Volume 236 — United States Reports

Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), was a Supreme Court of the United States case based on United States labor law that allowed employers to implement contracts—called yellow-dog contracts—which forbade employees from joining unions. The case was decided in the era prior to the Great Depression, when the Supreme Court invalidated laws that imposed restrictions on contracts, especially those of employment. The liberty of contract became viewed as a fundamental right that could be abridged only in extreme circumstances; abridgments violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

<p>APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO DOCKET AND PROSECUTE WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF FEES.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the construction and application of the Federal statute relative to conducting cases in forma pauperis, are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the District Court, are stated in the opinion. Federal courts are bound to proceed to judgment and to afford redress to suitors before them in every case to which their jurisdiction extends. They-cannot abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of another jurisdiction. Chicot Co. v. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 529, 534.

<p>The courts of Oklahoma have held that under § 7 of the Original Creek Agreement of 1901 a non-citizen husband, while by reason of non-membership in the tribe was not to be counted in determining the distributive shares for the purpose of allotment to, or in the right of, enrolled members of the tribe, was entitled under tribal laws to take an heir’s part of the lands which had been allotted to his deceased citizen wife. De Graffenreid, v. Iowa Land & Trust Co., 20 Oklahoma, 6f7.</p> <p>The laws of the Creeks were uncertain and ambiguous, and although the construction of a tribal law by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is not a construction of a law of the State, and this court has an undoubted right of review, it will not overturn, in a case at most only debatable, a rule of construction that for years has governed transfers of property.</p> <p>The Supplemental Creek Agreement of 1902, providing that the descent and distribution of allotments should be in accordance with § 49, Mansfield’s Digest, Laws of Arkansas, was not an interpretation of the provisions for descent and distribution in the Original Creek Agreement of 1901, but an express repeal thereof and the establishment of another rule as to the future; but without affecting the meaning of the provision in the Original Agreement as to the cases governed by it,</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of the Original Creek Agreement and the laws of descent applicable to allotments made thereunder, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court under § 237, Judicial Code, and the effect of a discharge in bankruptcy, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court on a direct appeal from the District Court, are stated in the opinion.

Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that: A pardoned person must introduce the pardon into court proceedings, otherwise the pardon is considered a private matter, unknown to and unable to be acted on by the court. No formal acceptance is necessary to give effect to the pardons. If a pardon is rejected, it cannot be forced upon its subject. A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended ...

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OP NEW YORK.</p> <p>The facts, which are similar to. those involved in the preceding case, are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OP APPEALS POR THE FIRST CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the validity of a chattel mortgage and the lien thereof on goods of the bankrupt, are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>No exception or bill of exception is necessary to open a question of law apparent on the record where the record shows no waiver of rights of plaintiffs in error. Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U. S. 165.</p> <p>When a municipality is authorized to raise money by sale of bonds this court will take it that the authority extends to putting the bonds in the form that would be necessary to obtain a purchaser. And, this applies also to certificates of indebtedness.</p> <p>There is no essential- difference between bonds of a municipality and its certificates of indebtedness, and in this case held that the purchasers for value before maturity and in good faith of negotiable certificates of indebtedness of the City of Denver were entitled' to recover, and the defense that the authority to issue certificates did not authorize making them negotiable could not be maintained.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of the War Revenue Act of 1898 and the subsequent Acts relating thereto, and their application to inheritances, are stated in the opinion. The questions involved in this case have been explicitly passed upon by this court and determined adversely to the position taken by appellee. The position of ■ the Government is covered by Mr. Solicitor General Bowers in his brief in Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U. S. 205.

Held: citing Amy v. Watertown, 130 U. S. 317 , that though the Southern Railway was doing business in Louisiana, yet .the default judgment was void because entered in a suit served on the Assistant when the statute designated the Secretary of State as the officer upon whom the citation should be served.

The- facts, which involve the constitutionality, under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, of Article 55, Louisiana Code of Procedure, relating to pos-sessory ánd petitory actions, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of a mortgage affecting property in Porto Rico and the determination of the question of whether it embraced the land or only the crops, are stated in the opinion. The instrument created a lien on the land; the rule that mortgages must be upon specific real estate is confined to its effect upon rights of third parties.. The instrument bound the title of Gallardo. The allegations of . the bill are sufficient.

Held: could not be an accomplice. The Queen v. Whitchurch, 24 Q. B. D. 420, 422; Solander v. The People, 2 Colorado, 48, 63; State v. Crofford, 133 Iowa, 478 , 480. So we think that it would be going too far to say that the defendant could not be guilty in this case.

The facts, which involve the power of the State Railroad Commission of California to regulate rates of transportation between intrastate points where part of the transportation is on the high seas, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution of orders made by the State Railroad Commission of Louisiana relative to switching of cars as applied to cars used in interstate commerce, are stated in the opinion. The District Court had jurisdiction. A switching movement, whereby interstate freight is delivered or an interstate movement is originated, is itself a movement in interstate commerce.

