</p> <p>2. Courts <s^>189(1)—Concurrent Remedies—Effect of Docal Statutes.</p> <p>A local statute of frauds cannot deprive one of the right to relief in a case where redress is afforded by the maritime law, and is sought to be availed of in a cause of action maritime in its nature, and depending in a court of admiralty of the United States.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. § 1320; Dec. Dig. <8=»4S9(1).]</p> <p>©=>For other eases see same topic & KEY-NUIUBSB in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

Suit in admiralty by the W. J. McCahan Sugar Refining Company against the steamship Julia Duckenbach, with the Insular Dine, Edgar F. Duckenbach and others, owners of the Julia Duckenbach impleaded. Decree for libelant in the sum of $100,774.87 against all respondents, with limitation of liability to claimants of the Duckenbach, and the Insular Dine appeals.

<p>1. Monopolies <©=>17(2)—Patents—Restrictive. Licenses.</p> <p>Under the Clayton Bill (Act Oct. 15,1914, c. 323, § 3, 38 Stat. 731), making it unlawful to lease or sell goods, machinery, or supplies on a condition that the lessee or purchaser shall not use or deal in the goods, machinery,' or supplies of a competitor of the lessor'or seller, where such condition may substantially lessen competition and create a monopoly, complainant, who by virtue of patents had a monopoly for the manufacture of motion picture projecting machines, cannot, in selling or leasing such machines, require the purchaser to use films manufactured by it, its letters patent for films having expired, and such a contract is invalid, as tending to create a nionopoly.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Monopolies, Cent. Dig. § 13; Dec. Dig. <S=>17(2).]</p> <p>2. Monopolies <©=>10—Statutes—Applicability.</p> <p>The Clayton Bill, leveled at monopolies, applies to contracts entered into before its enactment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Monopolies, Cent. Dig. § 9; Dec. Dig. <©=>10.]</p> <p>3. Monopolies <@=>10—Power op State—Clayton Bill—Applicability.</p> <p>Where a contract involved and restrained interstate commerce, the Clayton bill is applicable, though the particular acts of restraint and infringement occurred in the state of New York, where the contract was made.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Monopolies, Cent. Dig. § 9; Dec. Dig.. <®=>10.]</p> <p>4. Monopolies <@=>23—Rights Under Contracts—Use op Patented Articles—Restriction.</p> <p>Where the holder of a patent for motion picture projecting machines required one .licensed to- manufacture to impose conditions as to the use of films in the machines, in violation of the Clayton Bill, one who leased a machine sold by the manufacturer to a third person is not bound to-observe such conditions, on the theory that a patent license cannot be relied on and its terms repudiated.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Monopolies, Cent. Dig. § 16; Dec. Dig. <@=>23.]</p> <p>On Petition for Rehearing.</p> <p>5. Patents <©=>210—Sale op Patented Article—Use.</p> <p>The sale of a patented motion picture projecting machine carries with it, in the absence of restriction, an implied license of use.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. §§ 301, 302; Dec. Dig. <@=>210.] '</p> <p>6. Patents <©=>216—Construction—Restriction.</p> <p>The fact that there was attached to a patented motion picture projecting machine a plate reciting that the sale and purchase of the machine gave only the right to use it upon other terms tó be fixed does not, where it did not appear that the terms relating to royalty were ever fixed or brought to the notice of a purchaser from a licensee to manufacture, entitle the holder of the patent rights to Royalties.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 329; Dec. Dig. > <©=>216.]</p> <p>@=»For other oases see same topic & KEY-NÚMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes.</p> <p>7. Patents <§=>216—Construction—Restriction.</p> <p>In such case, evidence that the purchaser had knowledge of the terms upon which the holder of the patent rights was accustomed to grant permission to use a machine manufactured by its licensees will not establish the purchaser’s liability for royalties; there being nothing in the notice to prevent the holder of the patent rights from varying the royalties.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 329; Dee. Dig. <§=>216.]</p> <p>tg^For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Patents @=>328—Validity and Infringement—Fabric-Folding Machine.</p> <p>The Isaacs and Pellar patent, No. 819,548, for a fabric-folding machine which automatically adapts itself to the height of the pile of goods when successively folded, held valid and infringed by the device made under the Sussman patent, No. 1,102,555, for an improved machine.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Dec. Dig. <@=>828.]</p> <p>2. Patents <@=>157(2)—Construction of Claims—Ambiguity.</p> <p>A claim of a patent, although ambiguous, should, if possible, be so construed as to give it a valid moaning, rather than one which would make it purposeless.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 231; Dee. Dig. <§=>157(2).]</p> <p><gx^>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill by the Coca-Cola Company against the Koke Company of America and others. Decree for complainant.</p>

In Equity. Bill by Sarah C. Eckerson and others against Thomas F. Tanney and others. On motion to confirm the report of a special master directing specific performance of a contract to sell land. Report confirmed, with modifications. The case comes on upon a motion to confirm the report of a special master in a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land.

<p>1. United States <§=>23—House of Representatives—Powers of—Impeachment Proceedings.</p> <p>A subcommittee of the House of Representatives, acting under a resolution for the impeachment of a United States district attorney, is acting within constitutional limits when it investigates the attorney’s acts.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—Eor other cases, see United States, Gent. Dig. § 15; Dec. Dig. <§=>23.]</p> <p>2. United States <§=>21—Congress—House of Representatives—Contempt.</p> <p>While the House of Representatives has not the power of the English House of Commons of punishing contempts, yet it may punish a federal district attorney for insulting language or contumacious conduct directed towards a subcommittee of the House investigating a resolution for bis impeachment.</p> <p><g=^For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see United States, Cent. Dig. § IB; Dec. Dig. <S^21.J</p> <p>3. United States Congress—House of Representatives—Powers of.</p> <p>As the House of Representatives, in preferring charges for impeachment, is acting in a judicial capacity, the courts will not interfere with its act in punishing one for contempt on the ground that his insulting charges or contumacious conduct impeded the investigation of a resolution for impeachment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—Dor other cases, see United States, Gent. Dig. § 13; Dec. Dig. <3rs>21.]</p> <p>other cases see same topic & KEY-NUM1315R in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Shipping @=>132(3)—Liability foe Damage to Cargo—Burden of Proof.</p> <p>The buiden of proof to show that damage to cargo after it had been delivered to the ship was from a cause within an exception in the bills of lading rests on the carrier.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Shipping, Cent. Dig. §§ 479-481; Dec. Dig. @=>132(3).]</p> <p>2. Shipping @=>122—Liability for Damage to Cargo—Negligence of Stevedore. ' ,</p> <p>As between shipper and carrier, a stevedore, although an independent contractor, is a servant of the shipowner, for whose negligence, resulting in damage to the cargo, lie is responsible.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Shipping, Cent. Dig. §§ 452, 453, 45G, 457; Dec. Dig. @=>122.]</p> <p>3. Shipping @=>141(3)—Liability for Damage to Cargo—Perils of the Sea.</p> <p>Damage to cargo, which had been loaded, by reason of the slipping of a heavy steel rod from the sling while being lowered through a hatchway, which broke through the bottom and caused the sinking of the ship, was not from a peril of the sea, within an exception in the bills of lading.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Shipping, Cent. Dig. § 498; Dec. Dig. @=>141(3).]</p> <p>4. Shipping @=>141 (1)—Liability foe Damage to Cargo—Exceptions in Bills of Lading.</p> <p>Neither is such damage within exceptions relieving the carrier from liability Cor damage caused by “dangerous goods shipped without full disclosure of their nature,” or by “insufficiency of packages”; the shipowner and stevedore having full knowledge of the nature of the shipment and method of packing.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Shipping, Cent. Dig. §§ 493, 497, 499; Dec. Dig. @=>141(1).]</p> <p>5. Shipping @=>138—Liability for Damage to Cargo—Harter Act.</p> <p>Damage resulting to cargo while the vessel is being loaded at, her pier is not damage resulting from “faults or errors! in navigation or in the management of the vessel,” within the exemption of Harter Act Feb. 13, 1893, c. 105, § 3, 27 Stat. 445 (Comp. St. 1913, § 8031).</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Shipping, Cent. Dig. § 492; Dec. Dig. @=>138.]</p> <p>6. Negligence @=>121.(2)—Actions for Negligence—Evidence—Res Ipsa Loquitur.</p> <p>When a thing which causes damage is under the exclusive control of a person, and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of things docs not happen if the person having such control uses proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation, that the damage arose from that person’s want of care.</p> <p><®^>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—Eor other cases, see Negligence, Cent. Dig. §§ 218, 225, 271; Dec. Dig. @=121(2).]</p> <p>7. Shipping @=132(5)—Liability foe Damage to Caego—Negligence in Loading.</p> <p>A shipper of a number of steel drill stems for oil wells, each 35 feet long and weighing 3,500 pounds, packed each in a wooden box. The loading was under the joint management of the shipowner and a contracting stevedore. In loading, one of the rods broke through the end and slipped from the box. Thereafter a portion of the box was cut away, so that the hoisting chains could grip the rod, and a block, called a “preventer,” was also attached to one end of the box to prevent it from breaking out. However, one of the rods slipped from the sling while being lowered through the hatch, and broke a hole in the bottom of the ship, causing it to sink and other cargo to be damaged. Held, that the shipper was not liable because of the manner of boxing, which was usual and also known to the shipowner and stevedore, and that on the evidence the stevedore was not chargeable with negligence which would exonerate the shipowner from liability for the damage to other cargo.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Shipping, Cent. Dig. §§ 483, 484; Dec. Dig. @=132(5).]</p> <p><@Es>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy <&=»228—Finding of Referee—Presumption.</p> <p>When there is an issue of fact, a presumption obtains in favor of the finding of the referee in bankruptcy on the facts.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 387; Dec. Dig. <££3»228.]</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <©^175—Fraudulent Conveyance—Actual Fraud.</p> <p>A transaction between the director of an insolvent bank and another bank which took over its liabilities, whereby the director transferred property to such other bank, must be impugned, as violative of Bankruptcy Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 514, if at all, by actual fraud, as distinguished from constructive fraud.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 247, 218; Dec. Dig. ©s»175.]</p> <p>3. Bankruptcy ©=¡>166(1)—Conveyance by Insolvent—Validity—Statute.</p> <p>Where the director of an insolvent bank must have known his own insolvency when he conveyed property to the trust company which had undertaken to liquidate the affairs of his bank, not to benefit his own creditors, but to secure the trust company against loss in case the assets of file bank proved insufficient to pay its liabilities, the trust company being ignorant of the insolvency of the director and having no reason to believe that a preference was intended, there was no violation of Bankruptcy Act, § 67e (Comp. St. 1913, § 9651), providing that all conveyances, transfers, etc., made by the/ bankrupt within four months prior to the filing of the petition with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, shall be void as against such creditors, except as to purchasers in good faith for a present and fair consideration.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 250, 251; Dec. Dig. ©^>166(1).]</p> <p><gs»Ii’or other eases see samo topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Executors and Administrators @=506(1)—Suit for Accounting by Executor—Burden of Proof.</p> <p>In a suit in equity for an accounting by an executor, where as a preliminary question it was determined that his administration of the estate was fraudulent, and the case was referred to a master for an accounting, the burden of proof rested on defendant to show that he did not profit by transactions by which property of the estate was transferred to him.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. §§ 2169-2175; Dec. Dig. @=506(1).]</p> <p>@=oFor other eases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Aliens —Deportation of Chinese—Change of Status.</p> <p>A Chinese person, who, as found by the immigration officers, was a merchant at the time of going from the United States to China on a visit, and was readmitted as such on his return, but who until a year or two before going had been a laborer, and again became one on his return, from that time reverted to his former status of laborer, and, not having obtained the certificate of residence required by Exclusion Act May 55, 1892, c. 60, § 6, 27 Stat. 25, as amended by Act Nov. 3, 1893, e. 14, § 1, 28 Stat. 7 (Comp. St. 1913, § 4320), at which time lie was a laborer domiciled in the United States, is subject to deportation under said acts.</p> <p><g=s>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>|_Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Aliens, Cent. Dig. §§ 76-78; Dec. Dig. @=»24J</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Armstrong Cork Company and others against the Ringwalt Linoleum Works. On motion to dismiss bill.</p>

