¶1specially concurring.
¶2I agree that the words used here were probably not defamatory. However, I concur with the same reservation expressed by Mr. Justice Denecke, in his special concurring opinion in Murphy v. Harty, decided June 17, 1964, found at 238 Or 228, 250, 393 P2d 206, 217.
¶3specially concurring.
¶4I concur in the result reached by the majority, and agree that the writing involved in this case was not defamatory on its face. Therefore it was not libel per se. However, I prefer not to decide in this case whether or not the writing, in all the circumstances, could have been found to be defamatory as libel per quod. (For a discussion of the distinction between libel per se and libel per qiiod, see Prosser, Libel Per *620Quod, 46 Va L Rev 839 (1960), and Prosser, Torts 766, 782, §§ 106, 107 (3d ed 1964).)
¶5Having assumed that in Oregon it is necessary to allege and prove special damages if one seeks redress for a libel that is not defamatory on its face, the appellant has relied entirely on a theory that the publication was defamatory per se. We 'hold that it was not. That is all we should hold in this case.
¶6There is some confusion in the Oregon law as to whether or not it is necessary to allege and prove special damages in order to recover for a libel per quod. The most recent pronouncements of the court suggest that it is necessary to allege and prove special damages. Hudson v. Pioneer Service Co., 218 Or 561, 346 P2d 123 (1959). See also Ruble v. Kirkwood, 125 Or 316, 266 P 252 (1928); Peck v. Coos Bay Times Pub. Co. et al., 122 Or 408, 259 P 307 (1927); cf. Marr et al. v. Putnam et al., 196 Or 1, 246 P2d 509 (1952); Reiman v. Pac. Devel. Society et al., 132 Or 82, 284 P 575 (1930). (And see Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 Va L Rev 839, 846, footnote 50; Dean Carpenter’s discussion of the Oregon decisions in 7 Or L Rev 353 (1928); and Mr. Justice Denecke’s specially concurring opinion in Murphy v. Harty, 238 Or 228, 250, 393 P2d 206, 217 (1964).)
¶7The pleadings in the case at bar, however, do not present a suitable vehicle for the re-examination of the rule that special damages must be shown in order to recover damages for defamation not actionable on its face.