People v. Johnson

                                  No. 2-21-0110
                            Opinion filed July 7, 2023
______________________________________________________________________________

                                              IN THE

                              APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE                ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS,                           ) of Kane County.
                                       )
      Plaintiff-Appellee,              )
                                       )
v.                                     ) No. 20-CF-134
                                       )
JERRIS R. JOHNSON,                     ) Honorable
                                       ) Donald M. Tegeler Jr.,
      Defendant-Appellant.             ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
       Presiding Justice McLaren and Justice Jorgensen concurred in the judgment and opinion.

                                            OPINION

¶1     Defendant, Jerris R. Johnson, appeals his conviction of domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-

3.2(a)(1) (West 2018)), contending that the trial court (1) erred in denying his motion to dismiss

under the section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (commonly known as the

Speedy Trial Act (Act)) (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2018)) and (2) abused its discretion by barring

him from introducing evidence of the victim’s mental health as it related to her credibility. Because

the court neither denied defendant his statutory speedy-trial right nor improperly limited defendant

in presenting evidence of the victim’s mental health, we affirm.

¶2                                      I. BACKGROUND


¶3     The State indicted defendant on two counts of aggravated domestic battery based on

strangulation (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a-5) (West 2018)) (counts I and II), one count of robbery (cell

phone) (720 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (West 2018)) (count III), two counts of aggravated battery on a public

way (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(c) (West 2018)) (counts IV and V), two counts of domestic battery (720

ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1), (2) (West 2018)) (counts VI and VII), and one count of theft (cell phone)

(720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1) (West 2018)) (count VIII). Defendant opted for a jury trial.

¶4     Before trial, defendant filed a demand under the Act (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2018)).

When the trial did not commence within the time prescribed by the Act, defendant moved for

dismissal. Relying on the supreme court’s emergency orders suspending the time provisions in the

Act because of COVID-19 (see Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. Apr. 7, 2020); Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370

(eff. Apr. 3, 2020); Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. Mar. 20, 2020)), the trial court denied the motion

to dismiss.

¶5     Also, before trial, defendant filed a motion in limine seeking, among other things, leave to

cross-examine the victim regarding her mental health at the time she reported the incident because

that evidence would be relevant to the credibility of her accusation. At the hearing on defendant’s

motion, defense counsel stated that she had received medical records from the State showing that

the victim had gone to the hospital after the incident and reported that she was taking “an

antipsychotic medication, generic Zyprexa, and lithium bicarbonate used to treat bipolar disorder.”

According to counsel, the victim also reported suffering from anxiety and depression. Counsel

further told the court that one of the responding police officers told an emergency medical

technician that the victim was a “little 10-96,” meaning that she had a mental-health issue. Counsel

suggested that the officer’s comment “obviously len[t] credence to the idea that [the victim’s]

mental health … affect[ed] her perception of what had happened and her reliability for



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statements.” Accordingly, counsel requested leave to cross-examine the responding police officer

about the victim’s behavior at the scene and to cross-examine the victim about her “state of mind”

and the medications she was prescribed at the time she reported the incident. Finally, counsel asked

to present evidence that the victim “ha[d] a reputation in the community for making stuff up.”

¶6     In deciding the motion in limine, the trial court said it would allow defense counsel to

question the responding officer about the victim’s behavior at the scene but would not allow the

officer to speculate as to the victim’s mental health. The court further ruled that it would not permit

counsel to inquire into the medications the victim was prescribed at the time she reported the

incident, “unless somehow it c[ame] up that she[ ] [was] supposed to be on medication and she

was not taking medication and that affected her.” Nor would the court permit counsel to inquire

about the victim’s mental health at the time she reported the incident, because none of the mental

disorders counsel mentioned would impact the victim’s ability to perceive reality. Finally, the court

found it premature to rule on defendant’s request to introduce evidence that the victim had a

reputation for untruthfulness. Such evidence “could possibly come in,” but the court would “see

what happen[ed] at the trial in that respect.” The court instructed defense counsel that she should

approach the bench and obtain a ruling before she sought to introduce reputation evidence.

