Joan Campbell v. American Farmers Mutual Insurance Company, a Corporation, Reorganized School District No. 1 of Gray Ridge, Missouri, and Larry McCoy v. American Farmers Mutual Insurance Company, a Corporation’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

20 federal appellate · 1 district · 8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 36 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Defendants claim that the exclusion clause here under consideration is ambiguous and that accordingly it should be construed most liberally against the insurer who drew the contract. If the clause is ambiguous, it should be most liberally construed in favor of the insured, but where the language is plain and unequivocal the words used must be given their usual and natural meaning and there is no room for construction. See Gage v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., supra [Mo.App., 273 S.W.2d 761 ]. A reading of the clause in question convinces us that it is without ambiguity and that this court is without authority to rewrite the terms, thereof to arrive at a conclusion more favorable to the insured than the plain language of the contract, permits.” Campbell v. American Farmers Mutual Insurance Co., 238 F.2d 284, 288 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. City of Poplar Bluff v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. · 160 F. Supp. 337 - Clinchfield Railroad v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.

2. ““Here the boys had no other means of getting to the slab pile and their transportation back and forth was contemplated in the contract of employment and was a necessary part of the insured’s business.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. James Q. Bryan and Gratha Bryan v. The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company · James Q. Bryan and Gratha Bryan v. The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company

3. “"* * * Generally speaking, it is the scope of the contract of employment which furnishes the determinative test of whether such an accident is one for compensation. In other words, it is the contract of employment, and not the actual commencement of labor, which establishes the relationship of the parties under the act. If the right to tranportation is given, either positively or inferentially, by the terms of the contract, the employment begins when the employee boards the bus to go to the scene of his labor; it continues throughout the entire period of transportation; and it terminates when he leaves the bus at his home. If the contract provides in express terms for transportation, there is but small room for controversy, but, where its provisions are to be implied from the nature and circumstances of the employment, many considerations may be involved, such as whether the furnishing of transportation was merely an act of courtesy, wholly disassociated and disconnected from the relationship of master and servant; whether the employee received pay for the time spent on the bus; whether the furnishing of transportation was with the knowledge and acquiescence of the employer; and whether the course of the employment may extend beyond the hours of the servant's actual labor, and to places other than the premises upon which his labor is performed. "* * * [T]hat transportation to and from work may well be one of the incidents of the employment, and an accessory, collateral, or su”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Turnage v. State Farmers Mutual Tornado Insurance Co. of Missouri