Commonwealth v. Bradshaw

¶1Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by

¶2I agree with the majority’s conclusion in Part I of its opinion that appellant’s attack upon his indictment as duplicitous must fail. I reach that conclusion, however, by a different route than the majority. Part II of what follows, dealing with the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose the whereabouts of an informer, is submitted as a dissent. I express no comment on Part III of the majority’s opinion.

¶3Appellant was arrested on August 19, 1972, and charged with feloniously manufacturing, delivering, or possessing with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance, heroin. Two indictments were returned, and on February 16, 1973, appellant filed a motion attacking the indictments as duplicitous, which was denied. The case proceeded at once to trial before a judge sitting without a jury, and appellant was found guilty on both indictments. Motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial were filed, but the court en banc denied them, Judge Bradley dissenting. Appellant was sentenced to seven years probation on each indictment with the sentences to run concurrently, and this appeal followed.

¶4Willie Davis, a Philadelphia police officer, was the only witness to testify for the Commonwealth. In regard to the first indictment, his testimony may be summarized as follows. On June 26, 1972, he was assigned to investí-*37gate the illegal sale of narcotics in the area of Huntingdon and Sartain Streets in Philadelphia. He was patrolling that area in an unmarked car, accompanied by a confidential informer, when he observed appellant sitting on some steps. Davis had never before seen appellant, but he nevertheless exchanged a few words of greeting with him and told him he wanted to buy “two cops.” Appellant allegedly replied that he had sold his last “cop” but was willing to go with Davis to try to get some. Davis parked his car and started to walk down the street with appellant; the informer remained in the car. At one point appellant entered a variety store and made a telephone call. Shortly thereafter Davis gave appellant twelve dollars, and appellant walked ahead, knocked on the door of a house, remained thirty seconds, and returned with a brown paper bag containing a bundle of glazed paper packets. He gave two of these packets to Davis. Later analysis showed that they contained heroin. On cross-examination, Davis stated that the informer did not speak to appellant. He also stated that the car was not in view when the drugs were delivered to him, even though he and appellant were at most half a block from the car.

¶5In regard to the second indictment, Davis’s testimony may be summarized as follows. On the evening of July 13, 1972, he met appellant and told him he wanted to buy a bundle. Since Davis did not have any money with him, they agreed to meet the next day. Davis returned to the neighborhood the next day, but this time with another plainclothes officer in the car. He met appellant, went for a walk with him, and eventually was told to return to the car, where the other officer was waiting. Appellant came to the car and gave Davis twenty-five glazed paper packets, at least seven of which later analysis showed contained heroin. Davis identified himself as a police officer and tried to arrest appellant. A struggle ensued, and a loud, hostile crowd began to gather. Rather than risk injuring appellant or some bystanders, the officers *38decided not to arrest appellant immediately. He was later arrested on a body warrant.

¶6At the close of the Commonwealth’s case, appellant moved for dismissal of both charges “for lack of necessary witnesses”, arguing that the Commonwealth should be required to disclose the identity and whereabouts of the informer. The motion was denied.

¶7Appellant testified on his own behalf and gave an account quite different from that given by Davis. He stated that on June 26th, one Michael Richardson, obviously the confidential informer, drove up with Officer Davis; that he knew Richardson; and that Richardson got out of the car to speak with him. Appellant was permitted to relate his side of the conversation but not Richardson’s. Appellant “said to him I didn’t know where any narcotics was at that time; that I was waiting around myself because I use stuff and I was waiting to make a purchase myself,” whereupon Richardson got back into the car with Davis and drove off. Appellant specifically denied ever walking away from the car with Davis. As to the second occasion: On July 13th, Davis spotted appellant, said he wanted to see him the next day, and asked if he knew where he could purchase “some stuff.” Appellant said no. The next evening appellant went to a bar with a friend. Richardson was already in the bar, and Davis entered a few minutes later. He admitted speaking with Richardson inside the bar and with Davis outside the bar, but he denied ever selling any heroin to Davis.