¶7     The court summarized its ruling on the motion in limine:

               “So you get into the officer, his interactions with her and whether or not, you know,

       his questions and the answers, what they were, you know, how she was behaving

       emotionally and things. He can’t obviously guess as to any mental[-]health things. You

       cannot get into the prescriptions or any of her mental health at this point. As I said, I’ll wait

       to see if the reputation testimony comes in if it’s even appropriate at that point.”




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¶8        Defendant filed a second motion in limine to reconsider the trial court’s ruling on his initial

motion in limine. Defendant asserted that “[n]ew information ha[d] come to light that ma[de] [the

victim’s] mental health unequivocally a central question in th[e] case.” Specifically, defendant

pointed to two police reports indicating that the victim had fabricated claims of domestic battery.

Thus, according to defendant, the reports “demonstrate[d] recent, active delusional and

persecutory thinking.” Defendant also claimed that the reports generally alluded to defendant’s

prior paranoid and delusional behavior and “known history” of fabricating incidents. Based on

these reports, defendant asked the court to reconsider its ruling barring defendant from cross-

examining the victim about her mental health. Defendant also asked the court to permit police

officers to testify that the victim had a reputation for untruthfulness based on her mental-health

issues.

¶9        At the hearing on the second motion in limine, defense counsel reiterated her request to

cross-examine the victim about her mental health and how it affected her ability to perceive reality.

Counsel also requested leave to call police officers to opine that the victim was “untruthful due to

her delusional behavior and/or that she ha[d] a reputation in the community for untruthfulness

stemming from her delusional mental[-]health disorder.”

¶ 10      In ruling on the motion in limine, the trial court stated that it would allow defense counsel

to “get into whether or not [the victim was] on medication.” When defense counsel responded that

the court had previously ruled that she could not so inquire, the court replied that it would indeed

let counsel ask the victim whether “she [was] on medication and whether she was not.” The court

added that, if the victim answered that “she [was] on medication,” then counsel would have to

“live with the answer.” The court further allowed counsel to ask the victim whether “she’s ever

been diagnosed with a mental illness that would affect her ability to perceive the facts as they were



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occurring.” If the victim answered no, counsel would have to “live with her answer unless [counsel

had] someone to testify otherwise.”

¶ 11    The court also denied defendant’s request to call police officers to testify to whether the

victim was delusional. When counsel asked if she could cross-examine the victim “about … some

of her prior delusions[,]” the court answered,

                “It depends on what her answer is. Ask her if she’s ever been diagnosed with a

        delusional—you know, whether or not there has ever been a diagnosis of delusions. If she

        says no, you may be stuck. If she says yes, I will see how far I let you go.”

The court also reminded defense counsel that only two weeks remained until trial and that the court

was not inclined to continue the trial to allow counsel to locate doctors to testify about the victim’s

mental health. Counsel responded that she did not need to locate any doctors, because she was

already aware of doctors who treated the victim and who knew what medications she was

prescribed at the time she reported the incident. When the court asked if these doctors had been

identified as witnesses, counsel responded that they were on her witness list. The court commented,

“Well, let’s see if they show up.”

¶ 12    The following facts were developed at defendant’s jury trial. The victim testified that, on

January 22, 2020, at around 1 a.m., she and defendant were sitting in her car in a parking lot in

Elgin. They began to argue, and defendant started punching her in the face with a closed fist.

According to the victim, defendant also bit her hand and squeezed her neck until she lost

consciousness. The victim escaped to a Walgreens, where someone called 911. Defendant fled in

another direction.

¶ 13    According to the victim, her cell phone was in the car. However, she could not locate it

after the incident.



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¶ 14   The victim was taken to a hospital. Photographs of her injuries showed blood and bruises

on her face and neck, bite marks on her arm and leg, and blood on her hand.

¶ 15   The victim identified two recordings of telephone calls defendant made to her from jail. In

those calls, defendant encouraged the victim not to appear at his trial.

