Teepak, Inc. v. Learned’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16 district · 36 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 52 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Teepak argues that the abolition of both joint and several liability and the right of contribution among tortfeasors as determined in Brown is limited to joint tortfeasors and does not apply to successive tortfeasors as in the case before us. In support thereof, Teepak shows that existing Kansas case law imposes liability on the tortfeasor causing the initial injury for any additional injury to the injured party arising from medical malpractice occurring in the treatment of the original injury. Fieser v. St. Francis Hospital & School of Nursing, Inc., 212 Kan. 35 , 510 P.2d 145 (1973), is a case wherein this principle is extensively discussed and applied. “We see no valid reason for limiting the holding in Brown solely to the joint tortfeasor situation. The concept of contribution among tortfeasors arises from equitable origins—a person partially causing injury to another but paying for all of the injury should be entitled to contribution thereon from another person causing part of the injury. The equitable need for contribution vanishes when one tortfeasor has the statutory right to bring other tortfeasors into the action.as defendants and have fault (and liability) proportionally determined. The injured person herein, Carl Baise, sued Teepak and Alewel’s seeking recovery for the injuries received from eating the sausage. Teepak claims part of those injuries arose from medical malpractice. Teepak could have brought Dr. Learned into the action as a party whose negligence sho”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 9978 - Stowe v. McHugh, No. 117721 (Sep. 29, 1994) · Glenn v. Fleming

2. “Before concluding, it should be noted that the result reached herein is wholly consistent with the philosophy, as expressed in Albertson v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 230 Kan. 368 , 634 P.2d 1127 (1981), that comparative fault should be determined in one action.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. St. Francis Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. Critical Care, Inc. · 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 9978 - Stowe v. McHugh, No. 117721 (Sep. 29, 1994)

3. ““The relief granted by this court, in light of the facts in the Kennedy case and the interplay of principles of comparative negligence, indemnity, and settlement, was termed an action for comparative implied indemnity. We recognize the term is not appropriate to the case at bar in which post-settlement contribution, rather than indemnity, is at issue. However, while proportional contribution is a more appropriate term in the instant case, we have no desire to belabor that distinction and cloud the issue before us which concerns procedural prerequisites to any claim for post-settlement proportional payment, regardless of the nomenclature used.” 231 Kan. at 184 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 38 Kan. App. 2d 348 - Dodge City Implement, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners