Volume 237 — Illinois Reports

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Montgomery county; the Hon. S. D. Dwight, Judge, presiding.</p>

E. E. Newlin, Judge, presiding. This is an appeal by L. A. Brenneman and A. T. McDonald from a decree of the circuit court of Crawford county which cancels and sets aside as clouds upon the title of Edgar D. Zeigler, Ernest Zeigler, Anna Price and Charles A. Rapp, a lease executed to appellants by George Zeigler and Rachel Zeigler, his wife, and the assignments thereof, upon 18.825 acres of gas and oil land located in Crawford county.

Writ or Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Stephen A. Foster, Judge, presiding.

Writ oe Error to the Appellate Court for the Eirst District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John W. Houston, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Whiteside county; the Hon. Henry C. Ward, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Constitutional law—objections by one whose rights are not affected are not entertained. Courts do not entertain objections to the constitutionality of a statute unless the objection is made by one whose rights may have in some way been affected.</p> <p>2. Same—courts will not so construe a statute as to make it unconstitutional unless unavoidable. Courts will not construe a statute so as to render it unconstitutional if any other reasonable construction can be adopted which will make the act effective.</p> <p>3. Same—courts will not assume that legislature intended absurd consequences. Courts will not adopt a particular construction of a statute which will lead to absurd consequences unless the language of the statute will admit of no other reasonable construction.</p> <p>4. Same—Mobs and Riots act does not impose liability regardless of where mob assembled. The Mobs and Riots act of 1887 is not unconstitutional upon the alleged ground that it permits a recovery against a city or county for damage done by mob or riot even though the property destroyed may be in another city ot° county than the one where the mob assembled or the riot occurred, since the act does not so provide and will not be construed as having that effect.</p> <p>5. Same—Mobs and Riots act not invalid because it imposes liability regardless of negligence. The Mobs and Riots act of 1887 is not unconstitutional because it imposes a liability on a city or county without' regard to whether the city or county or its officers were guilty of negligence or had power to disperse the mob or suppress the riot, since the liability imposed by the act is npt based upon any element of negligence, but is imposed under the police power of the State as a matter of public policy.</p>

<p>1. Cloud on title—cloud on title defined. A cloud on a title is a semblance of a title, either legal or equitable, or a claim of an interest in lands, appearing in some legal form, but which is, in fact, unfounded.</p> <p>2. Same—when cloud on title exists. A cloud on title exists where the claim of the adverse party is valid on the face of the instrument or proceeding sought to be set aside and extrinsic facts are necessary in order to show that such instrument or proceeding is invalid.</p> <p>3. Same—bill does not lie to remove verbal claim or oral assertion of ownership. Such clouds upon title as may be removed by courts of equity are instruments or other proceedings in writing which appear upon the records and thereby cast doubt upon the validity of the record title.</p> <p>4. Injunction—injunction will not be granted unless complainant shows he will be injured. A court of equity will not issue an injunction unless the complainant shows he will be injured if relief is not granted, and the allegations of the bill must be clear and be supported by satisfactory evidence that substantial injury will be sustained.</p> <p>5. Same—complainant’s rights must be such as can be clearly ascertained. To authorize an injunction there should not only be a clear and palpable violation of the rights of the complainant, but the rights themselves must be certain and such as can be clearly ascertained and measured.</p> <p>6. Same—court of equity will not do a vain thing. A court of equity will not issue an injunction merely to allay unfounded fears or apprehension, nor will it entertain a bill simply to vindicate an abstract principle of justice.</p>

<p>x. Wills—it is not always necessary to adopt literal meaning of words. In construing a will it is not always necessary to adopt the literal and primary meaning of words, and it is proper to take into consideration, in determining their meaning, all the circumstances surrounding the testator, his purpose and motives in the disposition of his property, his relation to the beneficiaries of the will and the nature and situation of the property.</p> <p>2. Same—when extrinsic evidence is admissible. Where the testator devises land by the description “the north-east quarter of out-block five (5), situate in the city of Clinton,” but there are two conflicting plats of said out-lot 5, the later one being a resurvey of the original block, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show whether the description employed by the testator was used with reference to the old plat or the new one.</p> <p>3. Same—what may be considered in determining testator’s intention. In determining whether the description of land devised was used with reference to an old plat or a new one, the facts may be considered that the testator believed and claimed that he owned three-fourths of the block, which would be true only according to the new plat, and that if the description referred to the old plat the gift would be of little value and would leave as intestate property two houses in the block, except a few feet off of one house, through which the dividing line would run.</p> <p>4. Same—competency of the■ testator’s declaration. Where the question in construing a will is whether the words of description employed in a devise of land were used with reference to an old plat or a new, one, evidence of declarations of the testator showing that he was in the habit of using the words of the description with reference to the new plat is competent; but such declarations, in so far as they indicate an intention to provide for the devisee, are incompetent, and will be presumed not to have been considered by the court where the result would be the same without them.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Mercer county; the Hon. Henry E. Burgess, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Negligence—sub-contractors on a building owe duty to each other’s employees. A- sub-contractor at work in the erection of a building owes to the employees of another sub-contractor engaged in the same work, and who are exercising due care for their own safety, the duty of exercising care to do his work in such a way as not to negligently injure such employees.</p> <p>2. Same—duty of masonry contractor in erecting and removing platforms. A masonry contractor engaged in removing portions of a wall of an old building as the addition being erected progresses, and who builds platforms to protect employees of other contractors working below, is bound to use care to see that the platforms are sufficient for the purpose intended and to remove them when the purpose is accomplished, and not to permit them to remain in an unsafe condition.</p> <p>3. Same—when the question of proximate cause is for the jury. Where there is evidence tending to show that a platform erected by the defendant sub-contractor had become unsafe, and that the defendant knew or ought to have known of such condition, and that employees of another sub-contractor were likely to walk upon the platform as .they had been accustomed to do, the question whether his negligence was the proximate cause of an injury inflicted by the falling of a jplank while an employee of the other sub-contractor was walking upon the platform is for the jury.</p> <p>4. Pleading—when evidence cannot be excluded because of variance. Although the evidence introduced in a personal injury case may tend to prove negligence of a different character from that charged in the declaration, it cannot be excluded on the ground of variance unless the particular variance is pointed out.</p> <p>5. Same—when declaration states facts sufficient to show a duty from defendant to plaintiff. A declaration alleging, in substance, that the defendant and the plaintiff’s employer were both subcontractors engaged in the construction of a building, and that while the plaintiff was so employed, working in and about such building and exercising due care for his safety, the defendant negligently caused a piece of timber to fall from above the place where the plaintiff was working and strike and injure him, alleges facts sufficient to show a duty owing from the defendant to the plaintiff.</p> <p>6. - Instructions—when instruction in personal injury case is properly refused. An instruction in a personal injury case which assumes that though the defendant was guilty of negligence, without which the accident would not have happened, yet if the concurring act of another person contributed to the plaintiff’s injury the defendant would not be liable, is properly refused.</p>