<p>Death @^>44—Action fob Wrongful Death—Amendment of Pleadings.</p> <p>Under Act Pa. April 26, 1855 (P. L. 309), which provides that “the persons entitled to recover damages for any injury causing death shall be the husband, widow, children or parents of the deceased and no other relative.” the statement of claim in an action for wrongful death, brought by the administrator of the deceased for the benefit of his estate, cannot bo amended, after the time for bringing action fixed by the statute has expired, by substituting the widow of the decedent as plaintiff.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Death, Dec. Dig. <5=>44.]</p> <p><®s^Eor other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>In the matter of Herbert A. Stowe, doing business as the Stockton Creamery, bankrupt. On review of rulings of referee.</p>

<p>1. Tenancy in Common <§=45—Conveyance by Cotenant of Specific Property—Equities of Grantee.</p> <p>While the deed of one cotenant conveying a specific part of the joint property does not give the grantee the right to the particular tract conveyed as against other cotenants, it is not void, and will be given effect in equity, if it can be done without prejudice to their interests.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other eases, see Tenancy in Common, Cent. Dig. §§ 1,35-337; Dec. Dig. <§=45.]</p> <p>2. Partition <§=78—Suit Against Grantee of One Cotenant Alone— Equities of Parties.</p> <p>A. and B., who were cotonants in a tract of land, assuming themselves to be solo owners, undertook to make partition by each releasing to the other a specific part of the land. A. thereafter conveyed the particular tract so released to him by metes and bounds to defendant’s grantor. Complainants, who were also part owners of the land, brought suit against defendant alone for partition of such particular part. Held, that defendant could not by such action be deprived of its equitable right to have the entire tract valued, and A.’s share thereof set oil in that part conveyed by him.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Partition, Cent. Dig. §§ 265-273; Dec. Dig. <3=78.]</p> <p><@zs»For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBElt in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

Action by the C. F. Ferguson Sawmill Company against the Missouri Pacific Railway Company, the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company, and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants named bring error.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>Suit in equity by Edward C. Moore, Jr., against the City of Yonkers. Decree for defendant, and complainant appeals.</p>

<p>1. Collision <@=>95(5)—Overtaking Steam Vessels—Fault.</p> <p>The steam towboat Josh Cook, with, four barges in tow, two ahead, end to end, and one on each side, was passing up the Mississippi river at night, and when in Random Shot Chute, a narrow, crooked, and changeable channel above Memphis, about a mile long, was overtaken by the steamer Rees Lee. The Lee signaled her intention to pass to the port of the Cook, to which the latter assented. When opposite the leading barge the Lee sheered to starboard because unmanageable and from the effect of the current was turned across the channel. The Cook reversed and backed, but the Lee came into collision with the port barge, which shortly afterward sunk. Held, that the Lee was in fault for attempting to pass in the dangerous channel; that the action of the Cook in backing, if not proper, was taken in extremis, and not chargeable as a fault.</p> <p><¿3^Por other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER, in'all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Collision, Cent. Dig. §§ 200-202; Dec. Dig. <@=w95(5).]</p> <p>2. Collision ©=»94—Overtaking Vessels Passing—Assumption ojt Risk by Overtaking Vessel.</p> <p>Under Rule 22 of the navigation rules applicable to the Mississippi River (Rev. St. § 4233 [Comp. St. 1913, § 7964]) which provides that “every vessel overtaking any other vessel shall keep out of the way of the last mentioned vessel” an overtaking vessel is to be its own judge of the matter of safety in passing and assumes all risk, except such as may be due to the fault of the overtaken vessel and the latter by answering a passing signal no more than assents to the passing at the risk of the overtaking vessel.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Collision, Cent. Dig. §§ 197-199; Dec. Dig. <®^>84.]</p> <p>other cases seo same topic. & KEY-NTJMBElt in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of North Dakota; Wilbur F. Booth, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by E. D. Pearce against K. M. Nupen and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Kansas; John C. Pollock, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by J. E. Barimer, trustee in bankruptcy of the estate of I. M. Blitz, against the German-American State Bank. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United -States for the Eastern District of Missouri ; David P. Dyer, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by James N. Alsop against Ruddell M. McCombs and others. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff brings error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.</p> <p>Habeas corpus by Lo Pong, alias Lo Bong, against James R. Dunn, Inspector in Charge, Immigration Service, Department of Labor. From a judgment dismissing the writ, petitioner appeals.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Oklahoma.</p> <p>Action at law by Paul A. Ewert against G. W. Beck. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.</p>

<p>1. Criminal Law <@=>1180—Appeal—-Law of Case.</p> <p>Contentions of accused, disposed of on a prior appeal, become the law of the case, and, having been settled adversely to him, are no ground for reversal on subsequent appeal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note - -For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3002-3004; Dec. Dig. <§=>1180.]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law <@=>776(2)—Tbxal—Instructions—Character Evidence.</p> <p>A charge that evidence showing accused’s good character for honesty, integrity, and morality is admissible and should be considered by the jury, and if it is of such a nature as to lead the jury to believe that it is impossible that a man of such high character would commit such a crime, and for that reason raises a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury whether accused is guilty of the crime charged, accused is entitled to the benefit thereof, which was coupled with a further statement, pointing out that persons of high character frequently commit crimes, and that for accused to have obtained his position in the Post Office Depart-merit, it was necessary to furnish recommendation of two reputable citizens to vouch for his integrity, is prejudicial, in effect depriving accused of all benefit of the character evidence.</p> <p><@u=For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBEK in all Koy-Numberea Digests & Indexes</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1844; Dec. Dig. @=>776(2).]</p>

Dyer, Judge. In the matter of the bankruptcy of the Cogswell Candy Company. Claim by Devereaux Henderson, opposed by John J. Morse, trustee in bankruptcy. The claim was denied, and claimant appeals, and also petitions to revise the order.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska; Thomas C. Munger, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by the Moline Plow Company against the Omaha Iron Store Company. Prom the decree, both parties appeal.</p>

Geiger, Judge. Suit in equity by Friederich Ecderer against the Garage Equipment Manufacturing Company. Decree for complainant, and defendant appeals.

<p>Patents <S=s>283(1)—Suit fob IsnfErNGEMENT—Countekclaim.</p> <p>The defendant in an infringement suit cannot set up as a counterclaim under equity rule 30 (198 Fed. xxvi; 115 C. C. A. xxvi) a cause of action to obtain a" patent for the same invention under Rev. St. § 4915 (Comp. St. 1913, § 9460), if in any case it appears from the answer (1) that the court would not have had “cognizance” of an original suit for that purpose, because of the residence of the parties; (2) that defendant is not the “applicant” whose application was refused, and to whom alone the right of action is expressly given, and the applicant is not a party to the infringement suit, but an assignee; (3) that a suit by such applicant and defendant jointly to obtain the patent is pending in another jurisdiction; and (4) that more than a year has elapsed since final rejection of the application.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. §§ 448-450, 452; Dee. Dig. <§^=>283(1).]</p> <p><S=s>For other eases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Suit by Charles Perry Finkle against the barge Chicago. Decree for libelant.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill by the United States against the Associated Bill .Posters and others. Decree for complainants.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Lindenberger Cold Storage & Canning Company, Limited, against J. Lindenberger, Incorporated, and others. Decree for defendants.</p>

At Law. Action by John C. Webb, individually and for the use of the Queen Insurance Company of America and the London & Lancashire Fire Insurance Company, the Queen Insurance Company of America, and the London & Lancashire Fire Insurance Company, against the Southern Railway Company. On motion to remand to state court.