The facts, which involve the construction of. the Federal Anti-Trust Act, and the effect of a profit sharing contract of a corporation and those dealing with it exclusively and the right of the corporation to recover for goods sold, áre stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution of a privilege tax imposed by state authority on a wholesale liquor business confined exclusively to filling mail orders from points outside the State, are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>Chapter 479 is not repugnant to the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.</p> <p>It should be'construed with other constitutional provisions and statutes which are in pari materia with it. See Constitution of Tennessee, Art. 1, § 28; Code provisions rendering the business of liquor dealers a privilege; the Four-mile Law, and Manufacturers’ bill as construed by the Supreme Court of the State and the state court decisions construing Chap. 479. Austin v; Shelton, 122 Tennessee, 637; Kelly v. Dwyer, 75 Tennessee, 180; Kelly v. State, 123 Tennessee, 550; Logan v. Brown, 125 Tennessee, 209; Motlów v. State, 125 Tennessee, 548; State v. Butler, 1 Shannon’s Cases, 91; State v. Kelly, 123 Tennessee, 563.</p> <p>According to the allegations of the bills, the contracts of sale are actually made in Tennessee, as delivery of goods by the seller to a common carrier consigned to the purchaser is a delivery to the purchaser, whose agent the carrier is. 35 Cyc. 193; United States v. Andrews, 207 U. S. 229, 240; State v. Kelly, 123 Tennessee, 556, 562.</p> <p>This- court is not bound or precluded by any expression of opinion by the Supreme Court of Tennessee as to whether a particular transaction constitutes interstate or.intrastate business. This case does not present the question of the right of the State to tax a mere broker or selling agent, representing only non-resident principals, and selling'articles not in the State in which the sales are made, but which by the terms of the contracts are to be shipped from one State into another, as in Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U. S. 389; Dozier v. Alabama, 218 U, S. 123; Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U. S. 30; Brennan v. Titusville, 153 TJ. S. 289; Asher v. Texas, 128 TJ. S. 129; Bobbins v. Taxing District, 120 TJ. S. 489, and other cases, and see Ernest v. Missouri, 156 TJ. S. 296.</p> <p>See also Crutcher v. Kentucky, 14TTJ. S. 47; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 TJ. S. 640; McCall v. California, 136 TJ. S. 104; Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Wall. 479; Pickard y. Pullman Co., 117 TJ. S. 34; Covington Bridge Co. v: Kentucky, 154 TJ. S. 205; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 TJ. S. 204, and Moran v. New Orleans, 112 TJ. S. 69, which can all be distinguished, as those cases involved the right of the State to tax a direct instrumentality of interstate commerce or the commerce itself.</p> <p>A privilege tax on a merchant, levied by the State in which he is domiciled, where his goods and business are located, and where he makes his sales and deliveries, is not a violation of the commerce clause, because the merchant chooses, for reasons satisfactory to himself, to confine his trade to filling mail orders from non-residents of the State. If such a tax affects interstate commerce at all it is not directly, but only remotely and incidentally. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 158 U. S. 431, 439; Louis. & Nash. R. R. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 503, 518; Howe Machine Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 296; and see Browning v. Waycross, 233 U. S. 16.</p> <p>A merchant is not an instrument of interstate commerce. He may engage in interstate commerce, and while so engaged the States may not tax either the goods actually in transit or any of the instrumentalities used in the interstate transportation, or levy any other tax based on the fact of interstate business. Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U. S. 68, 82.</p> <p>■ It is onfy after sales have been made and the goods have been constructively delivered to the purchasers by delivery to the carriers that the interstate transaction begins. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270; Hopper v. California, 155 U. S. 648; Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S. 578.</p> <p>Complainants having taken out a Federal license which authorized them to sell both to non-residents and residents and to carry on generally- the business of selling and dealing in liquors in Chattanooga, cannot escape liability for the tax levied by the State on their occupation on the ground that they intend to confine themselves to a branch of the business which they contend involves interstate commerce. Ficklen v. Taxing District, 145 U. S. 1.</p> <p>If the business carried on by the complainants involves the transaction of interstate commerce by them at all, yet the State may lawfully require them to pay a privilege tax for the business done in the State. Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 80; Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 368; Pennsylvania Ry. v. Knight, 192 U. S. 21; Cargill v. Minnesota, 180 U'. S. 482.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Thf facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court of writs of error to review judgments of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of the mandate and decision in United States v. St: Louis Terminal Association as reported in 224 U. S. 383, and the effect to be given to such mandate and the further directions of this court in regard thereto, are stated in the opinion.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts, which, involve the jurisdiction of this court on writ of error under § 237, Judicial Code, to review judgment of the state court sustaining demurrer to and denying complaint, are stated in the opinion.

<p>In a case from the District Court, if the power to review attaches because of a constitutional question, that authority gives rise to the duty of determining all the questions involved, including those that otherwise are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the District Court, but if the constitutional question asserted as the basis for jurisdiction of this court is frivolous, this court has no power to review it or any of the other questions involved. The writ of error must be dismissed.</p> <p>The absolute power expressly conferred upon Congress to regulate foreign commerce involves the existence of power to prohibit importations and to punish the act of knowingly concealing or moving merchandise which has been imported in successful violation of such prohibition. Keller v. United States, 213 U. S. 138, distinguished.</p> <p>The contention in this case that § 2 of .the Act of February 9, 1909, c. 100, 35 Stat. 614, regulating the importation of opium, is unconstitutional as beyond the power of Congress,, has been so foreclosed by prior decisions of this court that it is frivolous and affords no basis for jurisdiction of this court under § 238, Judicial Code.</p>

The facts,' which involve the construction of the act of May 27, 1908, defining restrictions on alienation of allotments by members of the Five Civilized Tribes, and the validity of gas and mining leases made by a member of the Cherokee Tribe, are stated in the opinión. The act of May 27, 1908, removed all restrictions against the alienation of allotments of mixed-blood Indians having less than half Indian blood, including minors; Goodman was a minor Cherokee Indian of less…

Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915), was a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court ruling by a 9–0 vote that the free speech protection of the Ohio Constitution, which was substantially similar to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, did not extend to motion pictures.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>Argued simultaneously with No. 456 by the same counsel on the same briefs.</p>

Appellant, which we shall call complainant, it being such in the court below, is a Delaware corporation and the defendants are officers of the State of Kansas. The bill attacks the validity of a law of Kansas censoring moving picture films and prays an injunction against its enforcement. The relief was denied and the bill dismissed. This appeal was then allowed.

