¶1delivered the opinion of the court:
¶2In November 1991, the State charged defendant, Jerry J. Jackson, with resisting a peace officer (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 31—1). In February 1992, defendant pleaded guilty to that charge in exchange for the State’s agreement to dismiss an unrelated felony charge of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. The parties had no agreement as to any sentence that they would recommend be imposed. The court allotted the matter for sentencing hearing on March 9, 1992.
¶3On that date, defendant failed to appear, but the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing anyway. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court sentenced defendant to 364 days in jail and asked defendant’s counsel if she wanted a notice of appeal filed on behalf of her client. She responded, “I suppose that would be appropriate.” Later that same day, the court entered a written order directing the circuit clerk to prepare and file a notice of appeal on defendant’s behalf and appointing the office of the State Appellate Defender as counsel for defendant.
¶4On March 31, 1992, the circuit clerk filed a notice of appeal for defendant. On April 3, 1992, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the sentence, alleging that (1) the court erred in sentencing him in absentia, and (2) his sentence was excessive. On April 23, 1992, the trial court conducted a hearing on that motion and held that it had lost jurisdiction to consider the motion because of the filing of the notice of appeal. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in refusing to hear defendant’s motion to reconsider. We hold that it did not and affirm.
¶5 In general, the filing of a notice of appeal is the only jurisdictional step required to perfect an appeal, and that filing deprives the trial court of jurisdiction. (People v. Jones (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 268, 283, 472 N.E.2d 455, 462; People ex rel. Carey v. Scotillo (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 170, 175-76, 417 N.E.2d 1356, 1359; 134 Ill. 2d R. 606(a).) However, Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (134 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) requires a defendant who wishes to appeal a guilty plea to first file a motion to withdraw it. (People v. Wilk (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 93, 107, 529 N.E.2d 218, 223.) Further, a defendant who wishes to appeal only the sentence imposed upon his guilty plea need not file a motion to withdraw the plea; instead, he should file a written motion attacking the sentence prior to appealing. People v. Wallace (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 59, 61, 570 N.E.2d 334, 335; Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 110, 529 N.E.2d at 224.
¶6 We hold that the trial court correctly determined that the filing of the notice of appeal deprived it of jurisdiction. When the court so ruled, perhaps defense counsel should have filed a motion to withdraw the notice of appeal, as well as motions for other relief, in order to comply with the requirements of the supreme court in Wilk and Wallace. However, defense counsel took no further action, and part of the difficulty counsel had with determining what procedural steps to take might have resulted from defendant’s failure to previously appear as the court directed. In a different context regarding defendants who fail to appear when directed, this court wrote the following:
“[Defendants who wilfully choose to disregard court orders to appear at trial or sentencing hearings are entitled to no succor or sympathy from the trial courts or this court. …
… ‘The loss to the defendant of benefits otherwise available [such as consulting with his counsel about post-sentencing strategies] may be viewed as one additional cost of his wilful failure to appear … as directed.’ ” People v. Burcham (1991), 208 Ill. App. 3d 939, 943, 566 N.E.2d 832, 835.
¶7 As a last matter, we note that after the trial court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to entertain defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence, it referred to its earlier remarks at the March 9, 1992, hearing in which it addressed the Wallace case as follows:
“Even though you have a right to file a motion to reconsider, that would be a useless act on your part, because based upon the evidence before me, I would reimpose the same sentence and reaffirm the sentence that I imposed of the 364 days in jail in this matter, plus costs. I am not sure, with me having said that, that a motion to reconsider is a condition precedent.” (Emphasis added.)
¶8We point out that the “useless act” the trial court referred to is one which the Illinois Supreme Court, in its wisdom, has deemed mandatory. (See Wallace, 143 Ill. 2d at 61, 570 N.E.2d at 335; Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 103, 529 N.E.2d at 221 (“[a]t the risk of stating the obvious, it should be pointed out that the rules adopted by this court … are in fact rules of procedure and not suggestions”).) Accordingly, we hold it is error for a trial court to prejudge the matter, as attempted here, in an effort to short-circuit the requirements of supreme court rules. Motions to reconsider remain conditions precedent.
¶9For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶10Affirmed.