<p>1. Trial—what questions are for the jury. In an action for damages for injuries received by a passenger in an automobile hired from the defendant, who furnished the driver, the questions of the rate of speed of the automobile when it collided with a street car; whether the driver slackened speed; whether it was negligence to so approach the car, and whether the breaking of the brake-rod of the automobile caused the collision or the collision broke the rod, are for the jury.</p> <p>2. Negligence—duty of the driver of hired automobile. The driver of an automobile for hire .owes to the passengers the duty of keeping a proper lookout for persons and vehicles and of using care to have the automobile under such control as to enable him to avoid collisions.</p> <p>3. Same—what does not relieve owner of automobile from liability. The owner of an automobile for hire who furnishes the driver is liable for an injury to a passenger which would not have happened but for the driver’s negligence in approaching a street car at a high rate of speed without having the automobile under control, even though a latent defect in the brake-rod caused it to break when the driver attempted to stop the automobile to avoid colliding with the car.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Tazewell county; the Hon. L. D. PuTERBAHGH, Judge, presiding.</p>

Arthur H. Frost, Judge, presiding. The appellee resided in Rockford, Illinois, and John V. Smith (otherwise known as Valentine Trunk) boarded at her home for several years before and after the death of her husband, in 1902.

<p>1. Appeals and errors—a certifícate of importance may be granted in case of fourth class tried by municipal court. Under section 119 of the Practice act of 1907, providing that the Appellate Court may make a certificate of importance and grant an appeal in any case decided by that court in which an appeal or writ of error from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court is not allowed by such act, the Appellate Court may make a certificate of importance and grant an appeal in a case of the fourth class, which by the Municipal Court act can be reviewed only by writ of error sued out of the Appellate Court.</p> <p>2. Inn-kEEpERS—loss of goods by guest raises presumption of negligence by inn-keeper. An inn-keeper owes-the duty and assumes the obligation of safely keeping the property of his guests, and, if the property is lost, all that is necessary to make out a prima facie case is to show the relation of inn-keeper and guest and the loss, when the burden is then cast upon the inn-keeper to exonerate himself.</p> <p>3. Same—when Inn-keeper’s act has no application. Compliance by an inn-keeper with the provisions of the Inn-keeper’s act affords no protection against the loss of a hand-bag containing valuable articles, including jewelry, which was delivered by a departing guest to the porter sent by the inn-keeper to take charge of her baggage, and which was lost through the negligence of such porter or other servants of the inn-keeper.</p> <p>4. Sams—question of how much property can be kept in room by guest is one of fact. Under the proviso to the Inn-keeper’s act, that nothing contained in the act shall apply to such an amount of money and valuables as is usual, common and prudent for a guest to retain in his room or about his person, the question whether the valuables retained by a guest in his room in a particular case come within such proviso is one of fact, and is not raised by a demurrer to the evidence in a suit to recover for the loss of such valuables.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Coles county; the Hon. E. R. E. Kimbrough, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Municipal corporations—occupation of selling and collecting manure is a legitimate business. In the exercise of his right to pursue any lawful avocation he may choose, a citizen may engage in the business of collecting and shipping manure; but such business is one which may be conducted in such a manner as to be offensive or injurious to public health, and it is therefore a proper subject for regulation by the city.</p> <p>2. Same—when court cannot hold ordinance void for unrea>sonableness. If the legislature has authorized a municipal corporation to pass an ordinance of a particular kind, requiring or prohibiting the doing of a specific thing, the courts cannot declare the ordinance void for unreasonableness, and in such a case can only declare it void if it is in conflict with the constitution.</p> <p>3. Same—effect where an ordinance is passed under a general power. If a general power is given to a municipal corporation to act on a particular subject but there is no express authority to do a certain thing or pass a particular ordinance, the courts assume the legislative intent to be that the general power shall be exercised in a reasonable manner, and all ordinances passed under a general power must therefore be reasonable, and not vexatious, unequal or oppressive.</p> <p>4. Same—a city cannot grant exclusive privilege of removing manure. Under its general power to make regulations for the promotion of health and suppression of disease, a city may require the prompt removal of manure, regulate the conduct of the business, prescribe penalties for the infraction of reasonable rules and regulations, require a license to engage in the business and security for the observance of regulations and ordinances, but it has no power to grant, the exclusive privilege of engaging in the business to one person who has bid for the privilege.</p> <p>5. Same—when grant of monopoly cannot be sustained. The grant by a city of a monopoly having no legitimate relation to the purpose to be accomplished by the ordinance is offensive, and renders the ordinance unequal and unreasonable as between citizens.</p>

C. M. Walker, Judge, presiding, The appellee, the Commercial Loan and Trust Company, was the owner of a promissory note for $2500 executed by the American Fire Extinguisher Company and bearing the endorsement of appellant guaranteeing its payment.