The facts, which involve the provisions of the Act to Regulate Commerce regulating the giving and exchange of passes by carriers, are stated in the opinion. The construction of the disputed exception in the Anti-Pass Provisions of § 1 of the Act to Regulate Commerce for which the government contends is the construction which has been adopted by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the administrative body charged with the enforcement of that act.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of a statute of the State of Washington preventing the wilful printing and circulation of written matter having tendency to encourage of advocate disrespect for the law, are stated in the opinion. The constitutional question here' presented was sufficiently raised in the state court.

Held: so long as the tariff rate remains operative, the alternative rates based on value are deemed to be in force and controlling of the rights of the parties. Great Northern Ry. v. O’Connor, 232 U. S. 508 ;. Boston & Maine R. R. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97 , 121. If the rates were unreasonable it is for the Commission to correct them upon proper proceedings.

The facts, which involve the construction of § 67-f of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, and the application of proceeds resulting from a lien preserved for the estate thereunder, are stated in the opinion. The' Circuit Court of Appeals erred in refusing to dismiss appeal and petition for review. In re Mueller, 135 Fed.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the state and Federal courts and the effect of an attempted removal of the case to the Federal court where the amount, in controversy was léss than $2,000, are stated in the opinion. After the removal to the United States court the amount in controversy would be for determination by the Federal court under, the rules of practice prevailing in that court.

The facts, which involve questions regarding removal from the state to the Federal court where the cause of action has been dismissed after trial as to all the defendants, resident of the same State as plaintiff, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality both under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and similar provisions of the constitution of the State of Ohio of the “Run of Mine” or “Anti-Screen” Coal Mine Law of 1914 of the State of Ohio, are stated in the opinion. The Mine-run law deprives appellant of liberty and property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The facts, which involve the validity of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission regarding the establishment of joint and through rates to and from, and regulations as to switching cars at, New Castle, Pennsylvania, by the Pennsylvania Company, are stated in the opinion. In the absence of statute there is no principle of established law which requires one carrier to share the use and advantages of its terminals with another carrier, a competitor engaged in like business.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Women’s Eight Hour Labor Law of California, are stated in the opinion. The restrictions imposed by the Act upon women and their employers as to their freedom of contract in certain designated employments are not reasonably necessary, and are not such a necessary invasion of freedom of contract as will be justified under the sanction of the police power or of any other constitutional power.

The facts, which- involve the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of the California Women’s Eight Hour Labor Law, are stated in the opinion. The provision of the statute excepting graduate nurses from the operation of the law results in denying equal protection of the laws to all other women working in hospitals. The fact that a law may be passed in exercise of the police power does not obviate the requirement of equal protection.

The facts, which involve the validity of certain land patents issued under the homestead laws of the United States, are stated in the opinion. When the United States brings a suit to annul a patent to land held by a vendee of the entryman, on the ground of fraud in the entryman it must prove actual notice of such fraud in said vendee. United States v. Clark, 200 U. S. 601; United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321.

The facts, which involve the construction and application of Rev. Stat., § 2289, and the validity of an indictment for perjury for violation thereof, are stated in the opinion. The case was one in which the laws of the United States authorized the oath, and the false matter was material within the meaning of § 125 of the Criminal Code.

The facts, which involve the construction of §§ 1 and 2 of the Act to Regulate Commerce and questions of discrimination by the carrier against shippers of coal over its line, are stated in the opinion. Plaintiff has failed to prove by competent evidence that the railroad violated the Commerce Act. Plaintiff relied for his proof, upon the reports and orders of the Commission.

The facts, which involve the construction of §§ 1, 2 and 16 of the Act to Regulate Commerce and questions of discrimination, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve thp effect of the Federal Safety Appliance Act on state statutes relating to safety appliances on railroad cars used in interstate commerce, are stated in the opinion. Congress has such power as has been delegated to it by the States and all power not granted by the States is reserved to the States.

The facts, which involve the effect of bankruptcy proceedings on attachments in the state court, are stated in the opinion. . Section 67 of the Bankruptcy Act is not directed at the writ of attachment itself, but only at the lien obtained thereby. 'Austin v. O’Reilly, 2 Wood, 670; Henderson v. Mayer, 225 U. S. 631.

The facts, which involve the validity of a judgment for personal injuries obtained in the state court under the state statute and the application and effect of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, are stated in' the opinion.

The facts, which involve the power of the President of the United States to withdraw public lands from entry under Rev. Stat., §§ 2319, 2329, and the act of February 11, 1897, and the effect of the withdrawal order No. 5 contained in the Proclamation of President Taft of September 27, 1909, are stated in the opinion.

