State v. Bristor’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

52 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 52 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The very purpose of the implied consent law (K.S.A. 8-1001) is to coerce a motorist suspected of driving under the influence to ‘consent’ to chemical testing, thereby allowing scientific evidence of his blood alcohol content to be used against him in a subsequent prosecution for that offense. [Citation omitted.] For drivers who refuse, the purpose of the statute is to provide an effective means short of physical force to overcome the refusal. [Citation omitted.]” (Emphasis added.)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Adee · 19 Kan. App. 2d 591 - Furthmyer v. Kansas Department of Revenue

2. “"The Supreme Court has not defined precisely when a prosecution begins. The plurality in Kirby [ v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 , 32 L.Ed.2d 411 , 92 S.Ct. 1877 (1972)] indicated that adversary judicial criminal proceedings are initiated by way of `formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.' 406 U.S. at 689 . In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 , reh. denied 431 U.S. 925 (1977), the court found a criminal prosecution had begun when an arrest warrant had been issued, the accused had been arraigned on that warrant before a judge, and the accused had been committed by the court to confinement in jail. 430 U.S. at 399 . However, Brewer did not answer when a criminal prosecution begins, because the court did not say whether one of these factors would have been sufficient or whether the combination of several or all of them triggered the right to counsel. Relying on Kirby, an Indiana court found that a driver had no right to consult with an attorney before deciding whether to take a breathalyzer test because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not attach `until a judicial adversary proceeding had been initiated against him, that is, after the filing of an affidavit or indictment charging him with a crime.' Davis v. State, 174 Ind. App. 433, 435-36 , 367 N.E.2d 1163 (1977). Accord State ex rel. Webb v. City Court of City of Tucson, 25 Ariz. App. 214 , 542 P.2d 407 (1975); State v. Petkus, 110 N.H. 394 , 269 A.2d 123 ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Donlay

3. “"In this case, there is some discrepancy between the Court of Appeals majority and dissent as to whether a complaint had been filed against Bristor when the BAT was administered. The majority found the issuance of a ticket the equivalent of a complaint. 9 Kan. App.2d at 406. The dissent, relying on K.S.A. 8-2108, found a ticket does not become a complaint until it is filed with the court. 9 Kan. App.2d at 420. K.S.A. 8-2108 provides, `... such citation [the ticket] when filed with a court having jurisdiction shall be deemed to be a lawful complaint for the purpose of prosecution." Under this statute, Bristor's ticket did not become a complaint until it was filed with the court three days after his arrest. "It is not until after the test has been administered that the State commits itself to the criminal prosecution."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Donlay