¶ 16   The victim also testified about two prior incidents in which she and defendant argued and

he physically abused her. On the first occasion, defendant punched her several times, knocking a

tooth loose. In the second incident, defendant beat her, grabbed her arm, and pushed her to the

ground. She reported both incidents to the police. She admitted that, after officers examined her

for injuries, they refused to arrest defendant.

¶ 17   During cross-examination, defense counsel asked the victim whether she had any

psychotropic medications in her car on January 22, 2020. The victim answered no and that she was

“just taking regular medication” at the time. Counsel then asked the victim if she had told hospital

personnel that she was taking olanzapine (the generic form of Zyprexa) and lithium. The victim

answered, “That’s what I’m taking.” When counsel asked if lithium was a mood stabilizer, the

court sustained the State’s objection. When counsel asked the victim if she had been diagnosed

with bipolar disorder, the court again sustained the State’s objection.

¶ 18   Dr. Maciej Padowski, an emergency room physician, testified that he treated the victim

after the incident. Defense counsel cross-examined Padowski but never questioned him about the

victim’s mental health or whether she had been prescribed any psychotropic medication. After Dr.

Padowski testified, defense counsel released him from her subpoena.

¶ 19   Before defendant’s case-in-chief, defense counsel made an offer of proof. She noted that

the trial court “did not let [her] get into some of the mental[-]health issues with [the victim].” She

added that she would have liked to have asked Dr. Padowski whether the victim was taking



                                                  -6-


olanzapine, an antipsychotic medication, and lithium, a mood stabilizer. The court responded that

it had made no such ruling as to Dr. Padowski, because counsel had “never bothered to even ask

the question.” Counsel then stated that she would ask emergency room nurse Lucas Hayes about

the victim’s medications. The court responded, “We’ll see what happens.”

¶ 20   Hayes testified for the defense that he treated the victim after the incident. He did not recall

if the victim reported being on any psychotropic medication. After reviewing his report, Hayes

could not recall what, if any, medications the victim was prescribed.

¶ 21   Debra Narvaiz, defendant’s former girlfriend, testified for the defense that she knew the

victim from the neighborhood. According to Narvaiz, the victim’s reputation for honesty and

truthfulness was “not good” and that she was “known to tell stories.”

¶ 22   The jury found defendant guilty of counts VI and VII (domestic battery) and not guilty of

all other charges. The trial court merged count VII into count VI for sentencing purposes.

Defendant filed a motion for a new trial claiming, among other things, that the trial court erred in

sustaining the State’s objections to defense counsel’s cross-examination of the victim about her

psychotropic medication use. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial and sentenced

defendant to four years’ imprisonment. Defendant, in turn, filed this timely appeal.

¶ 23                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 24   On appeal, defendant contends that (1) the Illinois Supreme Court violated the separation-

of-powers clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1) when it issued the

COVID-19-related emergency orders tolling the time restrictions in the Act (see 725 ILCS 5/103-

5 (West 2018); see also Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. Apr. 7, 2020); Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. Apr.

3, 2020); Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. Mar. 20, 2020)) and (2) the trial court abused its discretion




                                                 -7-


in barring him from cross-examining the victim and Dr. Padowski about the victim’s mental health

and the psychotropic medications she was using at the time she reported the incident.

¶ 25   We can readily dispose of defendant’s speedy-trial argument. On March 30, 2022, our

supreme court granted leave to appeal in People v. Mayfield, 

 (see People

v. Mayfield, No. 128092 (Ill. Mar. 30, 2022)), where we held that the supreme court’s emergency

orders tolling the time restrictions under the Act did not violate the separation of powers (Mayfield,

). Defendant here requested that we hold this appeal in

abeyance pending the supreme court’s decision in Mayfield, because that decision would likely

control the outcome of the speedy-trial issue in this case. On May 2, 2022, we issued an order

holding this appeal in abeyance pending the Mayfield decision. See People v. Johnson, No. 2-21-

0110 (May 2, 2022) (unpublished minute order).