<p>1. Taxes—one objecting to drainage assessment must prove its invalidity. One objecting to the enforcement of a tax or special assessment has the burden of overcoming the collector’s prima facie case by proving the invalidity of the tax or assessment, as the presumption is that the taxing or assessing officers have performed their duty and that the tax or assessment is valid.</p> <p>2. Same—what does not overcome presumption that drainage assessment was divided into installments. On application for sale for an installment of a farm drainage assessment it is presumed the commissioners have entered an order of record dividing the assessment into installments, and as such division may be made, upon petition by the land owners, after the assessment is levied, proof that the drainage record shows no order for division up to the levy of the assessment, does not overcome such presumption.</p> <p>3. Drainage—notice of levy of a farm drainage assessment is unnecessary. Land owners must be notified of the classification of the lands of a farm drainage district; but notice of the levy of the assessment is not required, as the classification is the vital thing to the land owner, being the basis upon which all drainage assessments are to be made.</p> <p>4. Same—objection to classification cannot be made on application for sale. A land owner who has had notice of the classification of lands of a farm drainage district must present his objections to the classification upon the hearing for that purpose, and if he fails to do so he cannot urge, on application for judgment and order of sale, that his lands were classified and assessed as town lots instead of farm property.</p> <p>5. Same—disqualification of land owners to make classification does not extend to farm drainage districts. Farm drainage commissioners, although land owners of the district, have power to make the classification of lands which forms the basis of the drainage assessments, as the disqualification ■ of land owners of the district to act is confined to levee drainage districts.</p> <p>6. Same—requirement of statute that delinquent list be filed on March 10 is not mandatory. The statute requiring the delinquent list showing non-payment of farm drainage assessments to be filed on March 10 is not mandatory, and a failure to file such list until March 31 is a mere irregularity and does not defeat the collection of the assessments.</p>

George A. Carpenter, Judge, presiding. This is an action of assumpsit brought by Richard F. Conway against the city of Chicago to recover the balance due on special assessment' bonds issued in payment of the cost of paving certain streets in Chicago, known as the only of the common counts, to which the city of Chicago pleaded the general issue. By agreement a jury was waived and the cause submitted to the circuit court upon a stipulation of facts.

<p>1. Evidence—what testimony by a physiciaft should not be admitted. A physician sent to examine .an injured person with a view to testifying in an action for damages should not be allowed to testify that she showed nervousness, timidity and fear, that she trembled and shook and shrank away from him and cried and acted in a frightened manner, but the admission of such testimony is not necessarily ground for reversal.</p> <p>2. Same—what is not a proper question for expert testimony. Whether tiie removal of the clothes from a thirteen-year-old girl for an examination by a strange physician would tend to produce nervousness, timidity and shrinking on the part of the patient is not a subject for expert testimony.</p> <p>3. Same—when the admission of evidence in rebuttal is proper. Where a witness who has testified for the defendant in a personal injury case that, as the plaintiff’s teacher, she had seen nothing in her appearance to indicate that she was not in good health, states, on cross-examination, that she had seen the plaintiff’s mother at school once, the question whether she did not have a talk with the mother about the plaintiff’s health, which she answers in the negative, is sufficiently specific as to time and place to authorize the rebuttal testimony by the mother that they did have such talk.</p> <p>4. Instructions—when refusal to instruct jury that there is no evidence upon a certain point is proper. If there is any evidence tending to authorize the submission to the jury of the question whether the plaintiff’s injury had anything to do with her subsequent bleeding from the nose and mouth, the weight and sufficiency of such evidence are for the jury; and it is proper to refuse an instruction that there was no evidence upon that point and that nothing should be allowed to the plaintiff on that account.</p> <p>5. Same—when giving instruction referring to the material allegations will not reverse. An instruction stating that if the plaintiff has proven the “material” allegations of her declaration by such weight of' evidence as satisfies and produces conviction in the minds of the jury she has proven her case by a preponderance of the evidence is incorrect in leaving, the jury to determine what allegations are “material,” but the error will not necessarily reverse, particularly where the declaration has only one count, in simple form, and other instructions fully state what plaintiff must prove.</p>

<p>1. Em/nEnt domain—property need not be “taken,” in its literal sense, to entitle owner to compensation. Property in land, in the sense in which the word “property” is used in the constitution, means the right of user, disposition and dominion to the exclusion of all others, and the acquiring of an easement for public use is a material and permanent. interruption of the right of user, which entitles the owner to compensation for property taken.</p> <p>2. Same—acquiring of permanent right to enter land to lay and repair tile is a taking of property. The acquiring, by a drainage district, of the right to enter upon land permanently for the purpose of laying, maintaining and repairing a line of tile is a taking of property, within the meaning of the constitutional provision requiring compensation for property taken for public use.</p> <p>3. Same—when a proceeding by drainage district is a case of taking and not of damage. A proceeding by a drainage district to ascertain the compensation to be paid a land owner for the laying and maintaining of a tile drain in a strip of land of certain width is a case of taking and not of damage, even though but a small portion of the width of the strip is to be occupied by the tile; but if the owner 'retains substantial rights in the remainder of the strip the measure of his compensation is less than thé full market value of the land.</p> <p>4. Same—nature of interest acquired affects amount of compensation. The nature and extent of the interest acquired in a condemnation proceeding is to be considered in determining the compensation for the taking, and where the right acquired is practically exclusive, as in the case of a railroad right of way, the measure of compensation is the full market value of the land taken; but in any case the owner is entitled to be paid for such rights of use and enjoyment as are taken.</p> <p>5. New Trial—when alleged improper conduct of defendant with juror is absolved by affidavits. Where improper conduct of the defendant in talking to a juror about the case is charged as ground for new trial, affidavits by the juror and the defendant stating that the defendant did not talk or attempt to talk about the case to the juror, and that the juror had no personal acquaintanee with the defendant, absolves the defendant from such charge.</p> <p>6. Same—when charge of treating jury is properly ignored. A charge that the defendant in a condemnation case treated the jury to cigars is properly ignored by the court as a ground for new trial, where it appears that when the jury were en route to view the premises one of the jurors suggested that some one ought to furnish cigars for the crowd, whereupon defendant, who was in the habit of smoking, took some cigars- from his pocket and gave them to the jurors, and petitioners’ attorney gave them peanuts.</p> <p>7. Arrest oE judgment—formal defects of description in cross-petition for damages are cured by verdict.. Formal defects of description or a lack of certainty in a cross-petition for damages, which merely describes the defendant’s farm as a farm of a certain number of a'cres owned by him across which the petitioners’ tile was ,to be laid, and which sets forth elements of damage to the farm by a probable interference with the existing system of drainage, are cured by verdict.</p>

<p>Taxes—annual levy and certificate for each year a hard road tax is collected is not necessary. Where the proposition to levy a hard road tax for a period of years is adopted by vote, as provided in the act of 1883, relating to hard roads, the commissioners of highways may make one levy for the entire period and certify the same to the town clerk, who may, in turn, certify the same to the county clerk; and it is not necessary that new levies and certificates be made annually during the period of years the tax is collected.</p>

