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238 N.C. 656

78 S.E.2d 911

State v. Ferguson

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Decided November 25, 1953

Supreme Court of North Carolina · decided 1953-11-25

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““However, we are constrained to the view that the evidence does not make out a prima jade case against Pringler Ferguson. The evidence is silent in respect to when, where, or under what circumstances Pringler Ferguson entered the car. Nothing is shown respecting his or her relationship or association with the other occupants of the car — it does not even appear whether Pringler Ferguson is male or female. On this record he or she was a mere passenger in the automobile. That is not enough. To hold a mere passenger, knowledge of the presence in the automobile of contraband whiskey is insufficient. S. v. Meyers, supra [ 190 N.C. 239 , 129 S.E. 600 ]. See also S. v. Ham, ante, 94, 76 S.E. 2d 346 . The evidence must be sufficient to support an inference of some form of control, joint or otherwise, over the automobile or the liquor. S. v. Meyers, supra; 48 C.J.S., Intoxicating Liquors, Sections 222 (b), 281, 346 and 376. There is no evidence that Pringler Ferguson had any control whatsoever over either the liquor or the automobile. The evidence does not support the hypothesis of joint possession of the liquor. See S. v. Lee, 164 N.C. 533 , 80 S.E. 405 .””

quoted by 1 later decision, including State v. Godwin

““G.S. 18-6 provides, in so far as is material here, ‘ . . . that nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize any officer to search any automobile or other vehicle or baggage of any person without a search warrant duly issued, except where the officer sees or has absolute personal knowledge that there is intoxicating liquor in such vehicle or baggage.’ (Italics added.) “The uncontradicted evidence here is that Officer Moody stopped the car to make a routine check of the operator’s driver’s license. Following this, the officer saw and had absolute personal knowledge that there was intoxicating liquor in the automobile. This, by virtue of the express language of the statute, G.S. 18-6, dispensed with the necessity of a search warrant.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including State v. Simmons

Relies on State v. Ham · State v. Welch · State v. Elliott

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1953-11-25

How this case has been cited

Cited by 18 later decisions — most recently April 1976

16 state decisions

60195319601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Johnson, J.

¶1 The defendants’ first exception challenges the refusal of the court to grant their motion to suppress the evidence because it was obtained without a search warrant. The exception is untenable.

¶2 G.S. 18-6 provides, in so far as is material here: “. . . that nothing in this section shall he construed to authorize any officer to search any automobile or other vehicle or baggage of any person without a search warrant duly issued, except where the officer sees or has absolute personal knowledge that there is intoxicating liquor in such vehicle or baggage.” (Italics added.)

¶3 The uneontradicted evidence here is that officer Moody stopped the car to make a routine check of the operator’s driver’s license. Following this, the officer saw and had absolute personal knowledge that there was intoxicating liquor in the automobile. This, by virtue of the express language of the statute, G.S. 18-6, dispensed with the necessity of a search warrant.

¶4 We have not overlooked the provisions of Chapter 644, Session Laws of 1951, now codified as a proviso to G.S. 15-27. The pertinent part of this statute is as follows : . Provided, no facts discovered or evidence obtained without a legal search warrant in the course of any search, made under conditions requiring the issuance of a search warrant, shall he competent as evidence in the trial of any action.” (Italics added.)

¶5 It thus appears that this statute, G.S. 15-27, by its express terms contemplates situations in which a search warrant is not necessary to conduct a legal search. Such a situation is presented by the express provisions of G.S. 18-6 where, as here, “the officer sees or has absolute personal knowledge” that there is intoxicating liquor in an automobile under investigation.

¶6 It necessarily follows that the defendants’ exception based on refusal of the court to suppress the evidence must be overruled. Decision here reached is supported by S. v. Harper, 236 N.C. 371, 72 S.E. 2d 871, and cases there cited.

¶7 The defendants’ remaining exception challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to carry the case to the jury over the defendants’ separate motions for judgment as of nonsuit.

¶8 As to the defendant James K. Alexander, the driver, and the defendant Nellie May Ferguson, who owned the automobile, the exception is untenable under application of the principles explained and applied in this line of decisions: S. v. Harper, supra; S. v. Elliott, 232 N.C. 377, 61 S.E. 2d 93; S. v. Meyers, 190 N.C. 239, 129 S.E. 600. See also: S. v. Brown, ante, 260, 77 S.E. 2d 627; S. v. Gibbs, ante, 258, 77 S.E. 2d 779; *659 S. v. Welch, 232 N.C. 77, 59 S.E. 2d 199; S. v. Merritt, 231 N.C. 59, 55 S.E. 2d 804; S. v. Epps, 213 N.C. 709, 197 S.E. 580; S. v. Norris, 206 N.C. 191, 173 S.E. 14.

¶9 However, we are constrained to tbe view that tbe evidence does not make out a prima facie case against Pringler Eerguson. Tbe evidence is silent in respect to wben, where, or under wbat circumstances Pringler Ferguson entered -tbe car. Nothing is shown respecting bis or her relationship or association with tbe other occupants of tbe car — it does not even appear whether Pringler Ferguson is male or female. On this record be or she was a mere passenger in tbe automobile. That is not enough. To bold a mere passenger, knowledge of tbe presence in tbe automobile of contraband whiskey is insufficient. S. v. Meyers, supra (190 N.C. 239). See also S. v. Ham, ante, 94, 76 S.E. 2d 346. Tbe evidence must be sufficient to support an inference of some form of control, joint or otherwise, over tbe automobile or tbe liquor. S. v. Meyers, supra; 48 C.J.S., Intoxicating Liquors, Sections 222 (b), 281, 346 and 376. There is no evidence that Pringler Ferguson bad any control whatsoever over either tbe liquor or tbe automobile. Tbe evidence .does not support tbe hypothesis of joint possession of tbe liquor. See S. v. Lee, 164 N.C. 533, 80 S.E. 405.

¶10 Tbe results, then, are:

¶11 As to tbe defendant Pringler Ferguson: Reversed.

¶12 As.to tbe other defendants: No error.

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