Volume 238 — North Eastern Reporter, Third Series

Osowik - Trial court did err in denying motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. The convictions were supported by sufficient evidence. Claimed prosecutorial misconduct statements during closing arguments were not outcome altering. Judgment affirmed.

Judge Duhart. Assault. Self-defense. Manifest weight of the evidence. Nunc pro tunc.

WEAPONS – HAVING A WEAPON WHILE INTOXICATED – PLAIN ERROR – INTOXICATION – FIREARM – OPERABILITY: The trial court did not commit plain error by admitting the writing on an evidence envelope together with its contents as one exhibit because the writing was not probative of any element of the offense and thus defendant could not have been prejudiced by its admission. Defendant's conviction for having a weapon while under the influence was based on sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where two witnesses opined that defendant was under the influence of alcohol and observed multiple physical indica of intoxication and where the firearm was loaded when it was seized from defendant, a trained police officer opined the firearm was operable at the time of seizure, the firearm was test-fired, and defendant made statements indicating the firearm was operable.

The trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his illegal detention. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's untimely motion to suppress pretrial identification evidence. Because the State presented sufficient evidence to support each of appellant's convictions, double jeopardy does not preclude the State from retrying appellant. Other issues and assignments of error are rendered moot by our determination of the suppression issue related to appellant's illegal detention, which necessitates the reversal of his convictions. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee in this trip and fall case. Appellee did not owe a common-law duty to appellant as to the sidewalk in disrepair because this hazard was open-and-obvious. Nor did appellant demonstrate a duty under City of Columbus ordinances requiring a sidewalk to be properly maintained. A city ordinance that simply requires abutting property owners to maintain and repair sidewalks in accordance with certain standards and criteria does not impose a duty on those owners to pedestrians, but an obligation to assist the city in that maintenance and repair. Judgment affirmed.