Hernandez v. Harson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 133 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 143 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"It is well recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court that as a general rule attorney's fees are not allowed except where authorized by statute or contract. Rhodes v. Collier, 215 La. 754 , 41 So.2d 669 ; Efner v. Ketteringham, 217 La. 719 , 47 So.2d 331 ; Brantley v. Tugwell, 223 La. 763 , 66 So.2d 800 ; Griffin v. Bank of Abbeville & Trust Co., 228 La. 857 , 84 So.2d 437 ; Chauvin v. LaHitte, 229 La. 94 , 85 So.2d 43 ; McNeill v. Elchinger, 231 La. 1090 , 93 So.2d 669 ; Breaux v. Simon, 235 La. 453 , 104 So.2d 168 . A well recognized exception to this rule is that attorney's fees are allowed as damages when conservatory writs have been dissolved on motion and not on defenses applicable to the merits. Brantley v. Tugwell, supra; Edwards v. Wiseman, 198 La. 382 , 3 So.2d 661 . However, there is considerable conflict in the jurisprudence as to other exceptions to this rule. A reading of the various opinions handed down by this Court in this respect reveals that attorney's fees have been allowed when injunction proceedings have been instituted to prevent the seizure and sale of property owned by a third person. In some cases when the injunction is maintained attorney's fees were allowed and in other cases attorney's fees were only allowed as an element of damages where the injunction was dissolved on hearing of the merits. The two different views in this respect are thoroughly pointed out in the cases of Soniat v. Whitmer, 141 La. 235 , 74 So. 916 and Jackson v. Bouanchaud,”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Cecil John Ogea v. Loffland Brothers Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., Third Party · 442 So. 2d 1379 - Tate v. Tate

2. “Plaintiff is entitled to recover for humiliation, mortification and mental anxiety, and for physical discomfort and inconvenience as a result of the deprivation of use and enjoyment of his car.... Such an item is not confined to proof of actual pecuniary loss. It is true that there is no proof of malice nor was the seizure characterized by harshness and total disregard to the interests of plaintiff. Yet it was illegally and wrongfully executed, coupled with the continued deprivation of its use for an extended period of time, sufficient to have caused mortification, annoyance and physical discomfort.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 136 So. 2d 819 - Roge v. Kuhlman · 475 So. 2d 756 - Quealy v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.

3. ““We concede that earlier eases relied on by defendant seemingly uphold his contention. Later decisions, however, have firmly established the rule that a party damaged by an illegal seizure of his property may file suit within one year after the final termination of the litigation, or in other words, that the running of one year prescription begins not from the date of the illegal seizure, but from the time the rights of the parties are finally determined. Obviously, the measure of damages grows out not only from the wrongful seizure but its continued illegal detention, the loss and deprivation to which the owner is illegally subjected. The soundness of this rule is instantly apparent in that the owner of property illegally seized is incapable of ascertaining or knowing the quantum of damages he has sustained until his rights to its ownership have been definitively decreed.” (emphasis ours.)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Childress, Smith & Holloman v. Mayeaux · Poole v. American Bank & Trust Co.