¶1dissenting.
¶2In my opinion the trial court erred in admitting testimony that the witness Rena Mae Brown was given a lie detector test and that immediately thereafter arrest warrants were obtained. The contention is made that such testimony imputes veracity to the testimony of Rena Mae Brown by raising an inference that such lie detector (polygraph) test showed her testimony implicating Herlong to be true.
¶3In Stack v. State, 234 Ga. 19, 23 (214 SE2d 514) (1975), this court quoted the following language from the decision in Johnson v. State (Fla. App.), 166 S2d 798: " 'On the basis of an analysis of the cases hereinbefore discussed we conclude that while neither the results of a lie detector examination nor testimony which indirectly or inferentially apprises a jury of the results of a lie detector examination is admissible into evidence, the mere fact that the jury is apprised that a lie detector test *330was taken is not necessarily prejudicial if no inference as to the result is raised or if any inferences that might be raised as to the result are not prejudicial. This determination should not, of course, encourage attempts to introduce evidence concerning lie detectors. As is clear from the cited cases, such evidence is liable to be prejudicial and should be admitted only when clearly relevant and unmistakably nonprejudicial.”
¶4Under the decision in Stack v. State, supra, the trial court erred in permitting testimony that the lie detector test was given to the witness Rena Mae Brown and, immediately following, arrest warrants were issued for the defendants. As to the defendant Herlong, it cannot be said that such evidence was harmless.