¶1dissenting:
¶2I dissent. The affidavit in this case lacks the evidence to support a finding of probable cause to search either the defendant’s car or his residence.
¶3In order to find probable cause, the facts set out in the affidavit must be closely related to the time of the issuance of the warrant. Sgro v. United States (1932), 287 U.S. 206, 210, 53 S.Ct. 138, 140, 77 L.Ed. 260, 263. In other words, the affidavit must be based on current facts, those that indicate that a law is being violated at the time the warrant is issued. State ex rel. Townsend v. Dist. Court (1974), 168 Mont. 357, 362, 543 P.2d 193, 196. Facts alleging criminal activity that occurred five months prior to the application for a warrant are simply too remote to justify a determination of probable cause.
¶4The affidavit in question states that a confidential informant, while in the defendant’s home, observed marijuana plants and marijuana *225in processed form “at least two (2) times in the past five months.” The logical assumption stemming from this allegation is that at least one of these observations occurred five months prior to the application, otherwise there would be no need to use that particular timeframe. There is no indication when the other observation took place. Perhaps it occurred five months prior to the application, perhaps four and one-half months, perhaps three weeks. The language of the affidavit serves only to obscure the applicable time, making it impossible to determine when the informaht actually saw the evidence of criminal activity, thereby making it impossible to establish probable cause.
¶5Apparently, the majority feels that any defects in the remoteness of the observations are cured by the claim that the informant “recently” heard the defendant state that he was growing marijuana. Once again, the terminology merely serves to conceal the date on which the statement was made. “Recent” is a relevant term. “[W]hat is recent to one person is not recent to another. Whereas the word ‘recent’ may be months in some situations, it may be a much shorter period of time elsewhere.: State v. O’Brien (1974), 22 Ariz. App. 425, 528 P.2d 176, 178, review denied, (1975), 112 Ariz. 41, 537 P.2d 28. All I can really surmise from the use of the word “recent” is that the defendant’s admission probably did not take place more than five months before the warrant issued.
¶6The majority further attempts to justify probable cause by relying on the continuing nature of the crime. Indeed, it is arguable that cultivating marijuana is an endeavor that often continues for a period of time. However, the nature of the crime cannot overcome the problems created by the vague assertions of time contained in this affidavit. All I know for certain from this affidavit is that an informant sighted marijuana at the defendant’s residence five months prior to the application for a warrant. Without more concrete proof that the defendant continued to engage in criminal activity, I am unwilling to rely on the nature of the crime to cure this affidavit’s deficiencies.
¶7Furthermore, there is no reference whatsoever to the date on which the informant heard the defendant state that he was selling marijuana within the Libby city limits. We have previously held that an affidavit that omits any reference to time is void. Townsend, 168 Mont. at 362, 543 P.2d at 196. So too should we refuse to enforce the warrant authorizing the search of the defendant’s car when the only information linking the car to the transportation of marijuana is an *226undated allegation that the defendant admitted he was selling within the city limits.
¶8The majority voices concern over the protection of confidential informants. Protection of informants, however, should not take precedence over the right of people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Other steps, such as independent investigation on the part of the authorities, can be taken to protect informants. Independent investigation also establishes corroborating evidence to bolster a determination of probable cause.
¶9The majority opinion legitimizes warrants issued on loose, vague references to time. The Fourth Amendment demands a more exacting factual basis than is presented in the present case.
¶10I would affirm the suppression order of the District Court.