Mohler v. Miller’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

41 federal appellate · 3 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 67 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““This does not, however, answer the question as to when the appellant’s action was begun. In a well considered opinion in Isaacks v. Jeffers, [10 Cir., 144 F.2d 26 ] supra, it was held that where a complaint was filed in the Federal District Court before the expiration of the statute of limitations, the action was commenced and the running of the statute was interrupted by the filing of such complaint although process was not actually served until more than 60 days after the expiration of the limitation period. While state law controls the time within which an action must be begun, the manner in which an action is commenced and when it is deemed to have begun, are governed by the law of the forum. These matters are procedural and not substantive. This reasoning was approved and followed by Judge Learned Hand in Bomar v. Keyes, supra [2 Cir., 162 F.2d 136 , 140], wherein it was explicitly held: ‘How ever, we now hold that it is the filing of the complaint which tolls the statute. We think that Rules 3 and 4(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U. S.C.A. * * * have made no longer applicable § 17 of the New York Civil Practice Act, which fixes the beginning of the action at the date when the writ is served, or is put into the sheriff’s hands for service.’ ” (Id. at 155).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Smith v. Peters · Estep v. Combs

2. “Actions for damages for an injury to the person, or for false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution * * * shall be commenced within two years next after the cause of action accrued.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Jones v. Jones · J. Edward Jones v. Evelyn S. Jones

3. ““We think that Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, have made no longer applicable § 17 of the New York Civil Practice Act, which fixes the beginning of the action at the date when the writ is served, or is put into the sheriff’s hands for service. The Rules have with some modification adopted the practice which was apparently general in equity: i.e., that the filing of the complaint, when followed by lodging the writ in the marshal’s hands, will toll the statute. Therefore, we cannot see that any question arises except whether they go beyond the warrant of the statute: ‘the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil actions at law. Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.’ We have not to deal with a case in which the limitation is annexed as a condition to the very right of action created. The Civil Rights Act is not cast in that form; and when a right is not so conditioned, the statute of limitations is treated as going to. the remedy. We are content therefore to follow the Tenth Circuit, in holding .that the filing of the complaint tolls the statute.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hagy v. Allen