236 Md. App. 456 - Carter v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “To determine the elements of a statutory offense, we use the standard tools of statutory interpretation. State v. Bey , 452 Md. 255 , 265 [ 156 A.3d 873 ] (2017). Where the plain language of the statute, within the statutory scheme and in light of the legislative purpose of the statute, is clear and unambiguous, no further inquiry is necessary. Id. at 265-66 [ 156 A.3d 873 ]. We must give "words their natural and ordinary meaning," Davis v. State , 426 Md. 211 , 218 [ 43 A.3d 1044 ] (2012), and "the statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical or incompatible with common sense," Bey , 452 Md. at 266 [ 156 A.3d 873 ]. Normally, where the plain language of a statute is clear, our inquiry into the legislative intent ends. Id. at 265 [ 156 A.3d 873 ].”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 237 Md. App. 60 - Shortall v. State

2. “the General Assembly made clear that its intent was not to alter the elements of an existing crime, but to establish a new crime: the manufacture, distribution, dispensing, or possession of certain quantities of [CDS].”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 240 Md. App. 200 - Johnson v. State

3. “it is unlawful for any person ... [t]o manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or to possess a [CDS] in sufficient quantity to indicate under all circumstances an intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a [CDS].”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 240 Md. App. 200 - Johnson v. State