Held: in substance, that because after the default of Boggs in the performance of his contract the Government waited more than a year before entering into a new contract, during which time there was a material change in the cost of labor and building supplies, and because the new contract then made between the Government and Owen was different in substantial particulars from that upon which the Guaranty Company became…

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the construction and application of the Federal statutes relating to the introduction of liquor into Indian country within the State of Oklahoma, are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>Unless construed as relinquishing. Federal control of intrastate commerce in intoxicating liquors between other parts of Oklahoma and the former Indian Territory, § 3 of the Oklahoma Enabling Act is repugnant to Art. I, § 8, Const. U. S., as an unconstitutional attempt to authorize concurrent regulation of commerce which must be exclusively regulated either by State or Nation.</p> <p>If susceptible of a reasonable construction, which will avoid constitutional question, the statute will be so construed.</p> <p>The statute may be reasonably construed as remitting to the State exclusive control of intrastate transactions.</p> <p>The State and the Nation cannot regulate the same commerce at the same time, but Congress may relinquish exclusive control to State. It has done so by the Oklahoma Enabling Act, as to intrastate commerce in liquors.</p> <p>The act of March 1, 1895, having been superseded as to intrastate transactions by the Enabling Act, Const. IT. S., Art. I, § 9, forbids its continuance in force as to interstate transactions.</p> <p>This contention is not foreclosed bv Ex parte Webb, 225 U. S. 663.</p> <p>The act of March 1,1895, is entitled to be called a regulation of Congress.</p> <p>Art. 1, § 9 of the Constitution forbids the giving of a preference by any regulation of commerce to one State over another; it' applies to commerce on land as well as by sea.</p> <p>Treated as a regulation of commerce with Indian tribes, the statute gives a preference to Oklahoma, by permitting that State to regulate for itself the commerce in intoxicating liquors between its people and the former Indian Territory, while denying to the people of other States the right to engage in such commerce, under pain of Federal prosecution.</p> <p>Treated as a regulation of interstate commerce, the act discriminates against Oklahoma by forbidding interstate commerce with a large part of Oklahoma, while not forbidding the introduction of liqupr into any other. State.</p> <p>In support of these contentions see, Bank of Alexandria v. Dyer, 14 Peters, 141; Bowman v. Chicago &c. Ry., 125 U. S. 465; Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S. 645; Ex parte Cain, 20 Oklahoma, 125; The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616; C., R. I. & P. Ry. v. Hardwick Elevator Co., 226 U. S.- 426; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; Re Debs, 158 U. S. 564; Dooley v. United States, 183 U. S. 168; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 189; Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333; Re Heff, 197 U. S. 488; L. S. & M. S. Ry. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285; Leisy v. Hardin, 136 U. S. 100; Murray’s Lessee v. Baker, 3 Wheat. 541; N.:Y. C. & H. R. R. v. Freeholders, 227 U. S. 248; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge, 18 How. 421; Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. West. Un. Tele. Co., 96 U. S. 1; Perrin v. United States, 232 U. S. 478; Prentice & Egan on Commerce Clause; Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361; Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445; Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264; Tiger v. Western Invest. Co., 221 U. S. 286; United States v. 43 Gallons Whiskey, 93 U. S. 188; United States v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407; United States v. Wright, 229 U. S. 226; United States v. Del. & Hud. Co., 213 U. S. 366; Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U. S. 504; Ex parte Webb, 225 U. S. 663; Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190; Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Peters, 515.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of the Bankruptcy Act and effect of a discharge in bankruptcy, are stated in the opinion. A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all his provable debts, and the “provable debt” from which the bankrupt is released means an obligation susceptible of being presented in such form as to come within some one or.more of the classes of debts designated in § 63-cj. 1 Remington on Bankruptcy, § 628.

The facts, which involve the construction of the Bankruptcy Act and the effect of a discharge in bankruptcy, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of the War Revenue Act of 1898 and the refunding act of June 27, 1902, are stated in the opinion. Taxability of the direct bequests depends on taxability of the annuities to the grandchildren. They are taxable under § 29, act of 1898. Legacy includes annuity and there is no legal difference between it and life estate in income. Whether the estate is vested or contingent, and however it is called, it is taxable because not conditional.

