Woodfin v. Bender’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"In the instant case, the parties dispute the proper interpretation of the new salary schedule at issue. In McDowell-Purcell , we held that a writ of mandamus will not lie to compel a State official 'to exercise his discretion and apply the ascertained facts or existing conditions under [a] contract so as to approve payment to [a plaintiff] according to [the plaintiff's] interpretation of the contract rather than his.' 370 So.2d at 944 . Here, the Board members have not exhausted their discretion, and they cannot be compelled to accept the plaintiffs' interpretation of the salary schedule. A suit against the State, i.e., the Board members in their official capacities, is untenable in this case."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Barnhart v. Ingalls · 243 So. 3d 812 - Corley v. Richardson

2. “"[I]t is undisputed that the Bessemer Board members have a statutory duty to pay [the plaintiff] the appropriate salary increase under § 16-22-13.1, Ala. Code 1975. That statute specifically provides that a public school teacher with [the plaintiff's] years of experience being paid under the State minimum-salary schedule shall receive a 5.5% increase in salary beginning with the fiscal year 2000-2001. The basis for this calculation is at issue in this lawsuit. The amount of the salary increase the Bessemer Board members must pay [the plaintiff] involves obedience to the statute; it does not involve any discretion . The Bessemer Board members have a legal duty to pay [the plaintiff] the correctly calculated salary increase under the statute and in doing so they are performing a ministerial act. Therefore, [the plaintiff's] action against the Bessemer Board members in their official capacities is not an action 'against the State' for § 14 purposes; thus, the Bessemer Board members are not entitled to § 14 immunity from [the plaintiff's] action to compel them to fulfill their statutory duty to pay her the appropriate salary increase."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Barnhart v. Ingalls

3. “'In limited circumstances the writ of mandamus will lie to require action of state officials. This is true where discretion is exhausted and that which remains to be done is a ministerial act.' McDowell-Purcell, Inc. v. Bass , 370 So.2d 942 , 944 (Ala. 1979). Under Alabama Department ofTransportation v. Harbert International, Inc. , 990 So.2d 831 (Ala. 2008), and the numerous cases cited in it, ... when a plaintiff seeks payment of money from the State, the 'limited circumstances' in which a writ will lie to compel payment depends on whether the amount sought is 'certain' and the State's obligation to pay is 'undisputed.' If there is doubt as to those, the analysis ends and § 14 bars the action.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 243 So. 3d 812 - Corley v. Richardson