238 Ga. App. 206 - State v. Folk’s Empirical Analysis
1999
Citation profile
54 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 54 later decisions — most recently June 2019 · most notably Woodard v. State (2015), 244 Ga. App. 833 - Patman v. State (2000)
54 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 226 Ga. App. 714 - McClain v. State · 189 Ga. App. 519 - O'KEEFE v. State · 170 Ga. App. 837 - Moran v. State · 213 Ga. App. 793 - Roundtree v. State · 129 Ga. App. 118 - Brewer v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 54 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“A first-tier encounter never intrudes upon any constitutionally protected interest since the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to eliminate all contact between police and citizens, but simply to prevent arbitrary and oppressive police interference with the privacy and personal security of individual citizens. Verhoeff [v. State, 184 Ga. App. 501, 503 ( 362 SE2d 85 ) (1987)]. On the other hand, a second-tier encounter may violate the Fourth Amendment if the officer briefly “stops” or “seizes” a citizen without reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that a citizen is involved in criminal activity.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“[t]he odor of burning marijuana emanating from the interior of an occupied vehicle provides a strong indication that the vehicle contains illegal contraband. We previously have found the “alert” of a trained narcotics dog, standing alone, sufficient to provide probable cause for the search of a vehicle. ... [A] trained police officer’s perception of the odor of burning marijuana, provided his ability to identify that odor is placed into evidence, [also] constitutes sufficient probable cause to support the warrantless search of a vehicle.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“[A] trained police officer's perception of the odor of burning marijuana, provided his ability to identify that odor is placed into evidence, constitutes sufficient probable cause to support the warrantless search of a vehicle.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.