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← 236 F.2d 673 - Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc.

Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis

236 F.2d 673 · 1956

Citation profile

111
cited by 111 later decisions
14
states following
June 2015
most recently cited

41 federal appellate · 14 district · 51 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 111 later decisions — most recently June 2015 · most notably Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of City of Newark (1962), 125 Ill. 2d 203 - Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard (1988)

41 federal appellate · 14 district · 51 state decisions — followed in 14 states

3501956196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1732

Relies on United States v. Reynolds · Gunning v. Cooley · Galloway v. United States · Schulz v. Pennsylvania Railroad · Best v. District of Columbia

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 111 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “We have heretofore made clear as to apartment houses, the reasons which underlie the landlord's duty under modern conditions and which, as to various hazards call for at least `reasonable or ordinary care, which means reasonably safe conduct, but there is no sufficient reason for requiring less.' True, the landlord does not become a guarantor of the safety of his tenant. But, if he knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care ought to know, of a possibly dangerous situation and fails to take such steps as an ordinarily prudent person, in view of existing circumstances, would have exercised to avoid injury to his tenant, he may be liable. (citations omitted)”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Although an employer will not be held liable for failure to discover information about the employees [dangerous unsuitability for the employment] that could not have been discovered by reasonable investigation, the issue is whether the employer did make a reasonable investigation. The scope of the investigation is directly related to the severity of risk third parties are subjected to by [the] employee. Although only slight care may suffice in the hiring of a yardman, a worker on a production line, or other types of employment where the employee would not constitute a high risk of injury to third persons, “a very different series of steps are justified if an employee is to be sent” after hours, to work for protracted periods in the apartment of a young woman tenant.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[B]ecause of the extraordinary nature of criminal conduct, the law requires that the foreseeability of the risk be more precisely shown. Thus, although normally the “defendant need not have foreseen the precise injury, nor ‘should [he] have had notice of the particular method’ in which a harm would occur,” in order to establish proximate cause, unless the assault was foreseeable, the defendants in this case had no duty to act.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.