¶8I

¶9The first question presented is whether the trial judge erred in denying appellant’s pre-trial motion attacking the indictments as duplicitous. The two indictments are identical except for the date of the alleged offense. Each contains only one count:

That, on or about., in Philadelphia County, ROBERT BRADSHAW ALSO KNOWN AS *39MELVIN JENKINS, JR., feloniously did manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance, to wit: a narcotic drug classified under Schedule I or II, to wit: heroin.

¶10Appellant concedes that these incidents were drawn precisely in the language of the statute,1 but argues nevertheless that the statute creates three separate crimes, the manufacture of a controlled substance, the delivery of a controlled substance, and the possession with the intent to manufacture or to deliver a controlled substance, and that the joinder of these crimes in a single count makes an indictment duplicitous and insufficiently specific.

¶11It has long been recognized that two or more distinct and unconnected offenses should be charged in separate counts, and that if charged in a single count, the indictment is duplicitous. Commonwealth v. Morgan, 174 Pa. Superior Ct. 586, 102 A.2d 194 (1954); Commonwealth v. Hall, 23 Pa. Superior Ct. 104 (1903). This requirement has served a dual purpose: it has alerted the defendant to the charges against which he must defend; and it has provided him with the protection of a verdict, whether of guilt or innocence, against a second prosecution. Only one verdict may be returned for each count of an indictment, and if a single count is not specific and charges more than one offense, it is impossible to determine whether the verdict was returned as to one, several, or all offenses, and in turn whether further prosecution on one of the charges is barred. See Commonwealth v. Binns, 54 *40D & C 2d 106 (1972). Early in Pennsylvania common law, however, two exceptions to this general rule were recognized. Our courts allowed two or more separate offenses to be joined in a single count of an indictment if those offenses arose from a single act or transaction. Commonwealth v. Miller, 107 Pa. 276 (1884); Commonwealth v. Sutton, 171 Pa. Superior Ct. 105, 90 A.2d 264 (1952); Commonwealth v. Doran, 145 Pa. Superior Ct. 173, 20 A.2d 815 (1941). Also, when a statute made two or more distinct acts connected with the same transaction indictable and each act could be considered as representing a phase in the same offense, then our courts allowed each to be charged in a single count. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Zeitler, 79 Pa. Superior Ct. 81, 83 (1922), this court refused to quash an indictment as duplicitous when it charged that the defendant had

“operated a motor vehicle upon a public highway and did unlawfully injure the person and property of another person [named], then and there a user of said highway, and that the said defendant did then and there unlawfully fail and neglect to stop the said motor vehicle which he, the defendant, was then and there operating, and did then and there unlawfully fail to render such assistance as was necessary, and did then and there unlawfully fail and neglect to give his name and address to the injured party.”

¶12The relevant statute in that case imposed the duty upon any operator of a motor vehicle who injured the person or property of any other user of the highway to “stop, and render such assistance as may be necessary, and... upon request, [to] give his name and address to the injured party or his proper representative.”2 The defendant argued that the indictment charged three separate offenses under the statute, and therefore three counts were required. The court held, however, that the *41acts charged all represented phases of the same offense, and therefore “under the rules of criminal pleading and the established practice of our courts,” they could all be charged in one count. Id. at 83.

¶13In Commonwealth v. Cese, 176 Pa. Superior Ct. 650, 109 A.2d 228 (1954), the defendant was arrested for violating the gambling laws. One of the statutes involved provided that “[w]hoever, either publicly or privately erects, sets up, opens, makes or draws any lottery... is guilty of a misdemeanor. . . ,”3 The indictment charged that the defendant did “erect and set up” and “open, make, or draw” a lottery. It was the defendant’s contention that each of these acts constituted a separate offense and therefore could not be joined in one count. As in Zeitler, the court rejected this claim. It reasoned: “In this case it is clear that we have joined in one count successive phases of the same offense and for each distinct phase an indictment will lie. However, when the separate offenses are committed by the same person at the same time, as occurred in this case, the separate phases may be included in one count.” Id. at 658, 109 A.2d at 231. See also Commonwealth v. Miller, supra; Commonwealth v. Hall, supra.