<p>1. Maritime Liens ®=»57—Lien Given by State Statute—Enforcement in Admiralty Court—“Labor or Materials Furnished for Building a Vessel.”</p> <p>Rev. St. Me. c. 93, § 8, provides that whoever furnishes labor or materials for building a vessel shall have a lien on it therefor, which may be enforced within four days after the vessel is launched, or, if furnished under a contract not then completed, within four days after its completion. Intervener was employed by contract to furnish and install the engine and machinery of a steamer being built, and during performance of the contract was directed by the superintendent of the work for the owner to furnish and install a pinch wheel for the engine and a spring bearing for the shaft; the engine and shaft being secondhand and without such appliances. These parts were not completed when the vessel was put into service, but were installed afterwards, and within four days before the steamer was seized in a suit to enforce liens. Held, that the work done by intervener was such as contemplated by the statute and' entitled him to a lien; that the admiralty court, having taken possession of the vessel before the time for enforcing the lien had expired and sold the same, had jurisdiction to entertain and determine all claims against the proceeds, and would enforce intervener’s lien, although a different procedure was prescribed by the state statute.</p> <p><©=>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBEB in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Maritime Liens, Cent. Dig. § 96; Dec. Dig. @=57.]</p> <p>2. Maritime Liens @=43—Waiver—Taicins of Notes.</p> <p>Claimant, while performing a contract to furnish work and materials for the building of a vessel, for which on completion he would be entitled to a lien under the state statute, took notes from the owner for a part of his claim. _ He did not intend to abandon his lien, or understand that it would be affected; but the purpose of the parties was to enable him to raise money temporarily until the owner could. arrange for payment. After two or three days, finding he could not use the notes, they were returned. Meld, that claimant did not lose his lien, and that it was entitled to priority over a mortgage on the vessel and over the trustee in bankruptcy of the owner.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Maritime Liens, Cent. Dig. § 82; Dec. Dig. @=43.]</p> <p><gE5>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Courts <®r=>101—Interstate Commission—Rates—Injunction—Jurisdiction of Court.</p> <p>In a suit against the Interstate Commerce Commission and carriers to prevent enforcement of new rates, where there is an application for a temporary injunction, and the District Judge calls in two other_ judges, one of them being a Circuit Judge, to disi>ose of such application, the court as constituted is without jurisdiction to dispose of the case on the merits.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 344-350, 629; Dec. Dig. ®=»101.]</p> <p>2. Commerce (§.=»96—Interstate Commission—Temporary Injunctions— Right to.</p> <p>Where new rates permitted by the Interstate Commerce Commission would work injury and possibly discrimination against towns in South Dakota, while the previous existing rates worked injury and possibly had for several years discriminated against a town in Iowa, a temporary injunction imnding a suit against enforcement of the rates, will not he granted, the court being unable to measure the respective injuries, and the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission being presumptively valid.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Commerce, Cent. Dig. § 146; Dee. Dig. <5=»90J</p> <p>Reed, District Judge, dissenting.</p> <p><@ES>For oilier cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER. in'all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

In Admiralty. Libel of information and seizure maritime by the United States against the American schooner Lucy II. for violation of neutrality laws. On exceptions to libel. On September 14, 1915, the American schooner Lucy H. then in the port of Pensacola, Fla., in command of one H. B. Snell, master, took on board, besides a crew of 9 men and 15 Mexicans, a cargo of 162 rifles and 25,000 rounds of ammunition.

<p>Corporations <@=3308(5)—Contracts with Owner of Controlling Stock— Validity.</p> <p>On the organization of a corporation, all of its common,, stock, except 3 shares, of a par value of $30, were issued to petitioner in payment for certain formulas and inventions, and he became president and a director. The corporation also entered into a contract by which it employed him as general manager for 10 years at a weekly salary of $100. During the ensuing 6 years preferred stock was sold, but purchasers were not informed of the contract, nor was the stipulated salary paid petitioner, although he drew smaller sums from time to time for services. Statements were also issued, for purposes of selling stock and as á basis for credit, none of which showed any indebtedness to petitioner for past salary. Held, that the contract was one in form only, and not enforceable as against other stockholders or creditors.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other eases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1339, 1340; Dec. Dig. <@=3308(5).]</p> <p>other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Indians @=>15(2)—Lands—Alienation by Hktbs.</p> <p>Act April 26, 1908, c. 1876, § 22, 34 Stat. 145, provides as follows: “The adult heirs of any deceased Indian of either of the Five Civilized Tribes whose selection has been made, or to whom a deed or patent has been issued for his or her share of the land of the tribe * * * may sell and convey the lands inherited from such decedent. * * * All conveyances made * * * by heirs who arc full-blood Indians are to be subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.” Held, that such provision applies only to lands which had been or should thereafter be selected by or patented to the decedent during his or her lifetime, and does not apply to land selected by an administrator under section 20"of the Cherokee Agreement duly 1, 1902, 32 Stat. 716, and on behalf of an Indian who died without having received his allotment, and that such lands a.re alienable by the heirs without restriction under prior legislation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.-—For other cases, see Indians, Cent. Dig. § 39; Dee. Dig. @=15(2).]</p> <p>2. Indians @=>15(1)—Lands—Alienation by Heiks.</p> <p>Act April 26, 1906, c. 1876, § 19, 34 Stat. 144, which provides that no full-blood Indian of any of the Five Tribes shall have power to alienate “any of the lands allotted to him” for a period of 25 years, applies only to lands allotted to an Indian in his own right as his share of the tribal lands, and does not apply to land allotted to him as heir on behalf of a deceased member.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Indians, Cent. Dig. §§ 17, 37, 38; Dec. Dig. @=15(1).]</p> <p>other cases see samo topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by Annie Harris against Harry H. Bell and others. Decree for defendants.</p>