The facts, which involve the construction and application of the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the right of the United States to cancel patents for land on the ground of fraud in the entries, and the application of the statute of limitations to the actions to cancel, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the impairment of obligation and due process clauses of the Federal Constitution of legislation of the State of New York in regard to the new water supply for the City of New York, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment of a statute of West Virginia fixing the maximum fare for passengers' on railways at two cents a mile, are stated in the opinion. The earnings from intrastate passenger business must be separated from all other earnings to determine whether the act is confiscatory. Chapter 41, Act of 1907, regulating passenger rates upon railroads in the State of West.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the validity of an order of the State Railway Commission of Michigan requiring a railway with respect to intrastate traffic to interchange cars, freight and passengers with another railway, are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>Act 300 of the Public Acts of 1909 of Michigan recognizes and preserves the distinctions which obtain in Michigan between street railways and railroads. See Act 312.</p> <p>Railroad is used as meaning corporations organized under the general railroad law, and street railways as meaning those organized under the street railway act or other similar laws.</p> <p>Railroads broadly and distinctly differ from street railways, and it has always been the policy of the legislature of Michigan to maintain this classification.</p> <p>A street railway is constructed and operated on the public highways under the consent of the municipalities (§ 13, Street Railway Act, § 6446, C. L., 1897, App’x A, p. 44), and is not an additional servitude and may be constructed without, compensation to abutting owners. Detroit &c. Ry. v. Mills, 85 Michigan, 634, 652-655; Nichols v.' Railway, 87 Michigan, 361, 368-369, 370 — 1; People v. Railway, 92 Michigan, 522, 524; Dean v. Railway, 93 Michigan, 330; Detroit &c. Railway v. R. R. Commissioner, 127 Michigan, 219, 230; People v. Eaton, 100 Michigan, 208-211; Austin v. Detroit cfee. Ry., 134 Michigan, 149; Manuel v. Detroit &c. Ry., 139 Michigan, 106; Ecorse v. Jackson &c. Ry., 153 Michigan, 393.</p> <p>A railroad before constructing its railway upon a public street or highway must obtain the consent of the municipality and pay damages and compensation to abutting owners (subd. 5, § 9, General R. R. Law, § 6234, C. L., 1897). A railroad is an additional servitude. Cases supra and G. R, & I. R. R. v. Heisel, 38 Michigan, 62; S. C., 47 Michigan, 393; Cooper v. Alden, Har. Ch. 72; Hoffman v. Flint &c. Ry., 114 Michigan, 316; Nichols v. Railway, 87 Michigan, 361, 372; Keyser v. Lake Shore R. R., 142 Michigan, 143.</p> <p>Under §§ 19, 25 and 28, Art. 8, State Constitution, 1909, the control of the public highways is expressly reserved to and placed in the cities, villages and townships. Even under the constitution of 1850 the right of control over the highways by municipalities was absolute. Detroit v. Railway, 95 Michigan, 460; Monroe v. Detroit <fee. Ry., 143 Michigan, 315.; Attorney General v. Toledo Ry., 151 Michigan, 473.</p> <p>The decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court have long recognized the policy of the legislature, and declared the well-defined distinction between railroads and street railways. Grand Rapids R. R. v. Heisel, 38 Michigan, 62; Ecorse v. Jackson Ry., 153 Michigan, 393; Mason v. Lansing R. R., 157 Michigan, 1, 18.</p> <p>This distinction has also been recognized in the matter of taxation of railroads and street- railways, Detroit v. Mfrs. R. R., 149 Michigan, 530; and as well in the application of the criminal statutes relating to railroads, People v. Beebehyser, 157 Michigan, 239; and see Monroe v. Detroit' &c. Ry., 143 Michigan, 315.</p> <p>This act of the legislature must be considered a part of the charter of the railway company. Van Etten v. Eaton, 19 Michigan, 187; Attorney .General v. Perkins, 73 Michigan, 303; Dewey v. Central Car Co., 42 Michigan, 399; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 459; Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman Co., 139 U. S. 24, 48; Orr v. Lacey, 2 Doug. 230, 255; Day v. Spiral Buggy Co., 57 Michigan, 146; and see Nichols v. Railway, 87 Michigan, 361, 370.</p> <p>For definitions of “belt line’’and “terminal railroads” and the manner in which they are used in Michigan, see Bridwell v. Gates City Co., 127 Georgia, 520; State v. Martin, 51 Kansas, 462, 478; Colbier v. Railroad, 113 Tennessee, 101; Diebold v. Kentucky Traction Co., 117 Kentucky, 146, 152.</p> <p>Subdivision b, § 7, Act 300, is invalid finder the due process of law provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. As construed by the Commission and the state court it requires the railroad to deliver its cars to the railway company for the use of the latter company, and makes no provision for the paramount needs of the railroad of its own equipment, nor for its prompt return, nor compensation therefor. It also requires the. railroad company to make delivery of property- transported by it to a place off from its right of way which is not under its control. Atchison &c. R. R. v. Denver dec. R. R., 110 U. S. 667, 681.</p> <p>The statute does not require the Michigan Central to accept such passengers on through tickets issued by the Detroit Unitéd, or to accept freight on a through billing. The statute in substance expressly states that cannot be required, and unless there is language in the statute which legally requires a terminal delivery on the line of the street railway, the relation between themselves is that of the common law. The Michigan Central is not bound to carry beyond its own line, nor to enter into contracts for through routes. Atchison dec. Ry. v. Denver dec. Ry., 110 U. Si 667, 680, 681-682, 683; Oregon Short Dine v. Nor. Pac. B. B., 51 Fed. Rep. 465; S. C., 61 Fed. Rep. 158; Little Bock &c. B. B. v. St. Louis &c. B. B., 41 Fed. Rep. 559; S. C., 59 Fed. Rep. 400; 63 Fed. Rep. 775; Little Bóck &c. B. B. v. East Tenn. &c. B. B., 47 Fed. Rep. 771, 781; Prescott v. Atchison &c. By., 73 Fed. Rep. 438; Chicago City By. v. Chicago, 142 Fed. Rep. 844.</p> <p>As construed by the Commission and the state court the statute becomes a bald command that the Michigan Central turn its property over to the Detroit United for the use of the latter without compensation to it and without reasonable rules under which such use of the property may be had. This is invalid. Central Stock Yards v. Louis. & Nash. B. B., 118 Fed. Rep. 113; S. C., 192 U. S. 568, 571.</p> <p>See also cases supra, and Chicago N. W. By. v. Osborne, 52 Fed. Rep. 912, 915; St. Louis Drayage v. Louis. & Nash. B. B., 65 Fed. Rep. 39; Gulf &c. By. v. Miami S. S. Co., 86' Fed. Rep. 407, 416; Ilwaco &c. By. v. Oregon &c. By., 57 Fed. Rep. 673; Express Company Cases, 117 U. S. 1, 29; Louis. & Nash. B. B. v. West Coast Naval Stores, 198 U. S. 483, 497.</p> <p>A railway cannot be compelled to deliver its cars to private sidings or spur tracks. Mann v. Pere Marquette B. B., 135 Michigan, 210, 219; McNeill v. Southern Bail-way, 202 U. S. 543, 561; Central Stock Yards v. Louis. & Nash. B. B., 118 Fed. Rep. 113.</p> <p>The order of the Michigan Railroad Commission of June 5, 1908, is invalid because founded upon an invalid law. The action of the Commission was arbitrary and unreasonable. It does not undertake to provide a reasonable compensation for the use of its cars taken, or for loss, damage to, or detention thereof, or for the needs of the railroad with respect to such cars, or for their prompt, return. Oregon &c. B. B. v." Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510, 523; United States v. Balt. & Ohio S. W. By., 226 U. S. 14, 20.</p> <p>The use. of property is a taking in a constitutional sense in the State of Michigan. Grand Rapids Co. v. Jarvis, 30 Michigan, 308, 320.</p> <p>The rule is the same, irrespective of any written constitutional provision.</p> <p>It is not enough that plaintiff in error be turned over to its action at law for its remedy to obtain compensation, nor can it be required to accept anything other than a present adequate fund which is placed under its control and demand at substantially the time of the taking of the property. 2 Lewis on Eminent Domain, 3d ed., § 680; Waterbury v. Platt, 76 Connecticut, 435; Bloodgood v. Mohawk cfee. R. R., 18 Wend. 218; Attorney General v. Old Colony &c. R. R., 160 Massachusetts, 62,"90.</p> <p>Section 7, subd. b, of the act of 1909, as construed by the Railroad Commission and the state court, and the orders made in pursuance thereof, operate as a burden upon and interference with interstate commerce, as it requires delivery of such cars under all circumstances .and without excuse and without reference to the demands of interstate commerce. McNeill v. Southern Ry., 202 U. S. 543, 561; Chicago &c. Ry. v. Hardwick Elevator Co.,'226 U. S. 426, 433; St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Arkansas, 217 U. S. 136, 149; Houston &c. Ry. v. Mayes, 201 U. S. 321, 328.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>Suit to quiet title brought in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Florida by appellees, whom we shall call throughout complainants and the appellant defendant.</p> <p>The bill alleges that the complainants are the heirs at law of Miguel Marcos, a lieutenant in the Spanish Army; that he was granted by the lawful authorities of the King of Spain on the eighteenth of October, 1815, 5,500 acres of land in the then Province of East Florida, on two banks of a creek which empties into the St. John’s river about two miles north of Long Lake; that the grant was confirmed to his widow, Teresa Rodriguez, in her own right and for and on behalf of her children by the United States to the extent of a league square; that the grant was an inchoate right to said tract, under the laws of Spain called a first title or permit to occupy the land and, after occupancy and proof thereof, to secure a complete or royal title, but before such title issued Spain ceded East Florida to the United States, who, by the eighth article of the treaty between the United States and Spain, occupied the position of Spain with regard to this and like grants of land and were pledged to confirm title thereto; that the lands were neither surveyed nor segregated from the public domain during, the sovereignty of Spain; that the same were wild and uncultivated, were never in the actual occupancy of the grantee or of his widow and children and the title thereto at the time of the cession of the Floridas passed to the United States, subject to the equitable claim of the complainants.