¶14For the purposes of the present case, it would seem that Zeitlerand Cesewould be dispositive. Here, as in those cases, we are dealing with a statute that makes each phase of an offense a separate crime and with factual settings concerning only one transaction. Both Zeitlerand Cese, however, were decided before the adoption of Rule 219 (b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure,4 as were the other appellate decisions recognizing this exception to the general duplicity rule. Rule 219 (b) reads:

*42“Two or more offenses, of any grade, other than murder, may be charged in the same indictment if they are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. There shall be a separate count for each offense charged.” [Emphasis added.]

¶15In Commonwealth v. Lee, 454 Pa. 526, 312 A.2d 391 (1973), the Supreme Court said that this rule requires that “ ‘ [t] here shall be a separate count for each offense charged’ even if the same act or transaction is the basis for the separate offenses. To allow count one in this case to serve as the basis for charging offenses under two separate statutes would ... require that Rule 219 (b) be ignored.” Id. at 531, 312 A.2d at 394. Therefore, as of January 1, 1965, the common law exception that separate crimes may be joined in a single count if they arise from the same transaction ceased to be good law, at least when the offenses joined are based on separate statutes. The narrow issue presented in the present case is whether Rule 219(b) also suspended the common law exception dealing with offenses based on a single statute. I think not.

¶16First, to require that each indictable act be listed in a separate count would be to require the grand jury to carve up a statute like the one involved here every time it wished to return an indictment under it. If the legislature wished to have its statutes carved up, it would presumably have done so itself. More specifically, it would not have said that “Every indictment shall be deemed and adjudged sufficient and good in law which charges the crime substantially in the language of the act of the assembly prohibiting the crime....” Act of March 31, 1860, P.L. 427, §11, 19 P.S. §261. Cf., Commonwealth v. Lee, supra.

¶17Second,' and more important, there would be little benefit to the defendant by making such a requirement. *43The joinder of each offense in a single count will not create a danger of later prosecution on one of those offenses. It may be true that when they are so joined, one will not be able to tell of which act the defendant was found guilty. That, however, is of no consequence. In Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432, vacated, 414 U.S. 808 (1973) reh., 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in an exercise of its supervisory powers announced the rule that a prosecutor must bring all known charges arising from a single episode in a single proceeding.5Accord, 18 Pa. C.S. §110(1) (ii). Therefore, in a case like the present one, a second prosecution could not be brought under the same statute, no matter what charges appellant was convicted of at the first trial. It would therefore not matter whether the charges were all listed in one count or separated into three counts.

¶18Finally, any notice problem inherent in joinder can be alleviated by a motion for a bill of particulars. See Pa. R. Crim. P. 221. In Commonwealth v. Simione, 447 Pa. 473, 291 A.2d 764 (1972), the indictment alleged that the defendant “did possess, control, deal in, dispense, sell, deliver, distribute, or traffic in a narcotic drug: to wit: hashish.” The defendant moved for and obtained a bill of particulars, which specifically set forth that he was “charged with the sale of hashish.” In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Supreme Court recognized that the “Commonwealth is restricted to proving what it *44has set forth in the bill,” id. at 477, 291 A.2d at 766, and held that for the conviction to stand, the evidence had to be sufficient to establish that the defendant sold hashish.

¶19Rule 219 (b), therefore, does not suspend the common law rule that when a single statute makes two or more distinct acts indictable, they may be joined in a single count if each act may be considered as a phase in the same offense and if each is connected with the same transaction. Accord, Commonwealth v. Binns, supra. Appellant was therefore properly brought to trial on the indictments returned against him.

¶20II

¶21Appellant also contends that the trial judge committed several reversible errors during the course of his trial. Specifically, he contends that the judge erred in refusing to require disclosure of the whereabouts of the Commonwealth’s confidential informer, in permitting the introduction of appellant’s criminal record, and in refusing to allow appellant to testify what the confidential informer said to him. The majority is of the opinion that the refusal to require disclosure of the informant’s whereabouts was not reversible. I must disagree.

