¶1Appellee sued to recover damages for personal injuries received at a public railroad crossing in or near Iowa Park, in Wichita county. He alleged that *350the employés of the railroad company at the time were operating and moving a string of cars along a track over the public crossing in question, which, as the plaintiff was attempting to cross, ran into his automobile, injuring the same to the extent of $350, and also injuring the plaintiff’s shoulder, arm and back, thereby inflicting permanent injuries, with the consequent loss of time, for all of which he claims damages in the sum of $5,000.
¶2As grounds for the recovery, he alleged that the crossing was obscured by a string of cars on either side, and that the employés of the train were negligent in failing to give warning of the approach of the train by blowing the whistle or ringing the bell, and that defendant had placed no watchman at the crossing.
¶3The defendant answered with a general denial, and pleaded contributory negligence, in that the plaintiff had failed to stop, look, and listen for the approaching train; that he was driving on the wrong side of the street, and had failed to use reasonable care in discovering the approaching train before the collision, which it was alleged he could have done by the use of ordinary care in time to have avoided any injury.
¶4Upon the answers of the jury to special issues submitted to them, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $1,500, and the defendant has duly prosecuted this appeal.
¶5The fifth clause of the court’s charge is as follows:
“It was the duty of the defendant and its agents and servants in charge of the train to exercise ordinary care to prevent any accident and consequent injury to persons and vehicles crossing the tracks of the defendant at Iowa Park. The care required is such as a reasonably prudent person would • exercise under the same or similar circumstances, and you are charged that, if you find from the evidence that the defendant’s agents and servants in charge of said train failed to exercise such ordinary care in either or any of the particulars charged in the plaintiff’s petition, then you should answer special issue No. 1 in the affirmative. If you fail to so find, you should answer this issue in the negative. The plaintiff at the time of the injury charged was required likewise to exercise ordinary care for His own personal safety at the railway crossing — that is, such care as a reasonably prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances — and if you find and believe from the evidence that he failed to exercise such care in any or all of the particulars charged in the defendant’s answer, and that such failure on his part was a proximate cause of his injury, and contributed thereto, then you should answer special issue No. 2 in the affirmative. If you fail to so find, you should answer it in the negative.”
¶6After which follows, among others, special issue No. 1, reading as follows:
“Were the defendant’s agents and servants guilty of negligence in the operation of the train or the condition of the crossing where the accident occurred?”
To which the jury answered “Yes.”
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“You are charged that it. was not the duty of .the defendant to- keep a watchman at the crossing in question unless such crossing was peculiarly or extraordinarily dangerous, and, unless you so find, you will not find the defendant guilty .of negligence in this respect.”
¶8We are of the opinion that the defendant was, under the circumstances, entitled to have this charge submitted to the jury. A distinct ground of negligence upon which plaintiff relied for recovery was a failure of the defendant to keep a watchman at the crossing in question, and, by a reading of special issue No. 1 in connection with the fifth paragraph of the court’s charge, it may be seen that the jury were given the opportunity at least to consider and to affirm negligence on the part of the railroad company because of the failure to keep a watchman at the crossing. The evidence shows without dispute that no watchman in fact had been placed at this crossing, and it therefore became important to the defendant that the jury receive a proper instruction embodying the law relating to the subject.
¶9* This court, in discussing the duties of railroad companies relative to crossings in the case of C., R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Shockley (Tex. Civ. App.) 214 S. W. 716, had occasion to say this:
“The testimony introduced upon that issue is referred to in the opinion in the other case, but we are of the opinion that upon another trial the court should, in the charge submitting that issue, embody the idea that the duty to keep a watchman at a public crossing is not applicable except when such crossings are peculiarly or extraordinarily dangerous.”
¶10It was said upon the subject in Galveston-Houston Electric Ry. Co. v. Patella (Tex. Civ. App.) 222 S. W. 615, that:
“It seems to be settled by the authorities that railroad companies and street car companies can only be held negligent for failure to keep a watchman or maintain other warning devices at crossings where the circumstances surrounding the same are such as to make such crossing extra hazardous or extra dangerous.”
¶11See, also, Tisdale v. Panhandle & S. F. Ry. Co. (Tex. Com. App.) 228 S. W. 133.