</p> <p>The succession of complainants to the original grant is traced by the bill and it is alleged that soon after the cession of the Floridas to the United States, Teresa Rodriguez, applied to the board of land commissioners appointed to examine and report on claims to lands in East Florida for the confirmation of the grant and it was reported by the board to Congress as a valid grant'and its confirmation recommended. That thereafter Congress, by an act approved May 23, 1828, c. 70, 4 Stat. 284, confirmed it to the extent of a league square, to be located within the limits of the original claim and bounded by sectional lines, and to be in quantities of not less than one section. That under the sixth section of the act of Congress confirmation of the grant was required to be accepted as a final settlement-of the claim or the claim to be brought before the judge of the Superior Court for the district of East Florida within one year from.the passage of the act; that the latter proceeding was not had and that by the act of Congress the title to the land was confirmed to the extent of one league, to be-located within the bounds of the original grant.</p> <p>That it was held by the judicial and executive branches of the Government that a league square was 4,438.68 acres. That by the law-s then in force in the Territory of Florida it was the duty of the Surveyor General of the Territory to make the survey of the lands confirmed to complainants’ ancestor and make certificate thereof and file the same in the land office of the United States in said Territory. That among the acts of Congress extending to said Territory was the act of March -3, 1807, by the terms of which it was made unlawful to take possession of, survey or cause to be surveyed or settle upon any lands ceded or secured to the United States by ány treaty with a foreign nation,, or any land, claim to which had not been recognized and confirmed by the United States, under a penalty of forfeiture of the right, title and claim to such lands. That the ancestors of complainants were residing in Cuba on the twenty-third of May, 1828, and they and their descendants have since that date resided there and none 'of them have resided or been in the United States since the passage of the act of May 23, 1828, confirming the grant to the extent of a league square. That the United States never surveyed and segregated- the lands as confirmed, as held by the Land Department of the United States, and the confirmees .had no power to cause such survey to be made: That the lands embraced in the grant were surveyed as public lands by the United States in 1847, and such survey was approved May 15, 1848. A certified copy of the official plat of survey is attached to the bill and it is alleged that the lands were held by the Land Department of the United States to be public lands and were so treated from 1831 to February 12, 1894, upon which date the grant described in the bill was by the Land pepartment óf the United States declared to be a valid, confirmed private grant to Teresa Rodriguez and ordered to be patented, and thereafter it was so patented to her, her heirs, assigns and legal representatives, and the lands described as section 37, township 19, south of range 28, and section 41, township 19, south of range 29, according to the plat of the public surveys made by the United States, and for the aggregate of 5,486.46 acres. That until such recognition of the title of complainants and those under whom they claim,from and after May 23, 1828, complainants were excluded from the possession of the lands, and the United States had both the legal title and possession and right of possession of them and any occupancy of them by any other than the United States was a mere trespass; that before February 12, 1894, complainants and those under whom they take title were not able to take possession of the lands because the United States claimed the entire grant as public lands.</p> <p>The bill then sets out the asserted title of the defendant to have been derived from a sale to one John Starke on July 5, 1852, by the sheriff and ex-officio tax collector of Orange County,' Florida, based upon a pretended execution for certain unpaid taxes alleged to have been assessed “upon the Tands supposed to belong to Teresa Rodriguez,’” and the said sheriff attempted to deed to said Starke “'all the right, title and interest of Teresa Rodriguez and others’” in and to said tracts óf land. That the said sale and deed are absolutely null and void because (1) it was alleged to be an assessment upon the single tract containing 5,480 acres and to be payable for the years 1845 to 1851, both inclusive, during which time the legal title and possession were in the United States; that the lands were expressly exempt from taxation by the statute of the State of Florida during those years, which declared that the act for the assessment and collection of taxes should not be construed to embrace lands belonging to the United States. (2) That the amount of taxes assessed was in excess of what could have been lawfully levied. (3) That proper notice of the sale was not given; (4) nor was the land sold in the parcels required. (5) That the deed was not properly executed, it having no subscribing witness and its record being wholly unauthorized.</p> <p>Like invalidity is asserted against the tax and sale of the land for the years 1867, 1868 and 1869 assessed to John Starke, and conveyed by the sheriff to one William Mills. In addition it is alleged that no statute in Florida authorized a tax collector to make a tax deed upon a sale for the non-payment of taxes, such being the duty of the county clerk of the county wherein lay the lands. That the assessment and tax sale and deed to William Mills were made in execution of a conspiracy by him and Robert C.. Patten and one George C. Powell to deprive complainants of their title; that Mills never took possession of the lands but attempted to convey them to Powell; that Powell entered only upon section 9 (a part of section 37, above named) of said township 19, range 28, and made some improvements to complainants unknown and .cut some timber thereon. That he exercised no other acts of ownership and those were continued but for a short time and "were not uninterrupted by continued occupancy for seven years” and were subsequently abandoned by him; that the possession was not sufficient either in character or duration to enable him to claim the benefit of the statute of limitations against any action brought by complainants; that complainants were precluded from bringing any ac-, tion because the lands weré held and claimed adversely by the United States and held to be public lands of the United States. Other tax assessments and sales are alleged and conveyance and title traced through them to the defendant, the Wilson Cypress Company, but the latter has never had such possession as would bar a right of entry by complainants. It is alleged that complainants tried to get a recognition of their title but only succeeded on June 18, 1894.</p> <p>There are many other allegations which assert the validity of complainants’ title and the invalidity of that of defendant, and that on June 26, 1895, the United States quit-claimed and patented to the legal representatives of Teresa Rodriguez the lands granted to Marcos and which had been surveyed as section 37, township 19, range 28, and section 41 of the same township, range 29, containing 5,486.46 acres. That the.patent was duly recorded in' the records of the United States and in the public records of Lake County, Florida, and the grantor of defendant and defendant had knowledge of it when the conveyance was made. That after the issue of the patent complainants were for the first time entitled to the possession of the lands and from such date they became subject to taxation, and thereafter complainants sent their agent to Florida and took possession of the lands and have continued ever since to claim and have exercised acts of ownership over them.</p> <p>It is alleged that the tax deeds referred to in the bill are fair upon their faces and are clouds upon the title of complainants and hinder them in the full enjoyment of their property and should be canceled and discharged from the public records.</p> <p>It is further alleged that defendant will aver that no patent was necessary to evidence complainants’ title and that by the confirmation of the grant title vested in the grantee and his legal representatives, but complainants allege that under the facts set out the United States did not relinquish title until the twenty-sixth of June, 1895, and before the approval of the survey of the lands granted the legal title was in the United States and the claim of complainants attached to no particular land.</p> <p>There are other allegations of what the defendant will aver as to possession and right and it is then alleged that there never has been such possession by defendant as would establish an adverse holding.</p> <p>An injunction was prayed against the defendant enjoining it and its officers from exercising acts of ownership over the land or from disturbing the possession of complainants; that the tax deeds and other deeds set out in the bill be held to have been executed without authority of law and that they be annulled and canceled.</p> <p>The answer is as voluminous as the bill. It negatives many of the allegations of the bill either by denials or opposing allegations and asserts that the grant from Spain and its confirmation by the United States passed a complete title to the land. It also asserts the validity of the title acquired ■ through the tax deed; alleges the insufficiency of the bill in equity; sets up the statute of limitations, and charges laches and estoppel, the complainants in the bill having permitted large expenditures for care and improvement of the property by defendant. And it also puts in issue the relationship of complainants to Marcos and Teresa Rodriguez and denies that they are entitled to maintain the bill.</p> <p>Upon proof being submitted, and after hearing, it was decreed that complainants were descendants and heirs at law of Teresa Rodriguez, the grantee in the patent of the United States hereinbefore referred to, were entitled to “an undivided interest in and to the lands” in controversy (which were specifically described) “and for themselves and as representatives of all persons claiming title to said lands through the said Teresa Rodriguez, her heirs and legal representatives,” were “entitled to maintain this bill to remove cloud from” the lands.</p> <p>The decree recited the tax deeds and the lands which they purported to convey, and adjudged that the deeds, having been based upon assessments made prior to the issue of the patent and while the validity of the grant to Marcos was denied by the United Spates, were absolutely null and void and a cloud upon the title of Teresa Rodriguez and her legal representatives and heirs at law and set aside.</p> <p>And it was further decreed that defendant had no title or interest in the patented lands and that it and all persons claiming underwit were enjoined from setting up any title under the tax deeds or from entering upon or holding possession of the lands or any part thereof.</p> <p>The decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. The opinion of the court was as follows (202 Fed. Rep. 742): “The lands in controversy were not segregated from the public domain, and the title thereto remained in the United States until the issuance of the patent; therefore they were not taxable by the State of Florida at the several times they were listed for taxes and sold for nonpayment thereof.”</p>