R. W. Clifford, Judge, presiding. On July 12, 1907, William Maegerlein recovered a judgment for the sum of $3990 in the circuit court of Cook county against the city of Chicago, the appellee, for damages to certain personal property owned by Maegerlein, alleged to have been caused through the acts of the appellee, which resulted in a diversion of the surface water from Mary street, in that city, to and upon the premises of Maegerlein and under a building there owned by him…

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Henry county; the Hon. Albert E. Bergland, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Forcible detainer—the title cannot be inquired into for any purpose. In an action of forcible detainer the title to the premises cannot be inquired into for any purpose, and in such a proceeding by heirs of the deceased lessor the lessee cannot litigate the question of the validity of the lessor’s alleged will under which some person other than the plaintiffs claims the property.</p> <p>2. Appeals and Errors—when a freehold is not involved. No freehold is involved on appeal from a judgment in a forcible detainer proceeding by heirs of the deceased lessor against the lessee for breach of covenants in the lease, even though the lessor is claimed to have devised the property to other persons than plaintiffs, since the statute gives the heirs and personal representatives of the deceased lessor the right of action on the lease and the question of title is not involved in the proceeding.</p>

Writ op Error to the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on writ .of error to the Circuit Court of Grundy county; the Hon. Edgar EldrPdgP, Judge, presiding.

Writ or Error to the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. A. H. Chrtlain, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. C. M. Walker, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeals and errors—judgment of Appellate Court settles controverted questions of fact. In suits at law, where the facts áre •controverted, the judgment of the Appellate Court is conclusive upon the Supreme Court of all questions of fact, and if there are no errors of law thé judgment must be affirmed.</p>

Writ op Error to the Circuit Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. Jamps W. Craig, Judge, presiding. On June 10, 1908, an indictment in four counts was returned by the grand jury of Vermilion county against C. J. Young, the plaintiff in error, charging him with having violated sections 12 and 13 of the Local Option law of 1907. (Laws of 1907, p. 302.) To the indictment plaintiff in error pleaded not guilty.

<p>1. Practice—it is proper to allow joinder and replication to be filed at the trial. If at the time a case is called .for trial the plaintiff has not filed a joinder to the general issue or replications to the pleas of set-off, it is correct practice for the court to permit him to file his joinder and replications at that time.</p> <p>2. Building contracts—when recovery may be had under the common counts. Where a building contract is oral and there is no agreement that any architect’s certificates shall be given, a recovery may be had under the common counts where the contract has been performed and nothing remains to be done but to pay the contract price for ’the labor and material.</p> <p>3. Same—substantial performance of building contract is sufficient. Where there has been no willful departure from the terms of a building contract and no omission in essential points and it has been honestly and faithfully performed in its material parts, a recovery may be had although there are slight variations from the original agreement as to some portions of the work.</p> <p>4. Instructions—when omission of word “willfully” from impeaching instruction is not error. While the words “knowingly” and “willfully” are usually coupled together in an impeaching instruction stating the rule where a witness has knowingly and willfully testified falsely to a material matter, it is not error to omit the word “willfully,” as one who knowingly testifies falsely must be held to have done so willfully.</p> <p>5. Same—instructions are to be considered as a series. Giving an instruction stating that substantial performance of a contract is all that the law requires, without explaining what would be substantial performance, is not ground for reversal, where the instruction does not attempt to. direct a verdict and there are other instructions in the series plainly setting forth what is meant by substantial performance of a contract.</p> <p>6. Appeals and Errors-—questions of fact are not open to review in Supreme Court. In an assumpsit on a contract the questions whether the evidence justifies the amount of the verdict; whether a certain person was authorized by defendant to superintend the work; whether the contract was performed in a workmanlike manner and the work accepted, and kindred questions upon which the evidence is in conflict,- are questions of fact, which are concluded by the Appellate Court’s affirmance of the judgment entered on the verdict.</p> <p>7. Same—party cannot complain of improper remarks not objected to. A party cannot complain of alleged improper remarks to the jury by counsel where he did not make an objection and obtain a ruling by the court and preserve an exception to the ruling or refusal to rule.</p>

Appear from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. John Gibbons, Judge, presiding.

S. C. Stough, Judge, presiding. Appellee, Marcella Crowley, filed her bill in the circuit court of Grundy county for partition of two hundred acres of land, alleging that she was the owner of the undivided one-fourth thereof and that she derived title thereto by inheritance from her grandfather, Patrick Lamb, who the bill alleged was the owner in fee of said land at the time of his death, in February, 1903.

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas G. Windes, and R. S. Tuthill, Judges, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Dedication—offer to dedicate is withdrawn by death of proposed donor. An offer to dedicate land for a public street is revoked, by implication, by the death of the proposed donor before acceptance of the offer by the public authorities, and subsequent acts of the public authorities indicating an acceptance of the offer do not operate to complete the dedication.</p> <p>2. Same—proof of acceptance must be clear and satisfactory. Dedication of a street is not complete until acceptance, which may be express, as shown by some order, resolution or other record of the action of the public authorities, or be implied by acts of the public authorities recognizing the existence of the street and treating it as a public way, but the proof of ácceptance must be unequivocal, clear and satisfactory.</p> <p>3. Evidence—what is inadmissible in a street obstruction case. In a prosecution for obstructing an alleged public street by fences, evidence that the defendant, before building the fences, went to the streets and alleys committee of the village and requested permission to .build a lane across the strip of ground, calling it a street, which request was denied, is not admissible, as no estoppel can rest on what the defendant said, the request being denied.</p>

Edgar EldrEdge, Judge, presiding. The circuit court of LaSalle county, on a hearing, without a jury, of an appeal from a police magistrate of the city of Earlville, rendered a judgment against the appellant for a penalty of four dollars for absenting himself from four meetings of the city council, of which he was a member. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment, and, a certificate of importance having been granted, an appeal was taken to this court.

Edward A. Dicker, Judge, presiding. This is an appeal by Wells Fargo & Co. from a judgment of the Branch Appellate Court for the First District affirming a judgment for the sum of $207.50 and costs of suit recovered by Henry W. K. Cutter and Charles H. Crosette, co-partners doing business as Cutter & Crosette, appellees, against appellant, in the municipal court of Chicago, for the loss of certain goods delivered to it by appellees for shipment.

