State v. Ransom’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 30 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Ordinarily a person intends all of the usual consequences of his voluntary acts. This inference may be considered by you along with all the other evidence in the case. You may accept or reject it in determining whether the State has met its burden to prove the required criminal intent of the defendant. This burden never shifts to the defendant.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 13 Kan. App. 2d 609 - State v. DeVries · State v. Hartfield

2. ““After the briefs were filed in this case, the United States Supreme Court announced its opinion in Francis v. Franklin [citation omitted], and diligent counsel for the appellant have called that case to our attention as well as á mofe recent case of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which we will discuss later in this opinion. In Francis , the court stated the issue before it as follows: ‘This case requires that we decide whether certain jury instructions in a criminal prosecution in which intent is an element of the crime charged and the only contested issue at trial satisfy the principles of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 61 L. Ed. 2d 39 , 99 S. Ct. 2450 (1979). Specifically, we must evaluate jury instructions stating that: (1) “[t]he acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the product of a person’s will, but the presumption may be rebutted” and (2) “[a] person of sound mind and discretion is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts, but the presumption may be rebutted.” App. 8a-9a. The question is whether these instructions, when read in the context of the jury charge as a whole, violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement that the State prove every element of a' criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.’ 471 U.S. at 309 . ( 85 L. Ed. 2d at 350 .) “It is interesting to note that intent was not only an element of the crime charged but ‘the only contested issue at trial.’ The court noted”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Stone

3. ““The finding of unavailability of a witness is entirely within the court’s discretion. State v. Waite, Heard and Heard, 223 Kan. 337, 341 , 574 P.2d 1368 (1978); see State v. Alderdice, 221 Kan. 684, 687 , 561 P.2d 845 (1977). In Reich v. Reich, 235 Kan. 339, 343 , 680 P.2d 545 (1984), quoting Stayton v. Stayton, 211 Kan. 560, 562 , 506 P.2d 1172 (1973), the court said: ‘ “Judicial discretion is abused when judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable, which is another way of saying the discretion is abused only where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion. All judicial discretion may thus be considered as exercisable only within the bounds of reason and justice in the broader sense, and only to be abused when it plainly overpasses those bounds.” ’ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Johnson