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court to review judgments of the Circuit Court of Appeals, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of certain provisions of the Antitrust Act of the State of Kentucky, are stated in the opinion.

<p>A finding by the Interstate Commerce Commission in a general investigation that an advance in a rate on a specified commodity between specified points is unreasonable inures to the benefit of every shipper who has paid the unjust rate, provided however, that he asserts his claim against the carrier within the time fixed by law.</p> <p>A shipper who paid charges prior to the passage of the Hepburn Act and did not commence proceedings until more than one year after the passage of that act cannot recover on the strength of a finding of the Interstate Commerce Commission made in a general proceeding to which he was not a party that the rate paid was unreasonable.</p> <p>The Conformity Act (Rev. Stat. 914) does not apply to a state rule of practice prohibiting taking advantage of the statute of limitations by general demurrer to a cause arising under a Federal statute expressly limiting the time within which the right created by the statute can be asserted — in which case the lapse of time not only bars the remedy but destroys the liability.</p> <p>The prohibitions of the Interstate Commerce Act against unjust dis-criminations relate not only to inequality of facilities but also to giving preferences by means of consent judgments or waivers of defenses open to the carrier.</p> <p>Qucere, whether connecting carriers participating in a haul, the advanced rate for which was held by the Commission to be excessive but who were not responsible for advancing the rate, could be held jointly and severally responsible for reparation before they had been heard by the Commission.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. The contracts for exemptions are personal, are not vendible nor transferable, and are valid only so long as those companies as such conducted the business of common carriers.