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¶15The defendant also assigns error to the action of the court in refusing some 11 special instructions, the submission of which was requested. These instructions relate to the several grounds upon which the defendant’s plea' of contributory negligence is based. The several grounds of negligence were in fact submitted in the form of special issues, as requested by the defendant. But the special instructions to the refusal of which objection is made are explanatory of such special issues. To illustrate, we will give one of the special instructions which the court refused, to wit:
“You are instructed that, if you believe from the evidence that the said J. 0. Hodges approached said crossing on the occasion of his injuries, if any, without looking or listening for the approach of a train, and you further believe from the evidence that by looking or listening he would have seen or heard said train in timé to have prevented Ms injuries, if any, and you further believe that a man of ordinary prudence would, under the same or similar circumstances, have looked or listened for the approach of a train, then you are instructed to answer issue No. 2 ‘Yes,’ and this would be true even though you may believe from the evidence that there were no whistles or bells or other signals given to announce the approach of the train, and that the train was being operated in a negligent manner.”
¶16It may be true, as we are inclined to hold, that the defendant is entitled to have an affirmative presentation of his defenses, even in cases submitted upon special issues, but we find no error in the rulings indicated last above. The court in his charge instructed the jury that the plaintiff was required to exercise at the crossing ordinary care for his own personal safety, and that, if the jury found from the evidence that he failed to exercise such care “in any or all of the particulars charged in the defendant’s answer,” and that such failure was a proximate cause of his injury, and contributed thereto, then they should' answer special issue No. 2 in the affirmative, issue No. 2 being an inquiry as to whether the plaintiff had been guilty of contributory negligence. As already stated, the court submitted some ten or more special issues requested by the defendant. We will illustrate all by quoting one, to wit:
“You will please answer the following issues: First. Bearing in mind the charges on contributory negligence, find whether or not the plaintiff ‘ was guilty of contributory negligence in driving his automobile at the time and just *352prior to the accident at the rate of speed that he did drive the same. Answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ ”
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¶19For the error of the court, however, first discussed, it is ordered that the judgment be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.
¶20@=oFor other eases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
¶21On Motion for Rehearing.
¶22It is not at all clear to our minds that it is necessary to say more than what we directly and by necessary implication said in 'our original opinion, but appellant’s counsel have presented such an extended motion for rehearing, and argue it with such earnestness, that it may not be amiss to make the effort to amplify somewhat.
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¶24The special charges contained in that case were two, reading as follows:
“(1) You are- instructed that if you believe from the evidence that said Claude Harrington approached said crossing on the occasion of his death without looking or listening for the approach of a train, and you further believe from the evidence that by looking or listening he would have seen or heard sdid train in time to have prevented his injury and death, and ■ you further believe that a man of ordinary prudence would, under the .same or similar *353circumstances, have looked or listened for the approach of a train, then you are instructed to answer questions Nos. 6, 7 and 8, ‘Yes,’ and this would be true even though you may believe from the evidence that there were no whistles or other signals given to announce the approach of the train, and that the train was being operated in a negligent manner.
“(2) You are instructed that,' if you believe from' the evidence that the view of the crossing and the approaching train were either wholly or partially obstructed, and you further believe that the deceased did not reduce the speed of his automobile to 6 miles an hour or less at a point not nearer than 30 feet from said track, and that such failure was the proximate cause of his death, you will answer questions Nos. 6, 7, and 8 ‘Yes,’ and this would'be true even though you believe from the evidence that no signals were given announcing the approach of the train, and that the train, was being otherwise operated in a negligent manner.”
¶25An analysis of the ^opinion, we think, will show that the Commission held that the issue of proximate cause was one for the jury, and that the special charges took that issue away from the jury, and this, we think, is evident when special issues 6, 7, and 8 are examined with the special charges requested. For, as argued by the court in that case, even though the jury should find in answer to questions 6 and 7 that Harrington did some act that contributed to his injury, and that such act was negligent, nevertheless, in order for such finding to require a verdict for the defendant, it was necessary for the jury to go further and find whether such negligence .was the proximate cause of his injury. As we construe the opinion, this was the essential ground of the Commission’s holding. It is true there is in discussing the charges some general language used that, if misapplied, could perhaps be construed as condemning the charge we now have under consideration, but by such language we do not understand that it was the purpose of the Commission to condemn proper definitions and explanations in cases submitted on special issues. We have never understood it to be improper in a case submitted upon speciál issues for the court to define the terms “negligence,” “contributory negligence,” “burden of proof,” etc. That was done in the Harrington Case, as well as in the case herg, and no objection appears to have been taken.