<p>Appeal from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Lockwood Honors, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ or Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Macon county; the Hon. William C. Johns, Judge, presiding. This was an action on the case commenced in the circuit court of Macon county by the defendant in error to recover damages for a personal injury.

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. David T. Smiley, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Drainage—an appeal from classification does not vacate the classification. An appeal by a land owner from the classification of land by farm drainage commissioners does not vacate the classification, but the same remains in full force for all purposes until it is modified upon appeal, and a levy of the assessment while the appeal is pending is not void.</p> <p>2. Same—what is not ground for denying a judgment of sale. The fact that a drainage assessment was made upon the original classification, which was higher than the classification as corrected by the court on appeal, is not ground for refusing judgment of sale for the amount actually due upon the classification as., finally established, and the county court has power to determine the amount for which the objector’s lands are liable under the final classification and render judgment.</p> <p>3. Appeals and errors—when judgment is not vacated by appeal. A judgment at law is not vacated by an appeal where the appellate tribunal does not have authority to try the cause de novo, settle the controversy by a judgment of its own and enforce the judgment by its own process, but has authority merely to correct errors, and, after correction of errors, remand the cause to the tribunal whence it came.</p> <p>4. Same—when point is not saved for review because no cross-error is assigned. Upon appeal from a judgment denying" an application for judgment of sale for a drainage assessment, if no cross-error is assigned the point that the trial court erred in denying leave to the objector to file an additional objection is not saved for review, though exception was taken to the ruling and the question is argued by both parties in their briefs.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law—verdict must be responsive to issues formed. A plea of not guilty to an indictment charging that the defendants permitted an unmarried female under the age of eighteen years to live, board,-stop and room at a house of prostitution of which the defendants were the keepers, puts in issue all essential elements of the offense charged, and a verdict, in order to support a judgment of conviction, must, either by direct findings or by reference, be responsive to the issues thus formed.</p> <p>2. Same—a verdict should receive reasonable construction. A verdict in a criminal case should receive a reasonable construction, and should not be set aside unless from necessity originating in doubt as to its meaning, or from the immateriality of the issue found or a failure to find upon some material issue involved, and hence a verdict finding defendant guilty of “harboring” a female under eighteen years of age in a house of prostitution may well be construed as meaning that they permitted her to “live, board, stop or room” there.</p> <p>3. Same—when verdict is not sufficient. A verdict finding the defendant guilty “of harboring a female under the age of eighteen years in a house of prostitution, in manner and form as charged in the indictment,” is insufficient, in failing to find that such female was unmarried or that the defendant was the keeper of the house, even though such facts are alleged in the indictment, as the clause, “in manner and form as charged in the indictment,” refers to the indictment for the facts specially found in the verdict, but no others.</p> <p>4. Evidence—when admitting a book in evidence is not error. In a prosecution for' permitting an unmarried female under eighteen years of age to room in a house of prostitution kept by the defendant it is not error to admit in evidence a book in which the names of the various inmates of the house were entered, together with their accounts with the keeper of the house.</p> <p>5. Same—rule where evidence is competent as to one defendant and incompetent as to the other. In a prosecution against two defendants charged with being keepers of a house of prostitution and with permitting an unmarried female under eighteen years of age to room there, conversations which are competent as to one defendant, only, may be admitted if the jury are instructed to disregard such evidence entirely in determining the case against the other defendant.</p> <p>6. Instructions—instructions tending to encourage a disagreement of jury may be refused. An instruction reading, “If any one of the jury, after having considered all the evidence in the case and after having consulted with his fellow-jury men, should, entertain a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt, then the jury cannot find the defendant guilty,” is properly refused because of its tendency to encourage a disagreement of the jury.</p>

Robert W. Wright, Judge, presiding.' This is an action for the benefit of the next of kin of Thomas Keating to recover damages for his death, alleged to have resulted from injuries inflicted by an employee of appellant on one of its street cars in Chicago. • On the trial before a jury in the superior court of Cook county a verdict of $1500 was found and judgment was entered thereon against appellant.

E. R. E. Kimbrough, Judge, presiding. Appellees, Clarence Ulrey and the Illinois Oil and Gas Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of West Virginia and licensed to do business in Illinois, filed their bill in the circuit court of Clark county, alleging that on the 25th day of January, 1905, A. P. Keith, being the owner in fee of the south half of the south-east quarter of the north-east quarter, the south-west quarter of the south-east quarter and the…

Writ oe Error to the Circuit Court of Will county; the Hon. Frank L. Hooper, Judge, presiding. On July ii, 1906, Mary Sings, Edith G. Evans, America Miller, Alcyone Lewis, Arvilla A. Withrow and William Bissell, plaintiffs in error, brought an action in the circuit court of Will county against the city of Joliet, defendant in error, for damages for the destruction by defendant in error of an apartment house and its contents owned by plaintiffs in error in said city.

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Christian county; the Hon. James H. Morgan, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Lockwood HonorE, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>x. Taxes—what items of county tax levy sufficiently separated. Items of a county tax levy for “salaries of county officers, deputies and clerics, $20,000,” for “jury certificates and witness fees, $3000,” and for “printing and stationery, $6000,” are sufficiently separated to meet the requirements of the statute.</p> <p>2. Same-—levy of comparatively small sum for “incidentals” is valid. A levy by a county of a sum for “incidentals” which is a small amount in view of the size and population of the county, of which fact the court will take judicial notice, is valid.</p> <p>3. Same—what items in the county levy should be separated. Items for “pauper accounts and poormaster” and for “court house and jail” should be separated, respectively, in the county tax levy.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. Lewis Rinaker, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Taxes—oil and gas lease comes within term "mining right.” A lease of unlimited duration granting the right to enter upon land and prospect for oil and gas, drill wells, erect structures, lay pipes, etc., is a lease of a “mining right,” within the meaning of sections 6 and 7 of the Mines act, relating to the taxation of mining rights separately from the fee, and as such lease involves a freehold it should be assessed as real property, separately from the fee.</p> <p>2. Same-—mining right defined. A mining right is a right to excavate in the earth for the purpose of obtaining minerals or other useful products, and includes the. right to take petroleum from the earth.</p>

Prank L. Hooper, Judge, presiding. This is a petition filed by the People, on the relation of Zephir Boisvert and others, in the circuit court of Kankakee county, for leave to file an information in the nature of a quo warranto against Myron Magruder, Joseph Leclair and M. M. Beebe, to require them to show by what authority they hold and exercise the oifice of drainage commissioners of a certain pretended drainage district known as Bourbonnais Union District No. 5.