¶22The leading cases are Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) and Commonwealth v. Carter, 427 Pa. 53, 233 A.2d 284 (1967). In Roviaro, the petitioner was convicted of selling heroin to one “John Doe” and transporting it knowing it to be unlawfully imported. Before and during the trial he sought to learn Doe’s identity, but the trial judge refused to compel the government to disclose Doe’s identity because Doe was a police informer. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed. In so doing, it first recognized that in certain cases the government has a privilege to withhold from the defense the identity of police informers. The reason for this rule is that all citizens have an obligation “to communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-en*45forcement officials,” and “preserving their anonymity, encourages them to perform their obligation.” Id. at 59. The Court, however, proceeded to say that this privilege does not have an unlimited scope; rather its applicability depends on the particular circumstances of the case. It then held that in the case before it, the Government’s informer had played such an important part in the alleged criminal act that it was error for the trial judge to permit the Government to withhold his identity. In Carter, an informer introduced an undercover agent to the defendant and an alleged illegal drug sale took place in the informer’s presence. Another agent watched the sale from half a block away. The agents’ identifications of the defendant at trial were based solely on the single meeting. The defendant raised a mistaken identity defense at trial and asked the trial judge to require that the name and address of the informer be disclosed. The judge refused. Relying on Roviaro, our Supreme Court held that disclosure should have been required: “Where the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way. In these situations the trial court may require disclosure and, if the government withholds the information, dismiss the action....” Id. at 59, 233 A.2d at 287, quoting Roviaro v. United States, supra at 60-61.

¶23In Roviaroand Carter, the informer was an eyewitness to the specific criminal transaction. Here, the Commonwealth argues, disclosure was not required because the informer was not an eyewitness. This argument, however, misconstrues the holdings in Roviaroand Carter. In fact, to direct one’s attention to the question of whether the informer was an eyewitness to the crime will in many cases be to misdirect the inquiry. In Carter, the defendant claimed mistaken identity. Therefore, the fact that the informer had witnessed the transaction was important. *46That did not, however, make it essential. In Commonwealth v. Pritchett, 225 Pa. Superior Ct. 401, 812 A.2d 434 (1973), the defendant intended to raise an entrapment defense. Accordingly, we said that the crucial inquiry was not whether the informer had witnessed the sale of the drugs, but whether he could provide testimony that would be relevant to the activities or negotiations that preceded the sale. See also Lopez-Hernandez v. United States, 394 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1968); Gilmore v. United States, 256 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1958). Thus it is not a sine qua non to disclosure that the informer have witnessed the alleged crime. Instead, as was expressly stated in both Roviaroand Carter: “We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s testimony and other relevant factors.” Commonwealth v. Carter, supra at 59, 233 A.2d at 287, quoting Roviaro v. United States, supra at 62.

¶24In the present case, the defense was specific denial. To review the facts: Officer Davis testified in regard to the first transaction that he asked appellant to sell him some drugs, that appellant did not have any with him, but that at appellant’s suggestion, they walked away from the car and appellant got some heroin and sold it to him. Davis admitted that the informer was in his car when he first spoke to appellant, but he testified that the informer took no part in the discussion and could not see him or appellant when the sale was made. Appellant admitted seeing Davis and the informer. He claimed, however, that he spoke with the informer and told him he did not have any narcotics to sell, and that then Davis and the in*47former drove away. He denied ever walking away from the car with Davis. Moreover, according to appellant, it would seem he never even spoke with Davis. The crucial question, therefore, is whose story should be credited.

¶25Carteralso turned on a question of credibility. There the Supreme Court said: “Elemental to our concept of fairness, as well as that embodied in the federal constitution, is the awareness that the testimonial perspective of police officers is conditioned by the ‘often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’ Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 369 (1948). This awareness makes us reluctant to permit the establishment of facts crucial to criminal guilt solely by police testimony based on a single observation where testimony from a disinterested source is available. Thus, while disclosure might not be necessary in a case where police evidence as to crucial facts was corroborated by neutral witnesses, we are unwilling to do so in a case like the instant one.” Id. at 61-62, 233 A.2d at 288.

