National Labor Relations Board v. Darlington Veneer Co.’s Empirical Analysis
236 F.2d 85 · 1956
Citation profile
30 federal appellate ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 32 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 1991 · most notably National Labor Relations Board v. Wooster Division of Borgwarner Corp. (1958), Terrell Machine Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (1970)
30 federal appellate ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 29 U.S.C. § 158 (§ 8 of the National Labor Relations Act) · 29 U.S.C. § 159 (§ 9 of the National Labor Relations Act)
Relies on Consolidated Edison Co of New York v. National Labor Relations Board · Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. · National Labor Relations Board v. American National Insurance · National Labor Relations Board v. Truitt Manufacturing Co. · National Labor Relations Board v. Sands Manufacturing Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““The purpose of collective bargaining is to fix wages, hours and conditions of work by a trade agreement between the employer and his employees. N. L. R. B. v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 4 Cir., 110 F.2d 632 , 638. This can be done satisfactorily only if a bargaining agent is selected to represent all the employees with full power to speak in their behalf. The purpose of the statute would be largely frustrated if the results of bargaining must be submitted to a vote of the employees, with all the misunderstandings and cross currents that would inevitably arise in an election of that sort. * * * “We do not mean to say that the ratification and nullification provisions would not be legal and valid if agreed upon by the parties, nor that the mere advancing of such proposals is of itself an unfair labor practice. Cf. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 7 Cir., 213 F.2d 374 . We think, however, that the insistence upon such provisions as a condition of entering into any agreement is so unreasonable when objected to by the other party as to furnish of itself a sufficient basis for the finding by the Board of failure to bargain in good faith, * *”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“The Company, by insisting after all the other terms of the contract were agreed upon, that the contract be approved or ratified by a majority of the employees, was attempting to bargain, not with respect to “wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment”, but with respect to a matter which was exclusively within the internal domain of the Union. Members of a Union have the right to determine the extent of authority delegated to their bargaining unit. It is within their province to determine whether or not their bargaining unit may enter into a binding contract with or without membership ratification. It is not an issue which the Company can insist upon without mutual agreement by the Union, any more than the Union can insist that the contract be submitted to the Board of Directors or stockholders of the Company. The Union, by virtue of its certification as exclusive bargaining agent, was empowered by its members to make agreements on behalf of the employees it represented without securing the approval of those employees.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.