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District ;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John C. Scovel, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law—when person may be convicted of crime of receiving stolen property. One indicted for the crime of receiving stolen property may be convicted of the offense charged although the evidence shows he was an accessory before the fact, if he was not present at the actual time of the conversion of the goods.</p> <p>2. Same—evidence of self-confessed accomplice may be sufficient to convict. A conviction may be sustained although the only evidence of guilt is that of self-confessed accomplices, but such evidence is open to grave suspicion and should be acted upon with the utmost caution.</p> <p>3. Same—instructions must be accurate where evidence is close. Where the evidence in a criminal case is sharply conflicting on material points the instructions should state the law applicable to the facts with accuracy.</p> <p>4. Same—when giving instruction assuming fact is reversible error. In a prosecution for receiving stolen property it is reversible error to give an instruction assuming the fact that the defendant accepted the property, where that fact is denied by defendant and his denial is to some extent corroborated, and where none of the stolen property was found in his possession and the only evidence against him is the testimony of self-confessed accomplices.</p> <p>5. Same—what evidence is competent in a prosecution for receiving stolen property. In a prosecution for receiving stolen property, consisting of pig iron, which it is charged was bought by the defendant from teamsters engaged in hauling it to the owner’s place of business, it is not error to allow a witness employed by a foundry company to testify that the defendant, about the time of the offense charged, offered to sell the foundry company some pig iron which he claimed he was expecting to obtain from Indiana, but that he did not, in fact, sell or deliver any.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law—Lottery Policy act construed. The provision of section 2 of the Lottery Policy act, (Laws of 1905, p. 192,) authorizing the conviction and punishment of anyone who shall have in his possession, knowingly, any writing, paper or document representing or being the record of any chance, share or interest in numbers “sold, drawn or to be drawn,” covers not only such papers and documents as represent a chance, share or interest in numbers “sold,” but also in numbers “drawn or to be drawn,” and it is not necessary to allege and prove that they were sold.</p> <p>2. Same—what objections go merely to form of information. Objections that an information based on section 2 of the Lottery Policy act used the word “have” in the place of “had” and the word “knowly” for “knowingly,” should be raised, if at all, by a motion to quash, as they go to the form of the information only, and not to the merits of the offense.</p>

<p>1. Taxes—county levy of certain amount for “salaries of officers” is sufficiently specific. The levy by a county of a certain sum for “salaries of officers” will be regarded as applying only to salaries payable out of the county treasury from money raised by general taxation, and is sufficiently definite.</p> <p>2. Same—what is not a filing of the original certificate of levy with county clerk. Where the certificate of levy is executed in duplicate and each copy signed by the commissioners, the town clerk may file one copy in his office and treat it as the original, and transmit the copy which he has not filed to the county clerk.</p> <p>3. Same—when certificate of the town clerk may be amended. Where the town clerk transmits to the county clerk one of the duplicate certificates of levy, which does not bear the town clerk’s file-mark, and there are attached thereto other documents, including a portion of the record of a town meeting, with the certificate of the town clerk that the same is a copy of such record, the town clerk’s certificate may be amended, on application for judgment of sale, to show that the duplicate certificate of levy was a copy of the original on file in his office. (People v. Belleville and Eldorado Railroad Co. 232 Ill. 454, distinguished.)</p> <p>4. Same—when a certificate for additional road tax does not show a contingency. A certificate reciting that in the opinion of the highway commissioners an additional road and bridge tax levy is necessary “in view of the contingency that it is necessary, on account of their destruction, to re-build immediately nine bridges,” does not show that a contingency such as is contemplated by the statute exists, as that question depends upon the character of the forces which worked the destruction of the bridges.</p> <p>5. Same—when objections may be joined and heard in one proceeding. Where there is but one application for judgment of sale •by the collector and all objections are made by the same property owner, the objections may be joined and heard in the samé proceeding although several taxes are involved.</p> <p>6. Same—courts should not consider technical opposition to objections to taxes. It is the right of a property owner, under the statute, to have his objections to a tax determined “in a summary manner, without pleadings,” and the applicant for judgment of sale should not be allowed to interfere with such right by pleading as at common law or by offering technical opposition to the objections which does not go to their merits.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of DuPage county; the Hon. W. L. Pond, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ op Error to the Appellate Court for the Fourth District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison county; the Hon. B. R. Burroughs, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Appeals and Errors—Supreme Court cannot weigh the evidence in suit at law. On appeal from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court in an action at law the Supreme Court can only examine the record to the extent of determining whether there is any evidence tending to support the plaintiff’s cause of action and whether the rules of law have been properly applied.</p> <p>2. Same—when request to give instructions directing a verdict is necessary. The question whether the evidence in a suit at law fairly tends to establish the cause of action can only be preserved for review in the Supreme Court by requesting the trial court to give written instructions directing a verdict for the defendant.</p> <p>3. Same—when judgment of the Appellate Court is conclusive of question that verdict was too large. Where it is not claimed that the question of how much should be paid the plaintiff as salary for certain months was one which should not have been submitted to the jufy, the contention that the jury allowed too much is settled by the Appellate Court’s affirmance of the judgmént on the verdict, except in so far as the Supreme Court is required to review the rulings of the trial court on evidence and instructions.</p> <p>4. Contracts—when question whether plaintiff was discharged by employer is for the jury. Where the evidence for the plaintiff in an action for salary tends to show that after he had been shown a telegram authorizing another person to take his place he had an interview with his employer, in which the latter stated he wanted the plaintiff to resign and to make a proposition for settlement, and that the employer made a counter-proposition asking the plaintiff to think it over but not to go to work unless notified, the question whether plaintiff was discharged is properly left to the jury.</p> <p>5. Same—when salary may be recovered although no services were performed. Where the question whether the plaintiff in an action for salary had been discharged is properly left to the jury as a question of fact under the evidence, and the jury are fairly instructed upon the subject of what would constitute a discharge by the employer, the jury may allow the amount due for salary for certain months, even though the plaintiff rendered no actual services for that time.</p> <p>6. Evidence—when letters written by plaintiff to his employer are properly admitted. In an action for salary, letters written by the plaintiff to his employer after the plaintiff had been told not to go back to work until notified, which stated that the plaintiff did not consider himself discharged and asked for information on that point, are properly admitted in evidence, where their effect is limited, by an instruction, to the sole purpose of showing notice to the employer that plaintiff did not understand he was discharged.</p>

Homer Abbott,'Judge, presiding. On May 17, 1907, John Byrne, administrator of the estate of Thomas P. Byrne, deceased, the appellee, secured a judgment for the sum of $5000 in the superior court of Cook county against Marshall Field & Co., appellant, for damages to the next of kin of appellee’s intestate. The deceased was killed on November 5, 1902, by the falling of a passenger elevator which he was operating in appellant’s retail store in the city of Chicago.