¶26The statute (Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St.) article 1984a, among other things specifically declares that:
“In submitting special issues the court shall submit such explanations and definitions of legal terms as shall be necessary to enable the jury to properly pass upon and render a verdict on such issues.”
¶27In M. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Evans, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 68, 41 S. W. 81, writ refused, it was held by this court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Tarleton, that it was not error for the court to define the term “acquiesce,” as used in the lower court’s charge.
¶28In Salado College v. Davis, 47 Tex. 131, in an action for unlawfully overflowing the lands of plaintiff, it was held that it was the duty of the court to instruct the jury as to the meaning of the word “overflow.”
¶29In G. H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. De Castillo (Tex. Civ. App.) 83 S. W. 25, it was held error to refuse an instruction defining “contributory negligence.”
¶30In a recent case by this court (Norton v. Houston [Tex. Civ. App.] 235 S. W. 963), in which a will was contested on the ground, among other things, of undue influence, we held that the court committed reversible error in failing to explain what was meant by “undue influence,” even though in that case no special instruction on the subject was requested.
¶31In Davis v. Hardwick, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 71, 94 S. W. 359, it was held that it was error for the court to fail to explain “what would amount to conversion.” In disposing of the question, we said:
“We conclude that, under the peculiar facts of this case, the charge as a whole presented a misleading view, and that the specific objections above named are well taken. A failure of the court to define terms used in his charge will not ordinarily require a reversal. But this is not a rule of universal application. The duty of the court is to ‘so frame the charge as to distinctly separate the questions of law from the questions of fact’ and ‘instruct the jury as to the law arising on the facts.’ Rev. St. 1895, art. 1317. In cases where terms embody conclusions of law and when, as we think is ’the case here, a failure to explain or properly apply terms used in a charge is calculated to mislead a jury, or to induce a verdict predicated upon a misunderstanding of the proper application to be' given to such terms, the court will reverse. Harrison v. Houston (Tex. Civ. App.) 91 S. W. 647.”
¶32What we said in the case last cited has, we think, application to the one now under consideration.
¶33One of the specific acts of negligence, alleged in the plaintiff’s petition was:
“Plaintiff further alleges that defendant negligently and carelessly failed to keep a watchman at said crossing as it in duty bound was required to do.”
¶34And in the fifth clause of the charge the jury were plainly instructed that, if they should find that the servants in charge of the train “failed to exercise such ordinary care in ■ either. or any of the particulars charged in the plaintiff’s petition, then you should answer special issue No. 1 in the affirmative,” special issue No. 1 reading, as set out in our original opinion:
“Were the defendant’s agents and servants guilty of negligence in the operation of the train, or the condition of the crossing where the accident occurred.”
¶35*354The condition of the crossing, as alleged, consisted of the fact that several strings of cars had been switched and left on each side of the crossing, and the further fact that no watchman had been placed at said point. The conclusion seems almost irresistible that under the charge the jury could, and very probably did, consider the failure of the defendant to have a watchman at the crossing negligent, under the circumstances, and, if so, they could very readily have answered issue No. 1 in the affirmative, regardless of their findings upon any other issue of negligence alleged or submitted. Under such circumstances, as we originally stated, we think it was the defendant’s right to have the law relating to that subject explained. For it is undoubtedly true that the duty of the railroad company to maintain a watchman at crossings does not apply except where the circumstances surrounding the same are such as to make such crossings “extra hazardous or extra dangerous.”
¶36In addition to the authorities cited in our original opinion in support of this 'proposision, see, also, M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Magee, 92 Tex. 616, 50 S. W. 1013; M. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Hurdle (Tex. Civ. App.) 142 S. W. 992; Central Tex. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Gibson (Tex. Civ. App.) 83 S. W. 862; M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Bratcher, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 10, 118 S. W. 1091.
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