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235 S.W.2d 236

Hill v. Leschber

Court of Appeals of Texas

Decided November 1, 1950

Court of Appeals of Texas · decided 1950-11-01

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 17 Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the failure of Dr. David Heinrich to remove the broken piece of the root from the lower left molar from the extraction area of Mrs. Weeks’ jaw was the exercise by Dr. David Heinrich of same degree of care and skill that other general dentists would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances in the City of Victoria, Texas, and vicinity thereof, in the exercise of ordinary care for the welfare of a patient such as Mrs. Frances Weeks? Answer: ‘We Do’ or ‘We Do Not’ WE DO NOT If you have answered the foregoing Special Issue No. 17 ‘We do,’ and only in that event, then answer: SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 18 Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such failure, if any, was a proximate cause of the injury and damage sustained by the plaintiff Mrs. Frances Weeks? Answer ‘We do,’ or ‘We do not.’ Answer: (not answered)” * * * * * * “SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 26 What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, do you find from a preponderance of the evidence, will fairly and reasonably compensate the plaintiff, Mrs. Frances Weeks, for the reasonable value of such necessary medical and hospital expenses incurred by plaintiffs in connection with the removal of the tooth fragment, or root tip, from the extraction area of the lower left molar, as a direct and proximate result of the leaving of such fragment in Mrs. Frances Weeks’ body? Answer by stating the amount in dollars and cents, if any. $13”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Weeks v. Heinrich

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1950-11-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently August 1973

5 state decisions

30195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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HUGHES, Justice.

¶1Carl Leschber, appellee, sued C. F. Hill and Arnel Bielss to recover $296.42, alleged to he the unpaid purchase price of 8,300 pounds of corn which he sold and delivered to Hill and Bielss.

¶2Hill, alone, answered. He filed several defensive pleas but did not plead that he had paid for the corn.

¶3Trial was before a jury. Appellee moved for judgment against both defendants upon the jury’s verdict. This motion was granted. Hill, only, has appealed and the record does not contain a statement of facts.

¶4Appellant seeks a reversal and rendition because, as he says, “Appellee having failed, as shown 'by the jury’s answer to Special Issue Number 2, to show that he had not been paid by Bielss for the corn, the court erred” in not rendering judgment in his behalf.

¶5Special Issue No. 2 and the jury’s answer thereto read: “Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that defendant Bielss has not paid plaintiff for the corn he purchased from plaintiff? Answer ‘He has not paid plaintiff’ or ‘He has paid plaintiff.’ We the jury answer, ‘No.’ ”

¶6Appellant concedes that there was no duty on appellee to either plead or prove non-payment but he contends that since appellee assumed this burden, without objection, he cannot now complain.

¶7It is no doubt true that appellee cannot, under these circumstances, now complain of the form of Special Issue No. 2.

¶8Nevertheless, in our opinion, the judgment below must be affirmed for the reasons now to be stated.

¶9The plain meaning of the jury’s answer to Special Issue No. 2 is that the jury failed to find from a preponderance of the evidence that Bielss had not paid for the corn. This was not the equivalent of a finding that Bielss d'd pay for the corn. It merely shows that there was no evidence or insufficient evidence of defendant’s failure to pay. See 41 Tex.Jur., p. 1218, Sec. 354, and cases there cited.

¶10This finding of the jury as to the lack or insufficiency of the evidence to show non-payment is of no benefit to appellant. Proof of non-payment is unnecessary. 32 Tex.Jur., p. 710. The finding of the jury in this regard is of no consequence and was properly disregarded by the trial court. 41 Tex.Jur., p. 1235, § 368, and many cases there cited.

¶11We are further of the opinion that the verdict of the jury, construed as a whole, finds that neither appellant nor Bielss paid for the corn.

¶12The jury found that the corn was sold to Bielss as agent for Hill and that the same was to be a cash transaction. It further found that Bielss delivered the corn to Hill and that Hill then knew or should have known that the purchase price was to be paid by Bielss in cash. In answer to Special Issue No. 8 the jury found “that at the time defendant Bielss delivered the corn to defendant Hill that defendant Hill knew or by reasonable diligence should have known that defendant Bielss had not paid for said corn.” The jury also found that Plill had not paid for the corn.

¶13It will be noted that Special Issue No. 8 assumed as a fact that Bielss had not paid for the corn. Without a statement of facts we cannot say that this assumption was unwarranted. In support of the trial court’s judgment we must presume that it was.

¶14The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

¶15On Motion for Rehearing.

¶16Appellant now prays, not for rendition in his behalf but for a reversal “in order that justice may be accomplished.”

¶17*238Without a statement of facts it is impossible for us to say that justice would be served by another trial. If there was any evidence that Bielss had paid for the corn, appellant should have brought it up. His failure to do so leaves us without any cogent reason for ordering a new trial.

¶18The motion is overruled.

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