<p>1. Removal of Causes <@=>15—Causes Removable—“Suit Brought.”</p> <p>Where a complainant has filed a bill for an injunction in a'state court, and obtained a temporary restraining order and an order to show cause, which were served, • although no subpoena has issued, a “suit” has been brought within the removal statute (Judicial Code [Act March 3, 1911, c. 231] § 28, 36 Stat. 1094 [Comp. St. 1913, § 1010]).</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Removal of Causes, Cent. Dig. § 25; Dec. Dig. <§=>15.]</p> <p>2. Removal of Causes <@=>60—Separable Controversy.</p> <p>A suit by a member of a fraternal order having a Supreme Conclave, which is incorporated under the laws of another state as a fraternal benefit association, and which’issues certificates of insurance on the lives of members, and also having unincorporated local conclaves with which the members affiliate, to enjoin the Supreme Conclave from carrying into effect certain amendments to its by-laws, is removable by the corporation defendant, notwithstanding the joinder of the local conclave as a defendant and a prayer for an injunction to restrain it from in the future increasing the dues of members, which are entirely separate from the insurance assessments made by the Supreme Conclave; the only controversy under the issues tendered being between complainant and the foreign corporation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Removal of Causes, Cent. Dig. § 114; Dec. Dig. <@=>60. ]</p> <p><@u=>For other oases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Pledges <@=19—Collateral—Bights or Parties.</p> <p>Where two members of a firm executed a note, pledging collateral for that obligation or any other of their obligations, the collateral could not be used in discharging a note signed by all three members of the firm, and on their bankruptcy any surplus after payment of the note should be paid to the trustee in bankruptcy.</p> <p>LEd. Note.—For other cases, see Pledges, Cent. Dig. §§ 58-63; Dec. Dig. @=19.]</p> <p>2. Pledges <@=19—Collateral—Liability.</p> <p>Where collateral is pledged to secure a firm obligation, such collateral cannot be used in paying a note signed by the members of the firm as their joint individual obligation, and in case of bankruptcy, the holder of the collateral, holding a joint obligation of the members of the firm, must deliver to the trustee in bankruptcy any surplus.</p> <p>LEd. Note.—For other cases, see Pledges, Cent. Dig. §§ 58-63; Dec. Dig. <@=19.]</p> <p>3. Partnership <@=173—Partnership Obligations—Intention.</p> <p>Whether a note is a, partnership obligation or the individual obligation of those partners signing it depends on the intention of the parties.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Partnership, Cent. Dig. §§ 304, 305; Dec. Dig. <@=173.]</p> <p>4. Partnership <@=217(3)—Obligations—Evidence—Sufficiency.</p> <p>Where on bankruptcy of a firm and the members thereof a creditor who held firm notes and also notes signed by the members as individuals contended that a note by the members individually was a partnership obligation, and so collateral pledged for payment of partnership obligations might be used in paying such note, held, under the evidence, that the note was a firm note.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Partnership, Cent. Dig. § 425; Dec. Dig. <@=217(3).]</p> <p><@=»For other casos see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>5. Evidence <£=>396—Pabol Evidence Rule—Admissibility.</p> <p>Where a bank which received collateral prepared the written pledge, it cannot, after bankruptcy of the pledgors, vary the instrument by indefinite parol testimony.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—Eor other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 1754, 1755: Dec. Dig. @=5396.]</p> <p><§zs>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy @=39G(3)—-Property Passing to Trustee—Like Insurance.</p> <p>Under Act Pa. April 15, 1868 (P. L. 103), providing that all policies oí insurance on the life of any person taken out for the benefit of, or assigned to, a wife or dependent relative, shall be property of the beneficiary, and not subject to the debts of such person, and Banltr. Act July 1, 1898, e. 511, § 6a, 30 Stat. 518 (Comp. St. 1913, § 9590), which provides that the act shall not affect the allowance of exemptions under state laws, insurance on the life of a bankrupt made payable to his wife, although the designation of the beneficiary is revocable by him, is for the benefit of the wife and exempt where no revocation has been made, and no interest therein passes to his trustee under section 70a (section 9651).</p> <p>[Ed. Note.-—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 667; Dec. Dig. @=>396(3).]</p> <p>@=»For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Wabash Railroad Company against the West Side Belt Railroad Company, in which the Keokuk Trust Company filed a bill against the West Side Belt Railroad Company, the Wabash Railroad Company, and others. On motion to set aside warning order and quash service of writ.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by L. R. Jones and others against the Bankers’ Trust Company, a corporation. On motion to strike a portion of defendant’s answer.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy <§==>165(1)—Preferences—Dividends Paid by Assignee for Creditors.</p> <p>An assignment for tbe benefit of creditors, although avoided by bankruptcy proceedings within four months, is not void, and dividends paid by the assignee in the meantime in good faith do not constitute preferences which creditors receiving them must surrender before proving their claims, although creditors who did not participate in the dividends are entitled to have their claims equalized with those who did before further distribution is made, and if necessary for that purpose a portion of the dividend paid may be recovered by the trustee.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Dec. Dig. <§=»165(1).]</p> <p>other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Trade-Marks and Trade-Names <@=>3(4)—Descriptive Terms—“Toast.”</p> <p>The expression “Toasted Corn Flakes,” as applied to thin, flakes of white corn browned by the heat, is a descriptive term not the subject of a trade-mark, for the word “toast” means to brown by the heat, which as to the flakes was accomplished by large ovens, and, though the word “flake” has other equivalents, the phrase used accurately describes the product.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trade-Marks and Trade-Names, Cent. Dig. § 7; Dec. Dig. <§=>3(4).J</p> <p>2. Trade-Marks and Trade-Names <@=>3(3)—Subjects oe Trade-Marks.</p> <p>A descriptive term which does not indicate the origin of an article is not the subject of a technical trade-mark.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trade-Marks and Trade-Names, Cent. Dig. § 6; Dec. Dig. <§=>3 (3).]</p> <p>3. Trade-Marks and Trade-Names <§=>73(1)—Descriptive Terms—Secondary Meaning.</p> <p>A manufacturer or trader who has so used descriptive words with respect to his goods as to establish in the public mind a, secondary meaning in the term as denoting his goods is entitled to protection when another attempts to dispose of his goods under such name, so as to pass them off as the goods of the first appropriator.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.'—For other cases, see Trade-Marks and Trade-Names, Cent. Dig. § 84; Dec. Dig. <@=>73(i)J</p> <p>4. Trade-Marks and Trade-Names <@=>78—Unfair Competition—Right of Protection.</p> <p>Where a manufacturer establishes in a descriptive word a secondary meaning as indicating his goods, he is entitled as against another only to such protection as will prevent such other from using that term to pass off his goods as those of the original appropriator.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trade-Marks and Trade-Names, Cent. Dig. § 88; Dec. Dig. <@=78.]</p> <p>5. Trade-Marks and Trade-Names <@=>93(1)—Unfair Competition—Presumptions.</p> <p>While in the case of a technical trade-mark use by others is presumed to be with wrongful intent and will be enjoined, the rule is otherwise as to a descriptive word which it is claimed has acquired a, secondary meaning as a trade-mark, and in such case the person asserting the secondary meaning has the burden of proving that his competitor’s use of the term is unfair.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trade-Marks and Trade-Names, Cent. Dig. § 104%; Dec. Dig. <@=>93(1).]</p> <p>6. Trade-Marks and Trade-Names <§=>93(3)—Unfair Competition—Secondary Meaning of Term—Evidence.</p> <p>Where complainant claimed that the expression “Toasted Com Flakes” had an acquired secondary meaning as indicating its product, evidence that persons engaged by complainant to call for such product at retail stores in the majority of instances received complainant’s product is of little weight in establishing the secondary meaning of the term.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trade-Marks and Trade-Names, Cent. Dig. § 106; Dee. Dig. <@=>93(3).j</p> <p><g=wFor other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>■7. Trade-Marks and Trade-Names <§=93(3)—Unfair Competition—Secondary Trade-Mark.</p> <p>In a suit by complainant to enjoin another company from selling corn products under the name of “Toasted Corn Flakes,” evidence held insufficient to show that the descriptive phrase “Toasted Corn Flakes” had generally acquired a secondary meaning indicating complainant’s product so as to become a trade-mark.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trade-Marks and Trade-Names, Cent. Dig. § 106; Dec. Dig. 0=93(3).]</p> <p>8. Trade-Marks and Trade-Names 0=73(1)—Unfair Competition.</p> <p>Where complainant had not even established a secondary trade-mark in the phrase “Toasted Corn Flakes,” although to some of the trade the expression was shown to indicate complainant’s product, defendant, which sold its own product under the same name, is not guilty of unfair competition, where the dress of the two. packages was so unlike that defendant’s product could not be mistaken for that of complainant.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trade-Marks and Trade-Names, Cent. Dig. § 84; Dec. Dig. <§=73(1).]</p> <p>9. Teade-Marks and Trade-Names <@=75—Unfair Competition—What Constitutes.</p> <p>Though defendant sold its product under the descriptive name previously adopted by complainant, yet where there was no fraud on the public, defendant’s goods no.t being palmed off as those of complainant, there was no unfair competition.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trade-Marks and Trade-Names, Cent. Dig. § 86; Dec. Dig. <@=75.]</p> <p>10. Trade-Marks and Trade-Names <@=93(3)—Unfair Competition—Advertising.</p> <p>That complainant spent large sums in advertising its product and defendant’s sales of its product under the same name increased, though it spent little in advertising, is no ground for a finding of unfair competition.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trade-Marks and Trade-Names, Cent. Dig. § 106; Dec. Dig. <@=93(3).]</p> <p>11. Trade-Marks and Trade-Names <©=93(3)—Unfair Competition—What 'Constitutes.</p> <p>That complainant had previously manufactured a similar product under a different name and the identical product under a different name, both of which ventures were abandoned, does not establish defendant’s unfairness in subsequently disposing of its cereal under the name “Toasted Corn Flakes,” which was first used by complainant, to describe its own cereal of identical nature.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trade-Marks and Trade-Names, Cent. Dig. § 106; Dee. Dig. <@=93(3).]</p> <p><@=^For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

Dickinson, Judge. Suit in equity by Alice Frances Brown and others against the Pennsylvania Canal Company and Pennsylvania Railroad Company. Decree for complainants, and both parties appeal.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Michigan; Clarence W. Sessions, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Mitchell Bros. Company against Emanuel J. Doyle as Collector of Internal Revenue for the Fourth District of Michigan. There was a judgment for plaintiff (225 Fed. 437), and defendant brings error.</p>

H. Sawtelle, Judge. Suit in equity by Arthur A. Kline against the Arizona Mutual Savings & Loan Association, the Arizona Trust Company, and Sims Ely, receiver of such corporations. Held: owned, or enjoyed as a stockholder in said insolvent Loan Association.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan; Clarence W. Sessions, Judge.</p> <p>George W. Terry was convicted for knowingly and fraudulently concealing, while a bankrupt, from his trustee, property belonging to his estate in bankruptcy, and he brings error.</p>

M. Bourquin, Judge. Suit by the United States against William A. Mahaffey, in which Nelson Cooper intervened. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainant appeals. The United States brought this suit in December, 1909, against Mahaifey to cancel a patent for land in Montana issued to Mahaifey under the Homestead Law.

Petition to Revise in Matter of Law an Order of the District Court for the Northern Division of the Western District of Washington; Jeremiah Neterer, Judge. In the matter of the bankruptcy of David Jacobs and Isaac Jacobs, copartners, doing business as Jacobs Bros. Petition by S. T. Hills, as trustee, for delivery of assets claimed to have been concealed by David Jacobs and Isaac Jacobs, bankrupts.

In Equity. Suit by the Sundh Electric Company against the General Electric Company. On application by complainant to make subject to prior decree certain new structures made by defendant.

<p>Patents <3=305—Suits fob Infringement—Enjoining Suits Against Customers of Defendant.</p> <p>Where the owner of a patent has brought suit against the manufacturer of an alleged infringing device, in which the questions of validity and infringement are at issue and ready for hearing, such issues should be determined therein, rather than in suits against purchasers of the device, and until they are heard the court may properly enjoin complainant from instituting and prosecuting widely scattered suits against customers of defendant, which it is morally bound to defend, especially when complainant is a strong corporation and defendant a comparatively weak one, and there is evidence tending to show that one purpose of such suits is to injure defendant’s business and cause it unnecessary expense.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 499; Dec. Dig. @=>305.]</p> <p>other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill by Edwin Thacher against the Board of Supervisors of Polk County, Iowa, and others.</p>

In Admiralty. Petition of David J. Conroy, owner of the steam tug T. W. Wellington, for limitation of liability. On motion for restraining order against claimant.

Suit by Ralph Davis against the Southern Pacific Company. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff, as the assignee of Philip Wolf & Co., C. C. Donovan, and Herman Klaber & Co., brought suit against the Southern Pacific Company for the total sum of .?4,621.16, with legal interest thereon from appropriate dates, under the terms of alleged agreements had and made with the defendant, that it would pay the above aggregate sum to plaintiff’s respective assignors.

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Dexter Horton Trust & Savings Bank against the County of Clearwater, Idaho, and Oren D. Crockett, Treasurer of said County. Decree for defendants.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by Yee Gee against the City and County of San Francisco and James Rolph, Jr., Mayor of said City and County. On motion to dismiss bill.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by Kennedy J. Hanley against the Federal Mining & Smelting Company. Decree for defendant.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the bankruptcy of Vincent Opava. Petition to review the action of the referee and denying claim to exemptions, together with objections to the discharge of the bankrupt.

