¶1concurring.
¶2Since the procedure, or more accurately, the lack of procedure, for a juror’s questions of a witness in Zima’s trial approached an interrogational free-for-all, there is a basis for the majority’s criticism. However, if the objective of a trial, particularly a jury’s factfinding role in the judicial process, is ascertaining truth, or at least probable truth, for resolution of disputed claims or contradictory contentions and positions of litigants, an absolutely prohibitive rule against all questions from j urors is as incomprehensible as it is imprudent.
¶3Allowing a juror’s question to a witness is related to two of the Nebraska Evidence Rules, namely, Rule 611(1), which provides in part, “The judge shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (a) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth,” and Rule 614(2), “The judge may interrogate witnesses, whether called by himself or by a party.”
¶4A review of decisions in other jurisdictions supplies cogent reasons for allowing a juror’s questions to a witness; for example:
[A] well informed juror serves the cause of justice. In some cases it is important to clarify a problem in a juror’s mind. It may sometimes be necessary for a juror to call an important matter to the attention of court and counsel. We therefore think it is important for the trial judge to control direct questions to the witnesses by members of the jury, but we also believe jurors should be afforded the opportunity to direct any questions or problems they may have to the court.
¶5State v. Taylor, 25 Ariz. App. 497, 500, 544 P.2d 714, 717 (1976).
There is nothing improper about the practice of allowing occasional questions from jurors to be asked of witnesses. If a juror is unclear as to a point in the proof, it *958makes good common sense to allow a question to be asked about it. If nothing else, the question should alert trial counsel that a particular factual issue may need more extensive development. Trials exist to develop truth. It may sometimes be that counsel are so familiar with a case that they fail to see problems that would naturally bother a juror who is presented with the facts for the first time.
¶6United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir. 1979).
¶7“As finders of fact, jurors should receive reasonable help in resolving legitimate questions which trouble them but have not been answered through [counsel’s] interrogation of witnesses .. . .” Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Ctr., 293 N.W.2d 550, 556 (Iowa 1980).
¶8“[T]he interests of justice demand that jurors be well-informed with an opportunity to clarify matters they either did not hear or did not comprehend.” State v. LeMaster, 137 Ariz. 159, 165, 669 P.2d 592, 598 (1983).
[I]t [is] proper that a juror may ask an occasional question where something has been said by a witness which is confusing to the juror for the purpose of clarifying the matter. The extent to which the trial court may allow such questioning by the juror is a matter in the discretion of the court.
¶9Krause v. State, 75 Okla. Crim. 381, 386, 132 P.2d 179, 182 (1942).
¶10“The basic reason underlying [a juror’s asking questions of a witness] is that the jurors are the finders of fact and any questions they may ask may help them in reaching their ultimate determination.” People v Heard, 388 Mich. 182, 187, 200 N.W.2d 73, 76 (1972).
¶11“Law is not an exact science .... Despite the majesty and gravity with which its administration is properly invested, it is a very human affair after all. It has to do not with scientific axioms or scientific formulae, but with the everyday concerns of ordinary citizens.” H. MacMillan, The Ethics of Advocacy, in Law & Other Things 171, 174 (1971).
¶12In its opinion, the majority has mentioned decisions from other jurisdictions, including appellate decisions from eight states and one federal circuit court, which permit a juror’s *959question to a witness. To be added to the decisions mentioned by the majority are the following 14 decisions from state appellate courts and 5 decisions of federal circuit courts, all allowing juror questions to a witness in some manner: Ratton v. Busby, 230 Ark. 667, 326 S.W.2d 889 (1959); Ferrara v. State, 101 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1958); Story v. State, 157 Ga. App. 490, 278 S.E.2d 97 (1981); Stamp v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 133, 253 S.W. 242 (1923); State v. Crawford, 96 Minn. 95, 104 N.W. 822 (1905); Sparks v. Daniels, 343 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. App. 1961); State v. Rodriguez, 107 N.M. 611, 762 P.2d 898 (1988); Sitrin Bros. v. Deluxe Lines, 35 Misc. 2d 1041, 231 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1962); State v. Howard, 320 N.C. 718, 360 S.E.2d 790 (1987); State v. Sheppard, 100 Ohio App. 345, 128 N.E.2d 471 (1955); Krause v. State, supra; Reese v. Pittsburgh, 313 Pa. 32, 169 A. 366 (1933); Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978); Green v. Rudsenske, 320 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); U.S. v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Witt, 215 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1954); DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Callahan, supra; United States v. Gonzales, 424 F. 2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1970).
¶13Consequently, research on the point indicates that there are decisions from 22 state courts and 6 federal circuit courts which allow the practice of a juror’s question to a witness. It appears that, with the exception of Nebraska, as reflected by today’s decision, no appellate court, state or federal, has rejected the practice of juror questions in all circumstances and imposed an entire embargo on that practice. Although good sometimes comes from marching to the beat of a different drummer, the majority’s drumbeat is drowned out by the band of courts in other jurisdictions which allow the practice of juror questions to a witness.
¶14From the decisions in those jurisdictions allowing juror questions to a witness, there evolve a practical procedure and guidelines which reduce prospects for a mistrial, new trial, or reversal based on such questions to a witness. At the outset, a trial court must consider whether juror questions to any witness will assist the jury in its role as fact finder. A decision to allow or reject questioning from a jury is within the trial court’s *960discretion. If the court decides to allow questions from the jury, then before any testimony the court must inform the jury that if a juror has a question for clarification of a witness’ testimony, the juror’s written question shall be presented to the court, which determines whether the judge, and only the judge, will ask the witness a question submitted by a juror. After a witness testifies, a jury would have to be given suitable time to formulate questions in reference to the testimony given, but must be instructed that any question is a juror’s independent decision, to be made without discussing the content of the question with any other member of the jury. The juror’s written question would then be given to the bailiff for delivery to the judge. The court and counsel must examine the submitted question or questions with an opportunity, on the record but out of the jury’s hearing, for counsel’s objection to any question. If the court rules that the submitted question or questions will result in inadmissible testimony, the judge shall inform the jury that the court declines to interrogate the witness through use of the jury-submitted questions. However, if a submitted question will elicit admissible testimony, and after the judge has asked the jury-submitted question, counsel shall have the opportunity to interrogate the witness on the subject raised by the juror’s question and the witness’ answer. In this manner, the court may scrupulously control interrogation of a witness. See, State v. G. Barrett, 278 S.C. 414, 297 S.E.2d 794 (1982); Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Ctr., 293 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 1980); United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1979); State v. LeMaster, 137 Ariz. 159, 669 P.2d 592 (1983); Story v. State, 157 Ga. App. 490, 278 S.E.2d 97 (1981); People v. Gates, 97 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 10, 158 Cal. Rptr. 759 (1979); State v. Taylor, 25 Ariz. App. 497, 544 P.2d 714 (1976).
¶15Inherent in a categorical condemnation of the practice which allows a juror’s question to a witness is a skepticism concerning every trial judge’s capability to manage interrogation and a suspicion about a jury’s analytical and deductive capacities.
¶16It is a myth that only courts and counsel possess a map for the journey toward truth in a trial. The blindfold on Justice is not a gag. Hence, a juror’s question to a witness, in accordance with the procedure and guidelines suggested, should be a part of Nebraska practice.