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← 239 F.3d 626 - Spencer v. Sutton

Spencer v. Sutton’s Empirical Analysis

239 F.3d 626 · 2001

Citation profile

31
cited by 31 later decisions
1
states following
September 2021
most recently cited

8 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 31 later decisions — most recently September 2021 · most notably Kenneth Bernard Rouse v. R.C. Lee, Warden, Central Prison, Raleigh, North Carolina (2003), Lookingbill v. Cockrell (2002)

8 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions

270200120102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Brady v. State of Maryland · Slack v. McDaniel · Thompson v. Immigration and Naturalization Service · Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd. · Wolfsohn v. Hankin

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “is appropriate when, but only when, `extraordinary circumstances beyond [the petitioner's] control prevented him from complying with the statutory time limit.'”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “... equitable tolling is available only in `those rare instances where — due to circumstances external to the party's own conduct — it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against the party and gross injustice would result.'”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “the district court erred [rather than abused its discretion] in not tolling the statute of limitations for the entire period from Spencer's initial filing of his second MAR on April 23, 1997, until its final disposition on January 13, 1999”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.