<p>1. Criminal Law <§=>280(2)—Pleas in Abatement.</p> <p>An indictment is not subject to plea in abatement because incompetent testimony was presented to the grand jury, unless competent evidence sufficient to justify the indictment was not presented; the technical rules as to evidence not applying to the investigations of the grand jury.'</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 647, 648; Doc. Dig. <§=>280(2).]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law <§=>279—Abatement—Plea in—Time for Filing.</p> <p>A plea in abatement is a dilatory plea, and must be interposed promptly, usually at the time of arraignment; therefore a plea in abatement, filed after answer and motion to quash, on grounds which accused might have discovered before, comes too late.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 643, 644; Dec. Dig. @=>279.]</p> <p>3. Criminal Law <§=>280(2)—Abatemeni^-Prejudice of Grand Jury.</p> <p>An indictment is not'subject to attack where founded on sufficient evidence, because the grand jurors from reading newspapers had acquired strong opinions, and even bias against accused.</p> <p>TEd. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 647, 648; Dec. Dig. @=>280(2).]</p> <p>4. Criminal Law <§=>280(2)—Plea in Abatement—Discussion of Indictment.</p> <p>Where the evidence was clear and conclusive, the fact that the grand jury returned the indictment without discussion, on the prosecutor summing up the evidence and informing them of the law, is no ground for plea in abatement.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 647, 648; Dec. Dig. <§=>280(2).]</p> <p>5. Criminal Law <§=>280(2)—Abatement—Misconduct of Prosecuting Attorney.</p> <p>As grand jurors may well need guidance as to the law and the weight of the evidence, the district attorney may place the evidence before them, sum it up, and charge them as to the law, but he cannot dominate the grand jury or control its findings. Therefore an indictment is not subject to objection because the district attorney informed the grand jury as to the law, summarized the evidence, and in conclusion stated that he desired an indictment, it appearing that the grand jury, though they returned the indictment without discussion, were not coerced, and that the district attorney’s presentation was fair, unbiased and judicial in its character; the request for an indictment being no more than informing the grand jury of his purpose in presenting the evidence to them. '</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 647, 648; Dec. Dig. @=>280(2).]</p> <p>6. Criminal Law @=>280(2)—Abatement—Misconduct of Prosecutor.</p> <p>Though the district attorney was guilty of misconduct before the grand jury, in attempt ing to influence them to return an indictment, the indictment is not open to attack, unless it appears that the rights of accused were prejudiced.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. S§ 647, 648: Dec. Dig. @=>280(2).]</p> <p><§=>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Towage ©=>11(1)—Liability of Tug—Construction of Contract.</p> <p>A towing contract, which provided that the tug should use every means for the safety and safe delivery of the tow, but should in no way be held responsible for same, left the tug under the duty imposed by law to exercise reasonable care, but without liability, except for negligence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Towage, Cent. Dig. §§ 11, 14, 16, 21; Dec. Dig. <&=»11(1).]</p> <p>2. Towage <©=>11 (!>)—Tug—Liability fob Loss of Tow.</p> <p>Libelant hired a tug from respondent to tow its oil barges; the charter providing that the entire tow was under the orders and supervision of the charterer. The tug was sent from Port Arthur, Tex., with two loaded barges in tow for Frontera, Mexico, by way of Tampico. She had sufficient coal to reach Tampico with favorable weather, but libelant, which knew her coal capacity and consumption, placed an extra supply on the barges. The barges were overloaded, and in heavy weather became water-logged, which made the towing slow. When four days out the tug had only coal enough for 36 hours more, and because of heavy seas could not coal from the barges, and to save the tug and crew she abandoned the tow and proceeded to Galveston, which she reached with 4 tons of coal left in her bunkers. She reported for orders, but, receiving none, did not go in search of the barges. Held that, under the circumstances, she was not liable for the loss of the barges, but that libelant, in sending her out as it did with the overloaded barges, assumed the risk of adverse weather conditions.</p> <p><©^>Für other eases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER In all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other eases, see Towage, Cent. Dig. § 22; Dec. Dig. <@^»11(9).]</p>

<p>Corporations <@=>613(1)—Forfeiture of Franchise by Nonuser—Collateral Inquiry.</p> <p>Whether a corporation authorized by its charter to maintain a dam has forfeited such right by reason of having ceased to conduct the business for which it was incorporated, where it continues to exercise its franchise as a corporation and to maintain the dam, is a question which can only be determined in a. direct proceeding by the authority by which it was chartered, and cannot be raised collaterally by a private litigant.</p> <p>@=oFor other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>¡TM. Note.—For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 2431-2434; Dec. Dig. <8=^613(1).]</p>

<p>1. Commerce <S=>61(1)—Intoxicating Liquors—State Regulation.</p> <p>Webb-Kenyon Act (Act March 1,1913, c. 90, 37 Stat. 699 [Comp. St. 1913, § 8739]), prohibiting in substance the shipment in interstate commerce of intoxicating liquor into any state which is intended by any person interested therein to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used either in the original package or otherwise in violation of the law of the state, does not warrant Prohibition Act Colo. (Laws 1915, p. 275) § 10, declaring'that it shall be unlawful for any person, association, or corporation, or for any carrier, to ship or knowingly carry any intoxicating liquor to any point in the state, or from one point to another within the state without marking conspicuously on the package the words, “This Package Contains Intoxicating Liquor”; the Webb-Kenyon Act merely prohibiting the shipment of intoxicants intended to be used in violation of the state law, but not allowing the states to regulate that branch of interstate commerce.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Commerce, Cent. Dig. §§ 81, 89; Dee. Dig. <@==>61(1).]</p> <p>2. Commerce <@=>14—Intoxicating Liquors—Shipment—Interstate Commerce—Power op States.</p> <p>By Act March 4, 1909, c. 321, § 240, 35 Stat. 1137, now embodied in the Criminal Code (Comp. St. 1913, § 10410), making criminal the shipment in interstate commerce of intoxicating liquor unless the package be labeled so as to show the name of the consignee and the nature of the contents, Congress has expressly exercised its power to regulate interstate commerce shipments, and therefore state regulations such as that embodied in Prohibition Act Colo. § 10, as to the marking of such packages, are invalid.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Commerce, Cent. Dig. §§ 30, 92; Dee. Dig. <@=>14.]</p> <p>3. Commerce <@=>14—Interstate Commerce—Intoxicating Liquors—Exclusive Power op Congress.</p> <p>In view of the exclusive power of Congress over interstate commerce, and the fact that the interstate commerce shipment of intoxicating liquors requires uniformity of regulation, the states are without power, as was attempted by Prohibition Act Colo. § 10, to regulate the marking of shipments of intoxicants.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Commerce, Cent. Dig. §§ 30, 92; Dec. Dig. <@=>14.]</p> <p>^s»For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the Wilkes-Barre Light Company, an alleged bankrupt. On exceptions to receivers’ account.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Gardner R. Farrand and Edward B. Spear, bankrupts. On review of order of referee sustaining a mortgage to Helen Farrand.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the bankruptcy of the Mills Tea & Butter Company. Objections by the trustee to the allowance of appraisers’ fees.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the bankruptcy of the Mills Tea & Butter Company. Objections by the trustee to. the allowance by the referee of compensation to the receiver. Receiver’s allowance reduced.

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the bankruptcy of the Mills Tea & Butter Company. Motion for revision of referee’s statement of his fees. Referee’s fees ordered computed on different basis, with leave if desired to set down the matter for hearing.</p>

McCall, Judge. In the matter of, the bankruptcy of J. B. West, doing business as J. B. West & Co. Intervening pe.ition by the Mitchell Wagon Company against George H. Poole ano E. E. Houck, trustees in bankruptcy. From a electee denying the petition, petitioners appeal.

C. Van Fleet, Judge. Suit in equity by the Ennis-Brown Company against the Central Pacific Railway Company and the Southern Pacific Company, with fifteen other eases. Decrees for defendants, and complainant appeals.

Suit by the United States against the New Orleans Pacific Railway Company and another, in which Newton B. Terrell and another intervened. Prom a decree in favor of defendants, the complainant and the interveners appeal.

Suit by the United States against the New- Orleans Pacific Railway Company and others, in which Stephen N. Grant intervened. From a decree in favor of defendants, complainant and the intervener appeal.

Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Louisiana; Aleck Boarmar., Judge.

Dooling, Judge. In the matter of the petition of Owe Sam Goon for a writ of habeas corpus, directed against Samuel W. Backus as Commissioner of Immigration at the Port of San Francisco. From an order granting the writ and directing the discharge of petitioner (230 Fed. 654), respondent appeals. Owe Sam Goon, a native of China, came here in 1873 or 1874. In March, 1894, he was duly registered under Act May 5, 1892, c. 69, 27 Stat. 25 (Comp.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois.</p> <p>Action by the McNeil Higgins Company against the Old Dominion Steamship Company. There was a judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.</p> <p>Action to recover damages arising out of the shipment of a carload of coffee. Judgment for carrier upon directed verdict.</p> <p>On March 15, 1913, defendant received from plaintiff 279 bags of coffee of the alleged Value of $10,000 to be carried from New York to Chicago. The shipment passed from New York City to Newport News, Va,., and thence to Cincinnati, Ohio, and was there transferred to the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad Company to be carried to plaintiff. On March 24th, at Peru', Ind., the shipment met the so-called Dayton flood and windstorm. The top of the car was blown off, and the coffee was soaked by the rain from above and by water rising until it entered the car.</p> <p>Plaintiff admits that the storm thus encountered was extraordinary, unusual, and unprecedented, and constituted what is termed an “act of God.” Its action is based upon carrier’s alleged negligence after such catastrophe was encountered.</p> <p>The defendant held the car at Peru from March 24th to April 10th, when it was taken back to Cincinnati where the coffee was offered for sale, but no bid was received. Ton days later it was taken to Chicago.</p> <p>Defendant’s explanation for shipping the car to Cincinnati was that all evidences of the routing as well as the name of the consignee were destroyed in the flood, and in the opinion of its claim agent Cincinnnati was a good coffee market. Peru is 120 miles from Chicago, and Cincinnati is 234 miles from Chicago.</p> <p>Plaintiff contends that the coffee was only partially damaged by the water at Peru, and that if the car had been promptly and properly cared for the damage would have been comparatively slight. Defendant’s evidence tended to show that the coffee was first offered for sale at Peru, that the shipment to Cincinnati was made as soon as possible, and that its line from Peru to Chicago was not open prior to April 10th. Defendant’s evidence also tended to show that the coffee was utterly worthless before the water receded.</p> <p>The car reached Chicago April 24th and was x-ejected by plaintiff, and thereafter sold by defendant at public auction to coffee dealers. The amount realized therefrom was $101.01 after paying all freight charges and expenses of handling.</p> <p>At the close of the trial the court continued the case for a day to permit plaintiff to furnish additional proof that defendant’s line was open between Peru and Chicago at the time the shipment was made to Cincinnati. The court held the testimony offered failed to establish that fact. The request for additional time in which to secure such proof was refused.</p>