¶ 26   On March 23, 2023, the supreme court issued its opinion. See People v. Mayfield, 

. In affirming our decision, the supreme court held that its emergency orders tolling the

Act’s time restrictions did not (1) exceed its administrative and supervisory authority to regulate

court procedures or (2) violate the separation of powers. Mayfield, 

.

Thus, the pretrial delay in that case did not violate the Act. See Mayfield, 

.

¶ 27   Mayfield controls because its holding resolved the precise issue raised here. Thus, there

was no speedy-trial violation in this case.

¶ 28   We next address whether the trial court abused its discretion in barring defendant from

cross-examining the victim and Dr. Padowski about the victim’s mental health and her use of

psychotropic medication at the time she reported the incident.

¶ 29   We begin with the trial court’s ruling regarding defendant’s cross-examination of the

victim. A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him,



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including the right to cross-examine. Crawford v. Washington, 

 (2004). However,

a defendant’s right to confront a witness is not absolute (People v. Bean, 

 (1990)),

and the trial court may limit cross-examination to prevent irrelevant inquiries or questioning that

“threaten[s] to distract the jury from the actual issues by unduly emphasizing details of a

witness’[s] life” (People v. Printy, 

 (1992)). A trial court has broad

discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination, and we will not reverse the court’s restriction

of cross-examination absent an abuse of discretion resulting in manifest prejudice. People v. Price,

 (2010).

¶ 30   Although a witness’s mental-health history “ ‘is relevant as it relates to credibility, and is

thus a permissible area of impeachment, before such evidence may be introduced, its relevance

must be established.’ ” People v. Baldwin, 

 (quoting People v.

Plummer, 

 (2000)). The party seeking to introduce a witness’s mental-

health history must establish its relevance to the witness’s credibility. Baldwin, 

.

¶ 31   Here, defendant contends that the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of

the victim regarding her mental health, which defendant contends was relevant to her credibility.

We disagree that the court erred. In ruling on defendant’s second motion in limine, the court said

that defendant could ask the victim which medications she was prescribed and whether she was

ever diagnosed with “a mental illness that would affect her ability to perceive the facts as they

were occurring.” At trial, defense counsel asked the victim if she was taking olanzapine and

lithium, to which the victim answered yes. Although the court sustained the State’s objection to

questions about whether lithium was a mood stabilizer and whether the victim had been diagnosed

with bipolar disorder, those questions did not necessarily relate to the victim’s ability to perceive



                                                -9-


or her credibility. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting defendant’s cross-

examination of the victim regarding her mental health and any prescribed medications.

¶ 32   Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion as to defendant’s cross-examination of Dr.

Padowski. Defendant bases his argument on a false premise—that the court’s “previous rulings,”

i.e., rulings on the motions in limine and the cross-examination of the victim, precluded defendant

from asking Dr. Padowski which medications the victim was using at the time she reported the

incident.

¶ 33   A motion in limine permits a party to obtain a pretrial order admitting or excluding

evidence. People v. Gliniewicz, 

. “A motion in limine should be as

specific as possible and set out all relevant facts so that the trial court can properly assess the

relevance and admissibility of the evidence at issue as well as any potential unfair prejudice.”

Gliniewicz, 

. A pretrial ruling on a motion in limine is always

subject to reconsideration at trial because the trial court rules on it in a vacuum, before hearing the

trial evidence that might justify either admission or exclusion of the proposed evidence.

Gliniewicz, 

. “Generally, a trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine

will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Gliniewicz, 

. “An abuse of discretion exists only where the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or

unreasonable ….” People v. Ramsey, 

 (2010).

¶ 34   In ruling on defendant’s initial motion in limine, the trial court told defendant that he

“cannot get into the [victim’s] prescriptions or any of her mental health at this point.” (Emphasis

added.) The emphasized language indicated that the court’s ruling was neither final nor foreclosed

defendant from later seeking to introduce such evidence. Indeed, defendant filed a second motion




                                                - 10 -


in limine, again seeking leave to question the victim about her mental health and how it affected

her ability to perceive reality.

