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236 Ga. 1

222 S.E.2d 354

State v. Stonaker

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided January 8, 1976

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 1976-01-08

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“(1) The trial judge must charge the jury on each crime specified in the indictment or accusation, unless the evidence does not warrant a conviction of such crime, or unless the state has affirmatively withdrawn a crime or stricken it from the indictment or accusation. (2) The trial judge also may, of his own volition and in his discretion, charge on a lesser crime of that included in the indictment or accusation. However, his failure to do so, without a written request by the state or the accused, is not error. (3) The state or the accused may, by written application to the trial judge at or before the close of the evidence, request him to charge on lesser crimes that are included in those set forth in the indictment or accusation, and his failure to so charge as requested, if the evidence warrants such requested charge or charges, shall be error. (4) An erroneous charge on a lesser crime to that set forth in the indictment or accusation does not rise to the level of reversible error, unless such charge was harmful to the accused as a matter of law.”

quoted by 7 later decisions, including 244 Ga. App. 28 - Mills v. State, Swett v. State

“to clarify for the trial courts what must be charged and what may be charged and what need not be charged in the area of lesser included crimes in criminal trials.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Martin v. State, Powell v. State

Relies on Kerbo v. State · 134 Ga. App. 123 - Stonaker v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1976-01-08

How this case has been cited

Cited by 318 later decisions — most recently May 2025 · most notably Westbrook v. Zant (1983), Driggers v. State (1979)

3 federal appellate · 308 state decisions

1410197619801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Gunter, Justice.

¶1We granted the state’s application for a writ of certiorari to review the decision and judgment of the Court of Appeals in Stonaker v. State, 134 Ga. App. 123 (213 SE2d 506) (1975). The Court of Appeals reversed respondent’s conviction for what it considered deficiencies in the charge of the trial court to the jury: The failure of the trial judge to charge the jury on a lesser offense to that offense delineated in the indictment, and the trial judge’s failure to charge the jury on the subject of conflicting statements of the victim even though no such charge was requested in writing.

¶2The indictment charged the respondent with child molestation: "A person commits child molestation when he does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 14 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person.” Code Ann. § 26-2019. The charge to the jury was complete and accurate with respect to this alleged crime.

¶3The Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence would *2also authorize a conviction on the lesser included crime of battery, and since the trial judge failed to charge the law with respect to the crime of battery, the charge was erroneous.

¶4It has not heretofore been held by either of our appellate courts that the crime of battery is a lesser crime included in child molestation. Nor has it been heretofore held that a charge on battery must be given when the crime specified in the indictment is that of child molestation.

¶5However, our purpose in granting the application for the writ in this case was to attempt to clarify for the trial courts what must be charged and what may be charged and what need not be charged in the area of lesser included crimes in criminal trials.

¶6We now proceed to set forth the following rules in this area of the criminal law:

¶7(1) The trial judge must charge the jury on each crime specified in the indictment or accusation, unless the evidence does not warrant a conviction of such crime, or unless the state has affirmatively withdrawn a crime or stricken it from the indictment or accusation.

¶8(2) The trial judge also may, of his own volition and in his discretion, charge on a lesser crime of that included in the indictment or accusation. However, his failure to do so, without a written request by the state or the accused, is not error.

¶9(3) The state or the accused may, by written application to the trial judge at or before the close of the evidence, request him to charge on lesser crimes that are included in those set forth in the indictment or accusation, and his failure to so charge as requested, if the evidence warrants such requested charge or charges, shall be error.

¶10(4) An erroneous charge on a lesser crime to that set forth in the indictment or accusation does not rise to the level of reversible error, unless such charge was harmful to the accused as a matter of law.

¶11By the establishment of these rules it is obvious that the decision of this court in Kerbo v. State, 230 Ga. 241 (196 SE2d 424) (1973) and similar rulings in other cases by this court and the Court of Appeals are overruled.

¶12Under the facts of this case we hold that simple *3battery as defined in Chapter 26-13 of the Criminal Code of Georgia is not a lesser crime included in the crime of child molestation as defined in Chapter 26-20 (Sexual Offenses) of the Criminal Code of Georgia. It was therefore not error for the trial judge to fail to charge the jury on the crime of simple battery in this case.

Submitted August 8, 1975Decided January 8, 1976Rehearing denied January 27, 1976.William H. Ison, District Attorney, Clarence L. Leathers, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellant.Paul S. Weiner, for appellee.

¶13The other ruling of the Court of Appeals relating to the failure of the trial judge to charge on the subject of conflicting statements without a written request to do so was also erroneous. In the absence of a written request for such a charge, it is not error for the trial judge to fail to charge the jury on the issue of conflicting statements made by a witness. The charge given by the court in this case was fair and complete, and the failure to charge the jury on the issue of conflicting statements made by a witness, without a written request to so charge, cannot be held to be prejudicial or harmful error.

¶14Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Hill, J., who concurs specially.
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