Action by the Collins Produce Company against the Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Company. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. The Collins Produce Company, defendant in error, herein called “plaintiff,” brought suit against the Chicago & Eastern Illinois Bailroad Company, plaintiff in error, herein called “defendant,” for damages occasioned by the loss of a car of chickens. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $4,125.82.

<p>1. Trial <@=>169—Directed Verdict—Bight to.</p> <p>In a passenger’s personal injury action, verdict is properly directed for the carrier, where .there is no evidence of its negligence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 341, 381-387, 389; Dec. Dig. <@=>169.]</p> <p>2. Carriers <@=>414—Carriage of Passengers—Agents—Porters.</p> <p>Passengers in a parlor car belonging to another company are still passengers of the railroad company, and where the porter in charge of the car, though not a servant of the railroad company, was allowed to announce stations, the railroad company is liable for his acts; he being in that respect its agent.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1578, 1582, 1589; Dec. Dig. <@=>414.]</p> <p>3. Carriers <@=>320(26)—Carriage of Passengers—Actions—Jury Question.</p> <p>Where a passenger, his station being announced and the vestibule doors being open, proceeds to the platform of thel ear and onto the steps as the train is brought practically to a stop, the carrier cannot as a matter of law be declared free from liability for injuries resulting to the passenger when he is thrown from the car steps by the sudden starting of the train with unnecessary violence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1244, 1322; Dec. Dig. <@=>320(26).]i</p> <p>4. Carriers <@=>347(10)—Carriage of Passengers—Actions—Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>Where a passenger, his station being announced and the vestibule being open, goes to the platform and on the train slackening speed to a practical stop goes upon the steps, he cannot as a matter of law be held guilty of contributory negligence, though he is thrown from the steps by the sudden starting of the train with unnecessary violence, particularly where the stop was at a station and darkness prevented the passenger from seeing that it was not the one announced.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1355, 1356, 1386, 1402; Dec. Dig. <@=>347(10).]</p> <p>5. Carriers <@=>320(26), 347(10)—Carriage of Passengers—Actions—Evidence—Jury Question.</p> <p>In an action for injuries received by a passenger who was thrown from the steps of a car when the train which had practically stopped was started with a sudden jerk, the questions of the passenger’s contributory negligence in going on the steps, and the carrier’s negligence, held for the jury.</p> <p><@=>For other cases see same topic & KEY -NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>LTOd. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1244, 1322, 1355, 1356, 1386, 1402; Dec. Dig. ©=>320(26), 347(10); Negligence, Cent. Dig. § 301.]</p>

Cushman, Judge. Action by William Cothary and Margaret Cothary, his wife, against the Tacoma Railway & Power Company, a corporation. There was a judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings error. The defendant in error, who was the plaintiff in the court below, and will be here so designated, was struck and injured by an electric car running in Point Defiance Park near Tacoma.

<p>1. Banks and Banking @=>106—Acts of Officers—Accounting.</p> <p>Where the cashier of a bank, who was president of a lumber company and authorized to draw cheeks for the lumber company, directed entries charging the account of the lumber company with a sum of money to be made on the books of the bank, but no check for the amount was drawn, the cashier must be held as acting for the bank in his capacity as cashier, and not as president of the lumber company.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Banks and. Banking, Cent. Dig. §§ 253-250; Dec. Dig. @=>106.]</p> <p>2. Banks and Banking @=>106—Actions—Evidence.</p> <p>In a proceeding where a bank assorted, a.s against the estate of a bankrupt lumber company, a claim for a sum of money charged on its books against the bankrupt which had been taken by the cashier of the bank, who was president of the bankrupt and authorized to draw checks on its account, helé, under the evidence, that the bankrupt was not bound; no check having been discovered.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Banks and Banking, Cent. Dig. §§ 253-256; Dec. Dig. @=>100.]</p> <p>3. Subrogation @=>26—Right to Subrogation.</p> <p>Where a bank paid drafts to which were attached notes of a bankrupt lumber company, secured by liens, and marked the notes paid, the bank, having been under no duty to pay the drafts and having no interest to protect, was not subrogated to the liens securing the notes.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—-For other cases, see Subrogation, Cent. Dig. § 67; Dec. Dig. @=>26.]</p> <p>4. Appear and Error @=>843(2)—Review—Questions Presented for Review.</p> <p>Where an appeal in a proceeding involving claims against a bankrupt was by stipulation limited to two claims, as to one of which the question oijpraferen.ee only was involved, the question whether claimant had been paid need not be reviewed, after a decision that claimant was not entitled to preference as to one claim and that the other claim was unenforceable.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 3331; Dec. Dig. @=>843(2).]</p> <p>@=>Eor other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

Dooling, Judge. Suit by John E. Manders, trustee in bankruptcy, against George H. Wilson and wife. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the complaint (230 Fed. 536), plaintiff appeals.

<p>1. Bankruptcy <@=442—Review—Questions Review able.</p> <p>An appellate court cannot review matters not decided by the trial court. Therefore, where the lower court which, on review of the referee's order allowing fees to the trustees’ attorneys, did not decide out of what funds the fees were payable, although petitioners claimed a lien on a large portion of the bankrupt’s property, the question as to the priority of the respective parties cannot be reviewed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 918; Dec. Dig. <@=412.]</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <@=446—Review.</p> <p>In view of the presumption of the correctness of the trial court’s order, an order of the trial court directing payment to attorneys for the trustees of the bankrupt out of property or funds in the hands of the trustees must be deemed to include a further direction that the fees should be paid only out of funds properly applicable to payment of such fees.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 929; Dec. Dig. <@=446.1</p> <p>3. Bankruptcy <@=474—Costs—Fees oe Trustees’ Attorneys.</p> <p>Where petitioners asserted liens on the bankrupt's property and fees were allowed the attorneys of the trustees, the trial court should determine what property in the hands of the trustees is subject to petitioners’ lien, and what is subject to payment of fees of tbe trustees’ attorneys, taking into consideration the fact whether the services rendered were for tiie benefit of property claimed by petitioners.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 878-884; Dec. Dig. <@=474.]</p> <p><®=>For other eases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

i Bill by Joseph Holt and others against the Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias. From decree dismissing the bill, complainants appeal.

<p>On motion by appellants for an order authorizing and directing the District Court to reopen the case and receive further evidence. On motion by appellee to dismiss. Matter referred to District Court, with leave to reopen case. For opinion below, see 234 Fed. 912.</p>

f the United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Ohio; John M. Killits, Judge. Suit between the. Firestone Tire & Rubber Company and Frank A. .Seberling. There was a decree for the latter, and the former appeals. The attention of the court was directed to the record by the clerk. Record ordered received.

<p>1.. Patents <§^»25—Invention—What Constitutes.</p> <p>There is no invention in selecting and assembling the most desirable parts of different mechanisms in the same art, where each operates in the same way in the new device as it did in the old and effects the same results.</p> <p>LEd. Note.—For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. |§ 27-29; Dec. Dig. <§=25.]</p> <p>2. Patents <S=>328—Validity—Anticipation.</p> <p>The Burkholder patent, No. 1,004,741, for a, lift jack for automobiles, hold invalid for lack of invention and anticipation.</p> <p>3. Patents <@=3328—Patentability—Lack of Invention.</p> <p>The Burkholder design patent, No. 44,837, for a design for a lifting-jack standard, held invalid for want of invention, showing neither beauty, originality, nor creative design.</p> <p><g^For other cases seo samo topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

Suit by the Elliott Machine Company against Rothschild & Company and others. From a decree of the District Court dismissing bill for injunction charging infringement of United States letters patent No. 765,616, to Minnie S. Elliott, for “attachment for button setting machines” (224 Fed. 502), plaintiff appeals.