¶26United States ex rel. Drew v. Myers, 327 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1964) is to the same effect. There, a police officer was walking in Philadelphia with an informer when they came across the defendant. The informer arranged a narcotics sale for the officer with defendant and walked about ten feet away. The trial judge refused to force disclosure of the identity of the informer. On appeal, the Third Circuit stated:

“To engage in a semantic argument whether Irving [the informer] fits within the definition of an eyewitness is to provoke a needless discussion. Although Irving may have been unable to see the claimed passing of the tiny narcotics package between Drew [the defendant] and Harold [the police officer], a conclusion that he was unable to see Drew is untenable. Therefore, whether or not Irving was an eyewitness, what he saw — as it relates to the identity of the individual allegedly conducting the illegal transfer with *48Harold — would appear to make him an essential witness. Calling him could have elicited relevant and material facts contributing to a determination of the truth.... Drew, it is clear, had the right ‘to have all the facts connected with the [alleged illegal possession and sale of narcotics] ... fully and fairly disclosed by the prosecution...” Id. at 179-80 (footnotes omitted).

¶27Thus, it is clear that an informer’s identity and whereabouts must be disclosed when he is the only disinterested witness who can explain, amplify, or controvert the testimony of police officers as to crucial facts. Here, the informer was just such a witness. Davis’s and appellant’s testimony cannot be reconciled. The informer either could have corroborated Davis’s testimony that appellant agreed to make the sale, and walked away from the car with Davis to do so, or he could have corroborated appellant’s testimony that he was unable to sell any drugs. I am therefore of the view that it was error for the trial judge to refuse to compel disclosure.6

¶28The Commonwealth, and Judge PRICE in his opinion, submit that even so, the error was harmless because appellant admits he was aware of the informer’s identity, specifically, that he was a man named Michael Richardson. This does not mean, however, that the nondisclosure was harmless. The very purpose of disclosure is to allow *49the defense to be able to call the person to the witness stand. In order to do this, counsel must know his whereabouts. In Carter, the court did not speak merely of identity, but rather of the “names and whereabouts” of the informer. Commonwealth v. Carter, supra at 60, 233 A.2d at 287. Accord, People v. Diaz, 174 Cal. 2d 799, 345 P. 2d 370 (1959). Here, appellant was in jail from arrest to trial. He knew the informer’s name and his parents’ address. Richardson, however, was not staying with his parents, and appellant did not know where he could be found. He was under the impression that Richardson had left Philadelphia and was living somewhere in New York City. Therefore, the Commonwealth should have been forced to disclose the whereabouts of Richardson, limited of course to the pertinent information in its or its witnesses’ possession. To be classified as “harmless”, the error must be harmless “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1966); Commonwealth v. Davis, 452 Pa. 171, 305 A.2d 715 (1973); Commonwealth v. Pearson, 427 Pa. 45, 233 A.2d 552 (1967). That cannot be said in the circumstances here.7

¶29The only remaining question is whether the failure to disclose should lead to reversal of the convictions on both indictments. So far the discussion has concerned only the *50first sale and the first Indictment. According to Officer Davis’s testimony, the informer was not present at all during the second transaction, which is the subject to the second indictment, and even according to appellant’s testimony, the informer played a far more inconsequential part in this meeting than in the first one. There is a substantial question then whether the reasons proffered for reversal of the one conviction would also require reversal of the second conviction. The second conviction, however, need not be considered as an isolated occurrence. In People v. Williams, 51 Cal. 2d 355, 333 P.2d 19 (1958), the California Supreme Court was presented with an almost identical situation. There the defendant was convicted of selling narcotics on two separate occasions. The informer, though, was only present at the first. The court nevertheless reversed both convictions because the trial judge had refused to compel disclosure of the informer’s identity. In regard to the second sale, the court held:

“Although the informer did not witness the second transaction, it was consummated in reliance upon the prior one, and the theory of the prosecution, as sought to be established by the officer’s testimony, was that the same person, allegedly defendant, committed the two offenses. If the informer had contradicted the officer’s identification of defendant as to the first sale, this would have been highly material evidence to show that the officer was also mistaken in connecting defendant with the second transaction.

“The failure to compel disclosure of the informer’s identity resulted in a miscarriage of justice with respect to both counts.” Id. at 360, 333 P.2d at 22.

¶30This reasoning is both persuasive and applicable to the present case. Here, as in Williams, if the informer had contradicted the officer’s testimony as to the first sale, the officer’s testimony as to the second sale would also have been impugned.

¶31I would therefore reverse the judgments of sentence and award a new trial.