¶1 The testimony indicating that the defendant intentionally struck Thomas sometime after they reached the police station and that her sole object in so doing was to vent her spleen upon him suffices to overcome the general motion for a compulsory nonsuit and to support a conviction for simple assault. For this reason, we by-pass without discussion or decision the question debated by counsel whether or not the State’s evidence compels the single conclusion that Thomas arrested the defendant without authority of law and that consequently the blows she struck in resistance to her arrest were justified.
¶2 "We made this observation in the recent case of S. v. Albarty, ante, 130, 76 S.E. 2d 381: “There can be no valid trial, conviction, or punishment for a crime without a formal and sufficient accusation. As a consequence, it is impossible to overmagnify the necessity of observing the rules of pleading in criminal cases. The first rule of pleading in criminal cases is that the indictment or other accusation must inform the court and the accused with certainty as to the exact crime the accused is alleged to have committed.”
¶3*395 Scant beed was paid to tbe rules of pleading in criminal cases in tbe preparation of tbe warrant in tbe instant action. To be sure, tbe allegation “that . . . tbe . . . defendant (Evella Thorne) unlawfully, willfully violated tbe laws of North Carolina . . . by . . . assault on . . . one Harvey Thomas” is sufficient to charge a simple assault. This is so because it charges that offense “with such a degree of certainty and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to comprehend tbe charge, and tbe court to pronounce judgment on tbe conviction according to tbe law of tbe case, and tbe accused to plead an acquittal or conviction on it in bar of another prosecution for tbe same offense.” 6 O. J.S., Assault and Battery, section 104.
¶4 Tbe warrant is fatally defective in all other respects.
¶5 Tbe allegation “that . . . tbe . . . defendant unlawfully, willfully violated tbe laws of North Carolina ... by disorderly conduct by using profane and indecent language” imputes no crime to tbe accused. Tbe phrase “disorderly conduct,” standing alone, does not denote an offense known to tbe general law of tbe State. S. v. Myrick, 203 N.C. 8, 164 S.E. 328; S. v. Sherrard, 117 N.C. 716, 23 S.E. 157. Tbe allegation cannot be construed to charge tbe statutory crime denounced by G.S. 14-197 in these words: “If any person shall, on any public road or highway and in tbe bearing of two or more persons, in a loud and boisterous manner, use indecent or profane language, be shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not exceeding fifty dollars or imprisoned not exceeding thirty days.” It omits at least three elements of tbe statutory offense. It fails to state that tbe defendant used indecent or profane language (1) on a public road or highway, or (2) in tbe bearing of two or more persons, or (3) in a loud and boisterous manner. S. v. Shands, 88 Miss. 410, 40 So. 1005; 72 C.J.S., Profanity, section 4.
¶6 This brings us to tbe allegation “that . . . tbe . . . defendant unlawfully, willfully violated tbe laws of North Carolina . . . by . . . resisting arrest.” There is no validity in tbe contention of tbe State that this allegation imputes to tbe accused a violation of G-.S. 14-223, which specifies that “if any person shall willfully and unlawfully resist, delay or obstruct a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of bis office, be shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” A similar contention was expressly rejected in tbe recent case of S. v. Raynor, 235 N.C. 184, 69 S.E. 2d 155, where a similar allegation was adjudged “wholly insufficient to support tbe verdict and judgment rendered.”
¶7 In reaching tbe conclusion that tbe warrant does not charge any criminal offense except simple assault, we do not overlook tbe circumstances that tbe solicitor moved tbe court for authority to amend tbe warrant so as “to charge tbe violations in the words of tbe statutes, to-wit, . . . G.S. 14-197 and G.S. 14-223,” and that tbe court allowed tbe motion. These *396 events added nothing whatever to the warrant. The amendments were not actually made. S. v. Moore, 220 N.C. 535, 17 S.E. 2d 660; Sovine v. State, 85 Ind. 576. Since neither the motion nor the order set out the contemplated wording of the proposed amendments, the order allowing the motion to amend was not self-executing. See in this connection: S. v. Yellowday, 152 N.C. 793, 67 S.E. 480, and 42 C.J.S., Indictments and Informations, section 237. The warrant would not be bettered if the words of the motion were inserted in it. S. v. Ballangee, 191 N.C. 700, 132 S.E. 795.
¶8 The defendant did not move in arrest of judgment in the Superior Court or in this Court upon the supposed counts for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest on the ground that the allegations of the warrant relating to these matters do not charge criminal offenses. The respective duties of the Superior Court and this Court under such circumstances are thus stated in S. v. Watkins, 101 N.C. 702, 8 S.E. 346: “It seems that no motion in arrest of judgment was made in the court below, but that court should, in the absence of such motion, have refused to give judgment upon the ground that the offense was not sufficiently charged in the indictment. The court cannot properly give judgment unless it appears in the record that an offense is sufficiently charged. It is the duty of this Court to look through and scrutinize the whole record, and if it sees that the judgment should have been arrested it will, ex mere moiu, direct it to be done.”
¶9 On the charge of simple assault: No error.
¶10 On all other charges: Judgment arrested.