<p>In Equity. Bill by Niels A. Christensen and another against the Westinghouse Traction Brake Company. On motion by defendant for leave to amend its answer by setting up a counterclaim.</p>

<p>1. Costs <3=>48—Power of Court—Dismissal.</p> <p>A court of equity should as far as possible, where plaintiff waits until the moment of trial before dismissing, tax costs so as to reimburse defendant for expenditures made in good faith in preparation for trial, though the court cannot tax any costs which could not have been taxed had the case gone to trial and there been a decree for defendant.</p> <p>[ltd. Mote.—Dor other eases, see Costs, Cent. Dig. §§ 129, 192-210; Dec. Dig. <e=»48.]</p> <p>2. Costs $=.->187 -Taxation—Fees foe. Expert Witness.</p> <p>As the power to impose costs ultimately must be found in the statutes, and the only statute intended to penalize for vexatious proceedings (Rev. St. § 982 [Comp. St. 1913, § 1623]) merely declares that an attorney shall be liable for costs voxatiously increased by him, a plaintiff who delayed dismissal until (he eve of trial cannot be taxed with disbursements made by defendant to procure expert witnesses, and defendant is only entitled to the ordinary witness fees therefor.</p> <p>[Ed. Mote.—For other cases, see Costs, Cent. Dig. § 738; Dec. Dig. <g=s» 187.]</p> <p>3. Costs <s=»1U0 -Allowance—-Dismissal.</p> <p>Where plaintiff delayed his dismissal until the eve of trial, defendant cannot bo allowed as costs disbursement for the preparation of models for various alleged anticipating structures.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.-—-For other cases, see Costs, Cent. Dig. §§ 600-662; Dec. Dig. @=»190J</p> <p>®s»For other eases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>4. Costs <§=>182—Allowance—Dismissal.</p> <p>Under Rev. St. § 983 (Comp. St. 1913, § 1624), providing that lawful fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use on trials in cases, where by law costs are recoverable, shall be taxed, defendant, where plaintiff delayed dismissal until the eve of trial, is entitled to tax as costs disbursements for certified copies of patents and publications which would necessarily have been used.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Costs, Cent. Dig. § 714; Dee. Dig. <§=>182.]</p> <p>(gc^For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the alleged bankruptcy of James S. Utley and others. Sur motion for adjudication in bankruptcy on involuntary petition. Motion continued.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the bankruptcy of Schultz & Guthrie.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy <§^>152—Recovery by Trustee—Check Given Before and Paid After Filing of Petition.</p> <p>Bankrupt’s check given a.n<5 deposited for collection before the filing of his voluntary petition in bankruptcy not having been paid till thereafter, though before any of the parties, except bankrupt, knew of the facts, the trustee can recover the money of the payee, though the payment was not a recoverable preference; delivery of the check not operating as a.n assignment or segregation of the funds on deposit, nor impressing them with any trust in favor of the payee, and, the adjudication, which is considered as immediately following the filing of the petition, placing the deposit in the complete custody of the bankruptcy court, after which it is no longer bankrupt’s property.</p> <p><gc»For other oases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>LEd. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 191; Dee. Dig. <g=>152.]</p>

<p>Bankruptcy @=>92—Involuntary Petition—Dismissal.</p> <p>The alleged bankrupt is not entitled as of right to dismissal of the involuntary petition in bankruptcy against him, though neither of the petitioning creditors appear to press it, as rights of other creditors may be affected thereby, the principal petitioning creditor having, contrary to the spirit of Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 11, 30 Stat. 549 (Comp. St. 1913, § 9595), after the filing of the petition, brought suit and recovered judgment on his claim in a, state court, without any suggestion of the bankruptcy proceeding, and this having been paid; as, in case of adjudication of bankruptcy, the estate is to be liquidated as of, the date of the filing of the petition.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 107, 108, 133-136; Dec. Dig. @=>92.]</p> <p>@z=For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Bill by the Federal Cement Company against William B. Shaffer. Sur motion of the Bridgewater Estate to intervene.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Suit by H. T. Paulsen and Alfred Wellestine against the schooner Jacob N. Haskell. Decree for libelants.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the bankruptcy of the Boston French Range Company. Proceeding by claimant to review order of referee.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the alleged bankruptcy of Arthur P. Pearce. The petition was dismissed, and respondent seeks a recovery of costs. From the clerk’s taxation of costs in respondent’s favor, petitioners appeal.

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of E. A. Tapp, as involuntary bankrupt. Petition of W. M. Harris and others for the adjudication. On exceptions by petitioners to report of referee.

<p>In Equity. Suit by the American Specialty Company against the Collis Company. Decree for complainant for nominal damages as to some of the items in suit.</p>

In the matter of the bankruptcy of John Dillard Collins. Accounting by A. G. Gugel, trustee, in which the claim of Isabel Danziger was allowed. Proceeding to review order of the referee sustaining the accounting, and opposition of Isabel Danziger asking attorney’s fees. On May 16, 1912, John D. Collins, a builder, was adjudicated a bankrupt on bis voluntary petition.

<p>Action by the United States of America against the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, to recover the penalty imposed by the Hours of Service Act of March 4, 1907. On demurrer to special pleas of defendant.</p>

<p>At Law. Action by the United States against the Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Company. From the clerk’s taxation of costs, defendant appeals. Modified.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the bankruptcy of Herbert I,. Evans. On petition to review orders of referee, authorizing and confirming a sale of lands on which the bankrupt had entered under the desert entry laws.

The Pennsylvania Company was charged with violating Act Feb. 2, 1903, c.;349, 32 Stat. 791 (Comp. St. 1913, §§ 8698-8700), by transporting in interstate commerce a quantity of cattle hides in violation of the rules of the Department of Agriculture, and demurs to the information.

<p>1. Ratmioahs ©=»229—Saveiv Appliance Act—Dogging Oars.</p> <p>While the federal Safety Appliance Act of March 2, 1893, c. 190, § 6, 27 Stat. 532, as amended by Act April 1, 1896, e. 87, 29 Stat. 85 (Comp. St. 1913, I 8610), declares that nothing in the act contained shall apply to trains composed of four-wheel cars, or to trains composed of eight-wheel logging cars, where the height of such cars from the top of the rail to the center of the coupling docs not exceed 25 inches, the act applies to standard eight-wheel flat cars, though used exclusively for the transportation of logs, where the height of such cars from the top of the rail to the center of the coupling exceeds 25 inches.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 743; Doc. Dig. <@3»229.]</p> <p>2. Railroads <S=s>254(2)—-Safety Appliance Act—Construction—“Permit.”</p> <p>Where a railroad company engaged in interstate commerce allowed a lumber company to operate over a portion of its tracks lumber trains, which were not equipped in accordance with the federal Safety Appliance Act, imposing penalties on railroad companies engaged in interstate comnjerce which haul, or permit to be hauled over their tracks defectively equipped trains, the railroad company is> liable for the penalty, though trains were under the exclusive control of the servants of the lumber company, and it exercised no supervision other than to control the movement of such trains by its own dispatchers, and to'require those in charge to acquaint themselves with the company’s time-table, for the word “permit” should not be construed in its ordinary significance as implying knowledge of the thing permitted, as the statute, being remedial, should be given such a construction as will give effect to the intention of Congress.</p> <p>(g^For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBFK. in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>[Ed, Rote.—For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 765, 766, 768; Dec. Dig. <@=>254(2).</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Permit.]</p>

<p>Bankruptcy <@=>318(1)—Contract fob Sale of Accounts—Enforcement.</p> <p>A bankrupt corporation sold a large amount in accounts to petitioner under a contract by the terms of which petitioner advanced 77 per cent, of their face value. They were guaranteed, and to be collected by bankrupt, and remitted to petitioner, which was then to pay back the remaining 23 per cent., less any shortage, and an attorney's fee and commission agreed upon. At the time of the bankruptcy petitioner had received less than the amount advanced, but still retained accounts considerably exceeding the difference. Bankrupt’s receiver continued to collect the accounts and to retain the proceeds. Held, that the contract was not terminated by the bankruptcy, but should be settled in accordance with its terms, and that ¡petitioner was entitled to the stipulated commission and attorney’s fee.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 469; Dec. Dig. <@=>318(1).]</p> <p><S=>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the alleged bankruptcy of the Mason-Seaman Transportation Company. On motion to dismiss.</p>

<p>1. Courts <@=322(2)—Federal Courts—Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Where a verified bill alleged diversity of citizenship and that the amount involved as to each plaintiff exceeded $3,000, the federal district court must, no counter affidavit having been offered, be deemed to have jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 878, 879; Dec. Dig. <@=322(2).]</p> <p>2. Courts <@=365—Precedents—State Courts.</p> <p>The decision of a state court construing a local municipal ordinance must be followed by the federal courts.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other, cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 950, 952, 955, 969-971; Dec. Dig. <@=365.]</p> <p>3. Municipal Corporations <@=703(1)—Regulations—Discrimination.</p> <p>A New Orleans ordinance, requiring the operators of jitney busses and street cars to furnish a surety bond in the sum of $5,000 for each vehicle operated, is not invalid as being a discrimination in favor of street car companies, though the protection afforded by the bond is, in view of the larger number of passengers carried by street cars, less than in the case of jitney busses.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1509; Dec. Dig. <@=703(1).]</p> <p>4. Constitutional Law <@=274—Rights oe Citizen—Fourteenth Amendment.</p> <p>Const. Amend. 14, does not create any right in citizens to use public property, as streets, in defiance of the state laws.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 726; Dee. Dig. <@=274.]</p> <p>5. Municipal Corporations <@=703(1) — Streets — Regulation — Common Carriers.</p> <p>A municipality may regulate the use of streets by common carriers, no one having a vested right to use them for that purpose; and, as absolute liability for injuries may be imposed, hence an ordinance, requiring a common carrier by jitney busses to furnish a bond of $5,000 for each vehicle operated, for the protection of passengers or persons injured, is not invalid.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1509; Dec. Dig. <@=703(1).]</p> <p>6. Municipal Corporations <@=703(1)—Streets—Police Power.</p> <p>Under its police power, a city may require those operating jitney busses as common carriers of passengers to furnish a surety bond in the sum of $5,000 for the protection of any one injured, for the requirement of the bond necessarily tends to promote the public safety by requiring the carrier to exercise greater care.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1509; Dec. Dig. <@=703(1).]</p> <p>7. Municipal Corporations <@=703(1)—Streets—Bonds—Surety Bonds.</p> <p>In view of the greater desirability of a corporate surety, a municipal ordinance, requiring common carriers using the streets to furnish bonds for the protection of those who might be injured, signed by a surety company, is not invalid because of that requirement, particularly where those objecting did not show they could have obtained individual sureties.</p> <p><§E^For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1509; Dec. Dig. <@=5703(1).]</p> <p>8. Treaties <@=>8—Treaty Rights—Nat ore ok Treaty Rights.</p> <p>It is settled that the rights of property protected by a treaty are such as are capable of a, salé or transfer, and not such as are purely personal, as the right to operate a jitney bus, as a common carrier, on the streets oí a municipality.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Treaties, Cent. Dig. § 8; Dec. Dig. <@=58.]</p> <p>©s»Kor other eases see same topic & KISY-NUMBDR, in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes-</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by Robert Graham Hengst against the John B. Carter Company. On exceptions to master’s report. Confirmed.</p>

Petition by Douglas Y. McClellan against Ralph B. Schmidt, Sheriff of Essex County, N. J., for writ of habeas corpus. These proceedings were instituted for the discharge of the relator in default of payment of judgment obtained against him for tort on the ground that the judgment is released by a discharge in bankruptcy and does not come within the exception of section 17 (2) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.