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. The notice as published satisfied the requirements of the law. In regard to dedications no instructions were requested nor exception taken. Therefore the judgment should not be reviewed. Met. R. R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 195 U. S. 332. The reasonableness of "the verdict is a question for trial judge and is not reviewable. Col. Heights Realty Co. v. McFarland, 217 U. S. 547, 560. No injustice is shown.

<p>The business of taking in one State orders for portraits made in another State is interstate commerce, and if the original order contemplates an option on the part of the purchaser to have a frame also sent from the other State, the business is one affair and exempt from imposition of license fee by the State in which the sale is made.</p>

<p>APPEAL PROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: as a matter of law, that Carter’s residence was established and maintained in good faith and in the belief that his dwelling house was upon the land embraced in his homestead application and that such residence, taken in connection with the subsequent construction of trails find the stable or barn on the Northeast Quarter of said Section 2, was a constructive residence on said Northeast Quarter, and that said Carter…

The facts are stated in the opinion. Common carriers by railroad engaged in interstate commerce are required by the acts of Congress regulating commerce to collect the-rates published in the schedules or tariffs on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission. G., C. & S. F. By. y. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98; Tex. & Pac. By. v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242; Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U., S. 56; Tex. & Pac. By. v. Abilene Cotton Co., 204 U. S. 426; Tex. & Pac.

The facts are stated in the opinion. There was an established place of business and an infringement committed in New York. American Stoker Co. v. Underfeed Stoker Co., 182 Fed. Rep. 642; Chadeloid Chemical Co. v. Chicago Finishing Co., 180 Fed. Rep. 770; Chicago Tool Co. v. Phila. Tool Co., 118 Fed. Rep. 852; Wesiinghouse Co. v. Stanley Co., 116 Fed. Rep. 641; S. C., 121 Fed. Rep. 101.