Johnson v. Hansen’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

17 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““In the case at bar there was no preliminary showing of any fact that might have made relevant an inquiry concerning bias arising out of the relationship of verdicts and insurance premiums. Where a line of questioning obviously is going to open up prejudicial speculation, e. g., of a racial, religious, political or other emotionally charged nature, the exploration of which will manifestly incite similar speculation upon the part of listening jurors, counsel must be prepared to show the need which might make such an inquiry relevant, or run the risk of an immediate mistrial. Insurance matters should be handled with the same safeguards. In the case before us counsel did not advise the court of the existence of recent institutional advertising, or of other current propaganda calculated to produce bias upon the part of jurors in the local court. Thus there was no occasion to open up the matter of insurance, whether innocently or with scienter. We hold that the inquiry was improper.” fohnson, 389 P.2 at 331 . (Emphasis added.)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore · Borkoski v. Yost

2. “"* * * There is substantial support in the adjudicated cases as well as in the texts and legal periodicals for the view that the mention of insurance has little effect upon the jury’s verdict. For example, in Muehlebach v. Mercer Mortuary and Chapel, Inc., 93 Ariz 60, 378 P2d 741, 744 (1963), the court said 'the prejudicial content of a reference to liability insurance is largely a thing of the past. And it has, in part, been made a thing of the past by the expenditure of vast sums of money by insurance companies to educate prospective jurors of the claimed relation between large verdicts and insurance rates.’ "Even without the influence of such advertising it is likely that the average juror would, in most cases, assume that defendant was insured. Wigmore, in advocating the abolition of the nondisclosure rule makes note of this point as follows: " 'In the second place, liability-insurance is made compulsory in many States and for certain classes of liability; hence, in such cases the fact of insurance is notorious under the law. " 'In the third place, and apart from compulsory insurance, the general prevalence of liability insurance for automobile injuries, is known to the jurors; hence for the law to forbid any disclosure of it in the course of the trial seems to be merely a piece of hypocritical futility.’ 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 282a at 146 (3d ed 1940). "This theme runs through a number of the cases criticizing the nondisclosure rule. Thus in Causey v. Cornelius, 164 Cal A”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Fairbrother v. Rinker