Calvert v. Garvey Elevators, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 2 district · 36 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 44 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]he public policy of the State of Georgia requires adoption of a Fireman’s Rule in Georgia broader than that stated in Ingram.... [W]e now hold that it is a public policy of the State of Georgia that a public safety employee cannot recover for injuries caused by the very negligence that initially required his presence in an official capacity and subjected the public safety employee to harm; that public policy precludes recovery against an individual whose negligence created a need for the presence of the public safety employee at the scene in his professional capacity. “That is not to say that firemen or police are barred from recovery in all instances in which they are injured by negligent acts. The relevant inquiry is whether the negligently created risk which resulted in the fireman’s or policeman’s injury was the very reason for his presence on the scene in his professional capacity. If the answer is yes, then recovery is barred; if no, then recovery may be had.” Furthermore, it is important to note that our holding in this case addresses only the initial negligence which requires the public safety employee’s presence in his official capacity. We make no rule in this case concerning liability for subsequent acts of negligence or for intentional wrongdoing.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. White v. Edmond · 606 F. App'x 891 - Peak Ex Rel. Peak v. Central Tank Coatings, Inc.

2. “[f]irefighters enter on the premises to discharge their duties. Fire fighters are present upon the premises, not because of any private duty owed the occupant, but because of the duty owed to the public as a whole.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Thomas v. Pang · 818 So. 2d 1154 - Farmer v. B & G Food Enterprises, Inc.

3. ““A number of courts have used an assumption of the risk analysis in determining that a fire fighter who is injured in the performance of his duty cannot sue a third party whose negligence created the condition resulting in the injuries. See Baker v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. App. 3d 710 , 181 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1982); Krauth [v. Geller], 31 N.J. 270 [, 157 A.2d 129 (1960)]. The Fireman’s Rule is not based upon ‘express’ assumption of the risk, i.e., where parties contract with each other so that one accepts the risk of harm which is instant to the other’s conduct, but rather upon ‘implied’ assumption of the risk. “Assumption of the risk doctrine is divided into primary’ and ‘secondary’ assumption of the risk. Primary assumption of the risk technically is not a defense, but rather a legal theory which relieves an individual of a duty which he might otherwise owe another with respect to a particular risk. Secondary assumption of the risk occurs when the individual voluntarily encounters a known, appreciated risk without an intended manifestation by that individual that he consents to relieve another of his duty. Primary assumption of risk, therefore, is a doctrine which limits a duty owed by the occupier of the premises to the fire fighter. The primary assumption of risk doctrine is an absolute bar to a fire fighter’s recovery; it dictates that the occupier of the premises did not owe the individual fireman any duty of care. The Minnesota Supreme Court has made a comprehensive anal”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 45 Kan. App. 2d 177 - Simmons v. Porter