¶ 35    In ruling on the second motion in limine, the trial court stated that it would allow defendant

to “get into whether or not [the victim was] on medication.” When defense counsel responded that

the court had previously ruled that she could not so inquire, the court replied that it would indeed

let counsel ask the victim whether “she [was] on medication and whether she was not.” The court

added that, if the victim answered that “she [was] on medication,” then counsel would have to

“live with the answer.” The court further allowed counsel to ask the victim whether she had ever

been diagnosed with “a mental illness that would affect her ability to perceive the facts as they

were occurring.” If the victim answered no, then counsel would have to “live with her answer

unless [counsel had] someone to testify otherwise.” The court also permitted counsel to ask the

victim if she were ever diagnosed as delusional; if she answered yes, the court would determine

how far to let defendant pursue that matter. Further, the court reminded counsel that only two

weeks remained until trial and that the court was not inclined to continue the trial to allow counsel

to locate doctors to testify about the victim’s mental health. Counsel responded that she did not

need to locate any doctors, because she was already aware of doctors who treated the victim and

who knew what medications she was prescribed at the time she reported the incident. When the

court asked if these doctors had been identified as witnesses, counsel responded that they were on

her witness list. The court commented, “Well, let’s see if they show up.”

¶ 36    The trial court’s ruling on defendant’s second motion in limine allowed defense counsel to

ask Dr. Padowski whether the victim was prescribed psychotropic medications and whether she

was diagnosed with a mental illness that could have affected her ability to perceive reality. Further,

as with any ruling on a motion in limine, defendant remained free to seek, at trial, reconsideration



                                                - 11 -


of the court’s ruling on either of his motions in limine. Along those lines, we cannot reasonably

construe the trial court’s ruling on defendant’s cross-examination of the victim as a reversal of the

court’s ruling on defendant’s second motion in limine. Consistent with that ruling, and without the

State’s objection, defense counsel asked the victim if she had told hospital personnel she was

taking lithium and olanzapine. The court did not allow counsel’s follow-up questions, but that was

consistent with the terms of the ruling on the second motion in limine.

¶ 37    Defense counsel did not question Dr. Padowski because she mistakenly believed the court

had barred her from doing so. When she made an offer of proof, the trial court reiterated that it had

not barred her from questioning Dr. Padowski about the victim’s psychotropic medications.

However, instead of recalling Dr. Padowski, counsel opted to question Hayes about the victim’s

medications. The trial court did not abuse its discretion because it did not have the opportunity to

exercise its discretion: defense counsel never sought to elicit Dr. Padowski’s opinion about the

victim’s psychotropic medications. However, the trial court did not prohibit defendant, either

before or during trial, from questioning Dr. Padowski about the victim’s psychotropic medications.

The defendant committed a procedural default by failing to ask the question or seeking leave to

ask the question. “ ‘[P]rocedural default refers to the failure to adequately preserve an issue for

later appellate review.’ ” People v. Whitfield, 

 (2005) (quoting People v. Blair,

, 457 n.3 (2005) (Freeman, J, dissenting, joined by McMorrow, C.J., and Kilbride,

J.)).

¶ 38    For the foregoing reasons, we hold that (1) no speedy-trial violation occurred and (2) the

trial court did not improperly limit defendant in cross-examining the victim or Dr. Padowski about

the victim’s mental health or her psychotropic medications.

¶ 39                                    III. CONCLUSION



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¶ 40   For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.

¶ 41   Affirmed.




                                             - 13 -


                      People v. Johnson, 

Decision Under Review:     Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County, No. 20-CF-134;
                           the Hon. Donald M. Tegeler Jr., Judge, presiding.


Attorneys                  James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Lilien, and Fletcher P. Hamill, of
for                        State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.
Appellant:


Attorneys                  Jamie L. Mosser, State’s Attorney, of St. Charles (Patrick Delfino,
for                        Edward R. Psenicka, and Max C. Boose, of State’s Attorneys
Appellee:                  Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.




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