<p>1. Habeas Corpus <©=>113(12)—Scope of Writ—Review.</p> <p>Where an alien who was excluded from the United States on the ground that she was likely to become a public charge brought habeas corpus, the finding of the commissioner of immigration must be upheld if there is any evidence, however slight, to support his decision, for the weight of the evidence cannot be reviewed on habeas corpus, but, if there is no evidence to support his finding, the alien may be ordered released and admitted.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Habeas Corpus, Cent. Dig. § 114; Dec. Dig. <©=>113(12); Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 3400.]</p> <p>2. Aliens <©=>54—Admission to United States—Public Charge—Evidence.</p> <p>On habeas corpus to secure the release of an alien excluded from the United States by the commissioner of immigration on the ground that she was likely to become a public charge, 7veld, that there was no evidence to support the commissioner’s finding; all the evidence tending to show that the alien was not likely to become a public charge.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Aliens, Cent. Dig. § 112; Dec. Dig. <@=>54.]</p> <p>3; Aliens <©=>54—Admission to United States—Exclusion.</p> <p>Where an alien was refused admission to the United States on the ground that she was likely to become a public charge, the question of whether she was immoral cannot be considered, nor is her immorality ground for sustaining the exclusion.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Aliens, Cent. Dig. § 112; Dec. Dig. <®=>54.]</p> <p>^=s>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

In the matter of the license of Frank Corsi as a customs broker. Application under Act June 10, 1910, § 3, for review of the decision of the Secretary of the Treasury revoking Frank Corsi’s license as a customs broker. Revocation confirmed.

<p>1. Judgment ©=>822(3)—Fun Faith and Credit—Powers—Effect.</p> <p>One adjudged insane in Louisiana, against whom an interdiction was rendered, departed from the state and acquired a domicile in Tennessee, and by the Tennessee courts he was adjudged sane. Civ. Code La. arts. 420, 421, provide that, an interdiction having once been declared, the person interdicted cannot resume the exercise of his rights until after a definitive judgment repealing the interdiction. Held, that despite the full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution, the Tennessee judgment has no extraterritorial effect and is not conclusive of complainant’s right to relief in Louisiana as a person compos mentis, particularly where the interdiction was also based on complainant’s incompoteney because of excessive use of drugs and alcohol.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Judgment, Gent. Dig. § 1500; Dec. Dig. ©=>822(3).]</p> <p>2. Courts ©=>343—Federal, Courts—Jurisdiction of.</p> <p>Where, under the state practice, complainant could not, in Louisiana, maintain a suit for partition of an estate in which he was interested, the interdiction on account of his incompetency not. having been removed, he cannot maintain a bill for partition in the federal court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other eases, see Courts, Gent. Dig. §§ 915, 916, 919, 920; Dec. Dig. ©=>343.]</p> <p>©=>3Tor other casos seo samo topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Louis P. Dunkley was indicted for a violation of the Bankruptcy Act, and he demurred.</p>

<p>At Law. In the matter of the petition of Charles Brash, an alien, for citizenship.</p>

At Law. Action by the Continental Gin Company against W. B. Stocker and J. Oscar Howard. There was a judgment for plaintiff denying part of the relief sought, and plaintiff moved for a new trial.

In Admiralty. Libel by Mose Kruger and others against the steamer Fairhope, in which the Slidell Dock Yard & Shipbuilding Company intervened. The intervener’s claim was rejected by the commissioner, and it filed objections to his report.

<p>1. Railroads <3=188—-Mortgages—Foreclosure—Intervention.</p> <p>In a suit, to foreclose a mortgage or deed of trust given to secure bonds issued by railroad company, stockholders seeking to intervene cannot inject by their answer issues as to whether some of the stockholders had paid for the stock held by them.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 618-621; Dee. Dig. <8=188.]</p> <p>2. Rah,roads ©=183—Mortgages—Foreclosure—Deiitenses.</p> <p>Where a contractor, having constructed a line of railroad, disposed of part of the bonds given for the purchase price, foreclosure of the mortgage securing the bonds cannot be denied because of the contractor’s breach of contract damaging the corporation, but the claim should, after the mortgage has been foreclosed, and the money paid into court, be urged as against the interest of the contractor in the proceeds, so an intervention setting up the contractor’s breach should be denied.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 612; Dec. Dig. <3=183.]</p> <p><gs=>For other oases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>3. Railroads <§=>186—Mortgages—Foreclosure—Intervention—Defenses.</p> <p>In such case, where there was a suit pending against the 'contractor in another district involving its breach oí contract and right to interest on money deposited with it, that fact is an additional ground for denying intervention to defeat foreclosure.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 615, 616; Dec. Dig. <§=>186.]</p> <p><g^>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

Proceedings by the United States against Jung You for his deportation. From an order of the Commissioner directing deportation of defendant, he appeals. Order revoked, and defendant directed released.

<p>Physicians and Surgeons <®=»2—Statute Regulating Practice—Constitutionality.</p> <p>Act Cal. June 2, 1913 (St. 1913, p. 722), regulating the practice of medicine, held not invalid as in violation of the Constitution of the United States.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Physicians and Surgeons, Cent. Dig. § 2; Dec. Dig. @^>2.] ,</p> <p><©s»For other cases see same topic & KEY-NTJMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Costs <&=»246%—Suits in Forma Pauperis—Construction op Statute.</p> <p>Act July 20, 1892, c. 209, § 1, 27 Stat. 252, as amended by Act June 25, 1910, c. 435, 36 Stat. 866 (Comp. St. 1913, § 1626), authorizing citizens to maintain or defend suits or writs of error or appeals in civil or criminal cases without prepayment) of 1'ees or costs on the filing of an affidavit of poverty and requiring officers of the court to perform duties in such cases, does not give a District Court power to order Its reporter, who is not an officer of the court, to furnish a transcript for error proceedings to the defendant in a criminal case without compensation, or at the expense of the government.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Costs, Dec. Dig. <S^32461/2.]</p> <p><§£5>For other cases see samo topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy <§=>84—Involuntary Proceedings—Amendment op Petition.</p> <p>Permission will not be given to amend a petition In involuntary bankruptcy several years after it was filed by alleging as an additional act of bankruptcy a preferential transfer of property, where it is not alleged what the property was or when or to whom it was transferred.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 120 129; Dec. Dig. <§==84.]</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <§=>84—Involuntary Proceedings—Amendment op Petition.</p> <p>A petition in involuntary bankruptcy cannot be amended by alleging a preferential transfer of property more than four months before the application to amend was made, although less than four months before the filing of the petition.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other eases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 126-129; Dec. Dig. <§=>84.]</p> <p><g^>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Post Office <§=35—Offenses—Use of Mails to Defraud.</p> <p>An agent of an insurance company whose duty it was to identify remains and obtain certificates of death of persons insured, devised a scheme to defraud the insurance company by presenting to it fraudulent death claims, supported by false certificates. Ho knew that the claims required approval by the homo office of the insurance company in another state, and that they were sent by the local office to the home office by mail, but his connection with the fraudulent claims ended when they were presented to the superintendent of the local office. Held, that though the superintendent of the local office sent such fraudulent claims through the mail, the agent is not guilty of the offense of using the mails in connection with the scheme to defraud denounced by Pen. Code, § 215 (Act March 4, 1909, c. 321, 35 Stat. 1130 [Oomp. St. 1913, § 10385]).</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Post Office, Cent. Dig. § 55; Dec. Dig. <@=35.]</p> <p><S=»For other eases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Bankruptcy <@=>196—Creditors—Restraining Order.</p> <p>A judgment creditor levied execution on property which was claimed by third persons to whom the bankrupt had conveyed it, whereupon the execution was released. More than four months before the institution of the bankruptcy proceeding, the judgment creditor sued the bankrupt and such third persons, and secured a decree that the conveyances were void as to him. Such decree was entered within four months of institution of the proceedings, whereupon the judgment creditor caused execution to ba issued on the original judgment, and the property was sold as the property of the bankrupt. Meld, that a restraining order should not be issued against the judgment creditor in favor of creditors who had not participated in the suit to set aside the conveyances, notwithstanding the judgment creditor was proceeding only by virtue of the latter decree.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bankruptcy. Cent. Dig. §§ 308-316; Dec. Dig. <@=»196.]</p> <p><@=>For other oases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Equity @=>894—Masters—Compensation.</p> <p>The compensation allowed a master by a district court under Equity Eule 68 (198 Eed. xxxviii, 115 C. C. A. xxxviii) must be fixed under the rules applicable to costs, to be measured by tie time employed “having regard to all the circumstances” of the case.</p> <p>[Ed. Noto.—For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. §§ 857-859; Dec. Dig. <S=5>394.]</p> <p><@s»For other oases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digest’s & Indexes</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Suit by the United States against the steamship Roanoke. Decree for libelant.</p>