<p>Writ oe Error to the Circuit Court of Madison county; the Hon. B. R. Burroughs, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Piatt county; the Hon. W. G. Cochran, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District ;—heard in that, court on writ of error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Mancha BruggemeyEr, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District ;—rheard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Jersey county; the Hon. J. A. Creighton, Judge, presiding.</p>

John A. Gray, Judge, presiding. The appellants filed their bill for the partition of the real estate devised by the will of H. M. Lewis, their grandfather, making all the other devisees under the will parties defendant. Appellants are the children of Norvel Lewis, a son of the testator, who died before the making of the will..

Writ oE Error to the- Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. A. H. Frost, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Schuyler county; the Hon. Harry HigbEE/ Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. W. CliEEOrd, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Statutes—statutory rules of construction do not apply if contrary to legislative intent. Under section 1 of the act entitled “Statutes,” the rules of construction therein laid down must be observed in construing a statute, unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature or repugnant to the context of the same statute, in which case the general provisions of the act do not apply.</p> <p>2. Same—amendatory act is not a repeal of portions of original act unchanged. As a general rule, an amendment of a statute is only a repeal as to the portions of the original act left out of the amendment, and as to the portion unchanged in form or substance the amendment is merely a continuation of the original act.</p> <p>3. Same—amendment of ipo8 to sections 14a and 14b of Pharmacy act did not work repeal. The amendment in 1908 of sections 140 and 14& of the act to regulate the practice of pharmacy, which relate to the offense of selling cocaine and the punishment thereof, did not work a repeal of such sections as they were enacted in 1903, nor work an abatement of any pending prosecutions for selling cocaine in violation of the act of 1903.</p> <p>4. Evidence—when proof that sale of cocaine was made by a clerk is proper. The fact that the bill of particulars alleges that a sale of cocaine was made by the defendants on a certain date, without stating to whom the sale was made or that it was made by a_ clerk, does not preclude proof that the defendants kept for sale a certain catarrh powder, which was a compound of cocaine, and that their clerk made a sale of the same in the absence of the defendants, where it is not denied that the clerk was authorized to sell and was expected to sell what was called for.</p> <p>5. Same—when proof of other sales is competent. In a prosecution for selling cocaine in violation of the statute, where the defendants contest the authority of the clerk to make the sale counted upon, proof of other sales before and after the one on which the prosecution is based is competent for the purpose of showing the manner of conducting the business and the authority of the clerk as well as upon the question of intent.</p> <p>6. Cocaine—sale of cocaine in original package, without prescription, is unlawful. Section 14a of the Pharmacy act, as added in 1903, (Laws of 1903, p. 248,) which makes it unlawful for a druggist or any other person to sell or give away cocaine except upon prescription, supersedes the proviso to section i of such act, as enacted in 1901, excluding from the operation of thg. act sales of proprietary or patent medicines in the original, unbroken packages, and, under the amendment of 1903, a sale of a preparation of cocaine in the original package without a prescription is unlawful.</p> <p>7. Judgments and decrees—when judgment may order commitment until the penalty is paid. The constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt does not extend to actions of debt for fines and penalties inflicted for violations of the penal laws of the State, and it is not error for the judgment in such an action to order the defendants committed to jail until the penalty is paid.</p>

C. D. Myers, Judge, presiding. This was a bill in chancery filed by Nelson P. Perry and Thomas C. Kerrick, executors of the last will and testament of Emily T. Perry, deceased, in the circuit court of McLean county, to obtain a construction of . the will of Emily T. Perry. , Pending the litigation the files were destroyed by fire and Nelson P. Perry died. By leave of court the surviving executor restored the files and amended his bill, making new parties.

Writ oE Error to the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas G. WindEs, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Albert C. Barnes, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ of Error to the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. W. Clifford, Judge, presiding.

Appear from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Edward A. Dicker, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Julian W. Mack, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Equity—when equity may take jurisdiction though action at law could be brought. A court of equity may take jurisdiction of a suit against an underwriters’ association, its manager and certain members, to enforce payment of' insurance policies, and may grant relief even though an action at law could be brought, since the remedy in equity is more adequate and better adapted to secure performance of any personal act which may be required of the manager or committee of the underwriters. (Warfield-Pratt-Howell Co. v. Williamson, 233 Ill. 487, followed.)</p> <p>2. Insurance—when policies are not void for fraud. Renewal policies sent by the insurer to the insured without any application or representation by the insured and upon the same terms as the original policy, which was based upon a special contract as to the rate and not upon any system of discount from the prevailing board rate, are not void for failure of the insured to give information as to insurance rates, asked for in the letters enclosing the renewal policies, since if an insurer deems such information material it should insist upon an answer or cancel the policies.</p> <p>3. Same—policy construed as to meaning of term "concurrent insurance ” Under the rule that where a provision of an insurance policy is ambiguous and susceptible of more than one construction that construction will be adopted which is most favorable to the insured, a provision of a fire policy reading, “$150,000 total concurrent insurance permitted,” will be construed as permitting other insurance, concurring with that of the policy in question, to the amount of $150,000.</p> <p>4. Same—when compromise of suit against water company is no defense to suit on policy. In order that a compromise of a suit against a water company shall operate to discharge a fire insurance company from liability upon the ground that subrogation was thereby prevented, the insurer must prove that a liability on the part of the water company existed; but if the insured acted in good faith and the compromise was made for the benefit of all the insurance companies interested, by attorneys acting for them, the compromise presents no defense to a suit on the policy, even if the water company was liable.</p>

Writ oe Error to the Appellate Court for the Fourth District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Gallatin county; the Hon. Jacob R. Creighton, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Evidence—courts take judicial notice that the United States originally owned lands granted to State. Courts take judicial notice that the United States was the original proprietor of lands granted to the State; that section 16 in each township was so granted for school purposes, and that in fractional townships for which no land had been appropriated certain quantities of land, to be selected by Secretary'of the Treasury, were granted to the State.</p> <p>2. Same—official certificate of register of land office is competent to prove fact certified. Under the Evidence act the official certificate of a register or receiver of a land office of the United States to any fact or matter on record in his office is evidence and competent to prove the fact so certified.</p> <p>3. Same—exemplification of records by recorder of land office is competent evidence. An exemplification, certified by the recorder of the general land office, of a list of lands selected under the act of Congress on May 20, 1826, relating to selection of school lands in fractional townships, is competent evidence of the truth of its recitals under the general rules of evidence.</p> <p>4. Same—what proof shows that lands zuere selected by Secretary of Treasury. A certificate of the recorder of the general land office of the United States that a report by the register of the land office, showing the tracts of land selected by the surveyor of school lands, is a true and literal exemplification of the original list of lands approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, is proof of the fact that the selection made by the surveyor was approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, and amounts to proof of a selection by the latter.</p> <p>■ 5. School lands—lands selected in fractional townships for school purposes were granted to State. Lands selected in fractional townships for school purposes, in lieu of section 16, were not granted to the township but to the State, since they were to be held on the same tenure and upon the same terms as section 16, the title to which was held by the State.</p> <p>6. Same—title of State is not mere dry or passive trust. The State is not a mere naked trustee of lands selected in fractional townships for school purposes but is a purchaser for valuable consideration, with full power to sell or lease the school lands for the use of the schools, as the legislature may provide, and the title to such lands remains in the State until it is granted by the State.</p> <p>7. -Ejectment—plaintiff may introduce plats to identify property. A plaintiff in ejectment seeking to recover a tract of land by a certain description who shows a grant to the State of Illinois and a patent to him from the State, in which the description corresponds with the description in the declaration, may introduce plats for the purpose of identifying the property, and if defendant claims that there is no such property he must show such fact.</p> <p>8. Limitations—statute does not run against the State. As distinguished from a minor municipality holding title to land for a purely local use, the Statute of Limitations does not run against the State holding title to land in its sovereign capacity, and no delay in resorting to the remedy while such title is held by the State will bar the right to recover the land in an action of ejectment.</p>

<p>1. Executions—the plaintiff in execution is not bound to give sheriff directions about executing it. Although the plaintiff in execution has the right to control the writ and give the sheriff directions about executing it, yet he is not bound to do so, and when the writ is received and no instructions are given, it is the duty of the sheriff to proceed with due diligence to execute it.</p> <p>2. Same—failure of judgment creditor to give directions does not render execution dormant. It is the duty of a sheriff to receive an execution tendered him, and a failure of the judgment creditor to give any directions about executing it or where property of the judgment debtor may be found does not render the writ dormant or ineffective to preserve the lien of the judgment.</p> <p>3. Appeals and errors—weight to be given testimony of witnesses is a question for the chancellor. Whether the testimony of the attorney for an execution plaintiff, to the effect that he gave instructions he wanted the executions obeyed, should be given greater weight than the testimony of the execution clerks in the sheriff’s office, who testified that the executions were to be held, is a matter to be determined by the chancellor, and his determination will not be disturbed by a court of review unless clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence.</p> <p>4. Equity—when judgment creditor is not required to refund redemption money expended by grantee of a judgment debtor. A bill by the grantee of a judgment debtor to set aside as a cloud upon her title a deed based on an execution sale under the judgment may be dismissed for want of equity without requiring the re-payment to complainant of the amount expended by her in redeeming from a foreclosure proceeding, where her title was acquired subject to the mortgage and subject to the lien of judgment.</p> <p>5. Same—a judgment creditor is not required to refund money paid for taxes. Equity does not require a judgment creditor to refund money expended by the judgment debtor or his grantee for taxes assessed against the debtor’s land, which were paid after the judgment became a lien and before the land was seized under the execution issued on the judgment.</p>

Writ or Error to the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Rock Island county; the Hon. Emery C. Graves, Judge, presiding.

<p>Injunction—right of action on injunction bond accrues when injunction is dissolved. Under the present statute, where an injunction bond is conditioned for payment of damages in case the injunction is dissolved a cause of action accrues upon the bond immediately upon the dissolution of the injunction, and the fact that the court where the injunction proceeding was pending has failed to assess damages or finally dispose of the cause upon its merits is no defense to the action.</p>

Information to disbar. This is a proceeding for the disbarment of Federico M. Barrios, a member of the bar engaged in the practice of his profession in Chicago.

<p>Writ op Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. A. H. Chetlain, Judge, presiding.</p>

Appeae from the Appellate Court for the Second District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Will county; the Hon. Dorrance Dibeee, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal front the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Flon. Henry C. BeitlER, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ or Error to the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Rock Island county; the Hon. Emery C. Graves, Judge, presiding.

<p>Writ op Error to the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. James A. Creighton, Judge, presiding.</p>

William N. Cottrell, Judge, presiding. This is an appeal by the city of Chicago from a judgment of the Appellate Court for the First District affirming a judgment of the municipal court of Chicago for the sum of $115.55, recovered by the Lehigh Valley Transportation Company against appellant.

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. Isaac A. Love, Judge, presiding.</p>

R. S. TuThill, Judge, presiding. This is an appeal by the Evening American Publishing Company from a judgment of the Appellate Court for the First District affirming a judgment for $1500 recovered against it in the circuit court of Cook county by Rose Ball, the appellee, in an action on the case for libel.

Writ of Error to the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. W. Clifford, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison county; the Hon. B. R. Burroughs, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of LaSalle county; the Hon. S. C. Stough, Judge, presiding.</p>

Appear from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Ben M. Smith, Judge, presiding.

Lockwood Honoré, Judge, presiding. On December 26, 1906, Mittie C. Ambler, the appellee, made application in the circuit court of Cook county to register the title to the south half of lot 10, in block 25, in Carpenter’s addition to the city of Chicago. The applicant averred that she was the owner in fee simple of the land and that she was in possession thereof by her tenants.